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Regional Energy Governance and U.S.
Carbon Emissions
Hannah J. Wiseman** & Hari M. Osofsky*
The U.S. Environmental Protection Agency’s final rule that limits carbon
dioxide emissions from existing power plants—the Clean Power Plan—is an
environmental regulation that powerfully influences energy law and forms a
key part of the U.S. plan to meet its voluntary international commitments under
the December 2015 Paris Agreement on climate change. Even if portions of the
Plan are ultimately struck down, almost any viable pathway to lower carbon
emissions will require greater integration of these two areas of law to address
the large percentage of U.S. emissions from the energy sector. This integration
produces both challenges and opportunities for governance. The Clean Power
Plan (or similar regulations likely to be promulgated under the Clean Air Act
in the future) must rely on an environmental-law cooperative federalist
implementation structure in which states implement federal standards.
However, electricity markets and governance are highly regional, and
numerous studies show the economic benefits of interstate coordination,
whether through governmental cooperation or trading among utilities. The
project of energy-environment integration will benefit from existing regional
energy-based institutions that already integrate electricity sources from
different states. But it will require enhancement of existing regional
approaches to generation capacity planning and transmission expansion, the
interconnection of generators to lines, and energy markets. It also will require
more interstate, state-regional-federal, and interregional cooperation.
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This Article systematically explores the opportunities for implementation
of U.S. carbon emissions regulation presented by regional energy governance,
using the Clean Power Plan as a case study. The Plan is not only the most
ambitious effort at energy-environment integration to date, but also illustrates
the need for enhanced regional governance. The Plan’s many options for
interstate coordination—from multistate plans to utility trading—do not ensure
alignment with existing regional markets because coordination will be difficult
for states that choose different approaches to emissions accounting. The Article
provides a timely analysis of (1) why enhanced regional governance of carbon
emissions is needed, (2) what barriers it faces and opportunities it presents,
and (3) how states could build from existing regional approaches in other
contexts to create new mechanisms for cooperation and enhance regional
governance structures. Addressing these governance issues effectively in the
transition to a lower carbon economy will reduce the implementation costs of
carbon emissions reduction and improve the reliability of the electricity system.
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INTRODUCTION
In 2015, the U.S. Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) took a
substantial step toward addressing climate change by promulgating a final rule
called the Clean Power Plan (CPP) that adds to a growing set of greenhouse gas
regulations under the Clean Air Act.1 This regulation—aimed at reducing
existing power plants‘2 CO2 emissions to 68 percent of 2005 levels by 2030—
continues, and to some degree hastens,3 an ongoing domestic energy transition4
away from coal and toward more natural gas and renewables.5 The CPP
attempts to achieve this goal by bringing together a cooperative federalist
system of environmental law, which relies on state implementation of federal
standards, with a largely regional system of energy markets.6 This melding of
two different governance structures occurs because the CPP‘s environmental
goal—a substantial reduction of CO2 emissions—can only be realistically
achieved by changing energy generation practices, specifically, by decreasing
the amount of high-carbon fuels burned to produce electricity, and increasing
the use of zero- and lower-carbon fuels.7
1. Carbon Pollution Emission Guidelines for Existing Stationary Sources: Electric Utility
Generating Units, 80 Fed. Reg. 64,662 (Oct. 23, 2015) (to be codified at 40 C.F.R. pt. 60) [hereinafter
―Clean Power Plan‖].
2. The CPP applies to steam-fired and stationary combustion turbine power plants for which
construction had commenced as of January 8, 2014. Id. at 64,715–16. Steam-fired plants burn fossil fuel
to heat up water, which turns a turbine that produces electricity. Id. at 64,716. Stationary combustion
turbines use the exhaust from burning natural gas to turn a turbine; combined-cycle stationary turbines
use the exhaust to turn a turbine and the heat from the exhaust to produce steam that also turns a turbine.
Id. The same day that it released the CPP for existing power plants, the EPA also released a final rule
that regulates carbon emissions from newly constructed plants. See Standards of Performance for
Greenhouse Gas Emissions from New, Modified, and Reconstructed Stationary Sources: Electric Utility
Generating Units, 80 Fed. Reg. 64,510 (Oct. 23, 2015) (to be codified at 40 C.F.R. pts. 60, 70, 71, 98).
3. Many coal plants already were nearing retirement when the EPA finalized the CPP. See David
E. Adelman & David B. Spence, Cost-Benefit Politics in U.S. Energy Policy 24, 30–35 (KBH Energy
Ct. Research Paper No. 2015-12, 2015), http://kbhenergycenter.utexas.edu/files/2015/08/Cost-BenefitPolitics-in-U.S.-Energy-Policy (in addressing the mercury, interstate pollution, and CPP rules, noting
that ―most of the generating plants projected to retire in response to these rules are old plants, at or near
the end of their useful lives, that pollute at higher rates,‖ although noting various RTO and ISO concerns
about how the rules might hasten certain plant retirements and require substantial changes in
transmission to accommodate new generation).
4. Clean Power Plan, supra note 1, at 64,678, 64,736 n.384.
5. Id. at 64,667.
6. For discussions of previous ways in which environmental and energy law have been brought
together and some of the complexities of doing so, see Lincoln L. Davis, Alternate Energy and the
Energy-Environment Disconnect, 46 IDAHO L. REV. 473 (2010); Alexandra B. Klass, Climate Change
and the Convergence of Environmental and Energy Law, 24 FORDHAM ENVTL. L. REV. 180 (2013); see
also infra notes 7–11.
7. Air pollution laws historically have focused on the electricity sector, but none have focused
on the fuels used to produce electricity as much as the CPP. Rather, compliance with many previous
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The CPP is only one page within what is certain to be a long saga of
federal carbon-based regulatory approaches. Even if the U.S. Supreme Court
ultimately reverses the rule or portions of it, the Court already has made clear
that carbon can be regulated under the Clean Air Act.8 The EPA likely will use
similar regulatory strategies in the future, whether building upon the CPP or
modifying its approach to address any legal constraints that might emerge.
Regardless of the ultimate strategy taken, any viable approach to reducing U.S.
carbon emissions will have to integrate energy and environmental law to
address the substantial emissions from the energy sector.9 Further, the
expansion of renewable energy as a result of economic forces and state and
local renewable energy requirements is already requiring energy law to evolve
in response to these environmental initiatives10—an evolution explored in
depth in this Article.
Other environmental laws have brought together the energy and
environmental fields, both at the federal and state levels,11 but U.S. governance
regulations issued under the Clean Air Act entailed installing equipment at plants that ―scrubbed‖ or
otherwise removed pollutants from the pollution stream, although federal air quality standards did take
into account reductions in emissions achievable by burning cleaner fuels. Under these standards, states
have the option of requiring power plants to change the fuels that they use or to change other processes
at the plant in lieu of or in addition to installing pollution control technology. See, e.g., Clean Air Act,
42 U.S.C. § 7475(a)(4) (2012) (requiring that entities constructing new stationary sources of air
pollutants built in attainment areas—areas with relatively clean air—first show that ―the proposed
facility is subject to the best available control technology‖ for each regulated pollutant); § 7479
(defining ―best available control technology‖ as ―an emission limitation based on the maximum degree
of reduction of each pollutant . . . which the permitting authority . . . determines is achievable . . .
through application of production processes and available methods, systems, and technologies,
including . . . clean fuels, or treatment of innovative fuel combustion techniques for control of each such
pollutant‖); cf. Clean Power Plan, supra note 1, at 64,689 (―CO2 is an inherent product of clean, efficient
combustion of fossil fuels, and therefore is an unavoidable product generated in enormous quantities‖).
8. See generally Massachusetts v. EPA, 549 U.S. 497 (2007). For more discussion of the CPP
litigation, see infra Part II.C.1.
9. EPA, INVENTORY OF U.S. GREENHOUSE GAS EMISSIONS AND SINKS: 1990–2013, 2-3–2-4
(2015),
http://www3.epa.gov/climatechange/Downloads/ghgemissions/US-GHG-Inventory-2015Chapter-2-Trends.pdf (showing greenhouse gas emissions from fossil fuel combustion as the largest
contributor to U.S. emissions, and power sector emissions as the largest contributor within the fossil fuel
combustion category).
10. See infra notes 36–37.
11. Numerous federal Clean Air Act standards that reduce emissions of pollutants like sulfur
dioxide and mercury apply to the power sector because this sector is the largest emitter of these
pollutants. EPA, Sulfur Dioxide, http://www3.epa.gov/airquality/sulfurdioxide/ (―The largest sources of
SO2 emissions are from fossil fuel combustion at power plants (73 [percent]) and other industrial
facilities (20 [percent]).‖); Basic Information About Mercury, EPA, http://www2.epa.gov/mercury/basicinformation-about-mercury#airemissions (last updated Oct. 19, 2015) (―In the United States, power
plants that burn coal to create electricity account for about half of all manmade mercury emissions.‖).
Requirements for reducing emissions of these pollutants from power plants take into account certain
energy-based considerations, such as whether the operation of pollution-reducing equipment will be so
energy-intensive that the benefits of the equipment will be largely offset by increased electricity
generation to power the equipment. See, e.g., §§ 7475 (a)(4), 7479 (3). Further, states that determine
which types of generation electric utilities may build and which costs these utilities may recover from
retail customers consider utilities‘ costs of complying with federal and state environmental laws, and the
states typically allow utilities to recover these costs. Public utility and service commissions‘
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of carbon emissions from power plants expands this historic integration through
its holistic approach to electricity production.12 The CPP‘s approach requires
states and regional grid operators to grapple with the multi-level electricity
governance structures involved in the generation and sale of electricity and its
transmission through the electric grid. The target of the CPP or of similar
regulation that might be promulgated in the future—electric generation—is
regulated largely by states,13 but generation operates within a regional
electricity market governed by regional grid operators.14 These operators
environmental planning is typically limited to review of utilities‘ integrated resource plans in states
where these plans are required or encouraged and to review of utility requests to recover the costs of
state and federal environmental compliance. In integrated resource plans, utilities describe the types of
generation resources that they will use to meet consumers‘ electricity needs in the future, and states
often require the utilities to consider renewable energy and energy efficiency options within these plans.
See RACHEL WILSON & BRUCE BIEWALD, SYNAPSE ENERGY ECON., BEST PRACTICES IN ELECTRIC
UTILITY INTEGRATED RATE PLANNING 4–5, 7 (2013), http://www.synapse-energy.com/sites/default/files
/SynapseReport.2013-06.RAP_.Best-Practices-in-IRP.13-038.pdf. For examples of state statutes that
allow for the recovery of environmental compliance costs, see FLA. STAT. § 367.081(2)(a)(2)(c) (2015)
(―[T]he commission shall approve rates for service which allow a utility to recover from customers the
full amount of environmental compliance costs‖); IND. CODE § 8-1-27-8 (2015) (―The commission shall
issue an order approving an environmental compliance plan‖ if certain conditions are met.).
12. Clean Power Plan, supra note 1, at 64,710, 64,832 (noting that the Plan‘s options for state
compliance accommodate ―the wide range of regulatory requirements and other programs that states
have deployed or will deploy in the electricity sector‖ and harness ―emission reduction opportunities in
the interconnected electricity system‖).
13. The roles of public utility commissions vary based on how their state regulates their energy
markets. Some states have traditionally vertically integrated utilities. In those states, one utility controls
generation, transmission, and distribution for a geographic area within the state, and the public utility
commission sets the rates these utilities may charge for building and operating the infrastructure
necessary for these activities. Other states have restructured to have more competitive markets and leave
generation decisions largely to private actors. See U.S. Retail Competition Is Alive, and Seemingly
Managing Well, 26 ELECTRICITY J. 5 (Mar. 2013); John S. Moot, Economic Theories of Regulation and
Electricity Restructuring, 25 ENERGY L.J. 273 (2004); DISTRIBUTED ENERGY FIN. GRP., 2011 ABACCUS:
AN ASSESSMENT OF RESTRUCTURED ELECTRICITY MARKETS (2011), http://defgllc.com/
publication/2011-abaccus-an-assessment-of-restructured-electricity-markets/. In states that have not
restructured their retail electricity sectors, states determine what type of generation may be built and
where. States sometimes deny certain types of proposed generation, including low-carbon generation, on
the basis that the generation is not needed or does not qualify for receiving approval from the state, is
not a ―prudent‖ investment, or will not produce ―just and reasonable‖ rates for retail ratepayers. See,
e.g., Tampa Elec. Co. v. Garcia, 767 So. 2d 428, 435–36 (Fla. 2000) (finding that a power plant that
would produce wholesale power and that was incentivized by federal law—an independent, efficient
natural gas combined cycle plant cogeneration facility—could not be built in Florida because there was
no guarantee that the plant would provide electricity only to Florida customers); Nassau Power Corp. v.
Deason, 641 So. 2d 396, 398–99 (Fla. 1994) (per curiam) (finding that a nonutility generator may not
receive a certificate of need). Traditionally regulated states also influence utilities‘ use of different types
of generation by prohibiting the utilities from recovering the costs of certain generation from ratepayers.
See, e.g., Gulf State Utils. Co. v. La. Pub. Serv. Comm‘n, 578 So. 2d 71, 94 (La. 1991) (finding
sufficient basis in the record to support the state utility agency‘s conclusion that a utility‘s decision to
restart nuclear plants was imprudent).
14. Electric generating units (EGUs) that provide electricity for customers around the country
rely on a regional grid for the transport of most generated electricity. Learn More About
Interconnections, U.S. DEP‘T OF ENERGY, http://energy.gov/oe/services/electricity-policy-coordinationand-implementation/transmission-planning/recovery-act-0 (last visited Jan. 24, 2016). Due to the
physical configuration and regional operation of this grid, it is common for a single electric utility to
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decide how much and what type of generation should be available for future
use,15 plan for transmission lines that will be built to connect new generating
units to the grid,16 determine when generating units may interconnect with the
grid, and influence which generators may dispatch electricity (send electricity
through the grid) at any given moment.17
This interconnection of electricity markets across state borders makes it
critical for states to reduce carbon emissions cooperatively in ways that align
with regional energy governance. The EPA estimates that states will save $1.5
billion in CPP compliance costs if they collaborate,18 and regional grid
operators estimate even larger cost savings from regional approaches as
compared to individual state compliance.19 Further, cooperative
implementation is essential because of the regulation‘s design and the nature of
energy markets, which are decidedly interstate in nature. The EPA addressed
the need for interstate collaboration in the CPP by creating numerous ways for
states to work together, from allowing for multistate goals to creating several
options for interstate and cross-state utility trading, including a pre-written
―ready-for-interstate-trading‖ plan.20 But states must choose between two
different mechanisms for measuring emissions and complying with emission
standards, and emitters in states that choose different mechanisms cannot easily

construct generating units in multiple states and, at any given time, to draw from these generating units
in different states to serve its customers. See Clean Power Plan, supra note 1, at 64,728–29 (―Shifting of
generation among EGUs is an everyday occurrence within the integrated operations of the utility power
sector‖); CAL. ENERGY COMM‘N, Total Electricity System Power, CAL. ENERGY ALMANAC,
http://energyalmanac.ca.gov/electricity/total_system_power.html (last visited Oct. 13, 2013) (showing
approximately 98,000 gigawatts of electricity imported into California from the Southwest and
Northwest in 2014, and 198,973 gigawatts of in-state generation).
15. Grid operators do so by making decisions about generation ―reserve capacity,‖ which are
generating units available to address future increases in electricity demand. See Reserve Electric
Generating Capacity Helps Keep the Lights On, ENERGY INFO. ADMIN. (June 1, 2012),
http://www.eia.gov/todayinenergy/detail.cfm?id=6510 (describing electric generation reserve capacity
and showing reserve capacity available in different regions).
16. Transmission Planning and Cost Allocation by Transmission owning and Operating Public
Utilities, Order on Rehearing and Clarification, 77 Fed. Reg. 64,800, 64,800 (Oct. 24, 2012) (codified at
18 C.F.R. pt. 35) (requiring regional transmission planning).
17. For further discussion of the role of regional operators in the energy system, see infra Part
II.B.3.
18. EPA, REGULATORY IMPACT ANALYSIS FOR THE PROPOSED CARBON POLLUTION GUIDELINES
FOR EXISTING POWER PLANTS AND EMISSION STANDARDS FOR MODIFIED AND RECONSTRUCTED POWER
PLANTS at ES-8 tbl. ES-4 (2014), http://www2.epa.gov/sites/production/files/2014-06/documents
/20140602ria-clean-power-plan.pdf; see also Angus Duncan, Clean Air Act Section 111(d) CO2
Reduction Compliance Pathways for the Pacific Northwest and Intermountain States, 30 J. ENVTL. L. &
LITIG. 303, 308 n.14 (2015) (citing this statistic).
19. See infra note 119 and accompanying text (describing the Midcontinent Independent System
Operator‘s estimate of $3 billion in annual cost savings in that region alone).
20. For a detailed discussion of these options, see infra Part I. Moreover, in developing CPP
requirements, the EPA assumed that utilities would change practices at various generating units on a
regional grid to comply with CPP emission limits, meaning that individualized state solutions would be
a more difficult and awkward compliance approach than the many opportunities for interstate solutions
that the EPA built into the CPP. See infra notes 112–113 and accompanying text.

2016]

REGIONAL ENERGY GOVERNANCE

149

trade with each other. Interstate collaboration among states in energy regions
will not materialize without concerted state effort to work together and agree
upon basic elements such as the type of compliance mechanisms states will use.
Further, as generators within each regional grid operate more or less frequently
and build new units in order to comply with the CPP and trade with sources in
other states, regional grid operators will need to update regional governance
and operation of the grid. These changes will be necessary to plan for,
accommodate, and support generation changes that will occur throughout their
region and other regional grids.21
This Article systematically analyzes how to bring together interstate
options for carbon emissions reductions with regional energy governance.22
Specifically, the Article considers how states will have to meld intrastate CPP
requirements or those of similar carbon emissions reduction efforts with
existing state-based energy regulation, facilitate cross-state discussions and
interstate coordination of generation policy, and coordinate with regional
entities that govern the grid. It also explores how regional grid governance
itself will have to change to enable successful interstate carbon emissions
reductions. The Article considers needed changes, opportunities for
collaboration and improved governance presented by existing regional energy
organizations, and challenges to interstate coordination. Finally, the Article
explores how states could build from regional approaches outside of the CPP
context to coordinate CPP planning, thus lowering implementation costs and
improving the reliability of the electricity system.
The Article argues that effective energy-environment integration, whether
through the CPP or similar future efforts to reduce carbon emissions, will
necessitate four types of enhanced coordination. First, states‘ regulatory
systems for energy generation currently do not incorporate the CPP‘s
environmental requirements. For example, in states that regulate whether new
generation may be built and how much utilities may charge ratepayers for this
generation, state energy regulatory commissions will have to incorporate state
environmental agencies‘ carbon-based requirements into their regulatory
decisions. Second, because utilities often operate generation in multiple states,
and planning carbon emissions reductions on a state-by-state basis would be
less efficient and more costly, states will need to coordinate ―horizontally‖
across state lines.23 This interstate coordination will allow utilities to plan for
additions of generation in the numerous states that these utilities serve and
change operating practices at units in different states to reduce emissions.24
21.
22.

For a detailed discussion of this issue, see infra Part II.B.3.
As discussed further below, the CPP provides important, detailed guidance regarding the
technical details of regional implementation. We complement this guidance by exploring the
institutional aspects of regional governance such as the types of decision-making structures that could
best support regional governance.
23. See infra Part II.B.2.
24. See id.
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Similarly, it will allow states to enable more trading among sources in
numerous states—a practice that will make emissions reductions easier and
cheaper—by selecting compatible plans. Third, states, including states that
allow interstate trading or that have formed interstate agreements for emissions
reductions, will have to coordinate more closely with regional grid operators.25
This state-regional cooperation will allow regional grid operators to incorporate
states‘ emissions reduction plans or individual sources‘ trading approaches into
decisions about the amount and location of generation capacity that will be
necessary and available to satisfy regional demand, transmission planning and
interconnection, and generation dispatch.26 Finally, many states that engage in
interstate strategies for reducing carbon emissions are not likely to limit
themselves to the boundaries of the regional grid in which they operate.27 For
example, one way for states to comply with the CPP is to adopt the federal
ready-for-interstate-trading program, which would allow power plants in the
state to trade with power plants in any other state that had similarly adopted the
federally-designed trading program.28 This interstate coordination among
different grid regions may require regional grid operators—which already
coordinate with each other to some extent—to improve communications and
collaborative planning among regions.29
A simplified example illustrates the enhanced need for intrastate,
interstate, state-regional-federal, and interregional coordination. Assume that
states A, B, and C—which are not located within the same regional grid—
decide to allow utilities within each state to trade with utilities in the other
states in order to comply with the CPP. State A is a very windy state and has
some existing wind generation, State B relies primarily on coal-fired
generation, and State C has numerous natural gas generating units. If State A is
a state that regulates retail electricity—requiring agency approval of the need
for new generation units and which rates may be recovered from ratepayers, if
any—utilities will likely apply to the state to build more wind generating units
and potentially to recover some costs if some of the electricity will be sold
retail. The state‘s regulatory process will have to accommodate these requests.
Further, if States A, B, and C decide to allow trading, some interstate
coordination will be needed because states must adopt certain uniform elements
of their plans for CPP implementation for trading to work. They could all
decide to use the ready-for-interstate-trading approach offered by the EPA, for
example, but even if they take this relatively easy-to-implement approach, they
must implement the same strategy for measuring emissions and complying with
carbon caps (either emissions of CO2 per megawatt-hour (MWh) of electricity
generated or total CO2 emissions) for trading to work.
25.
26.
27.
28.
29.

See infra Part II.B.3.
See id.
See id.
Clean Power Plan, supra note 1, at 64,833, 64,892.
See infra Part II.B.3.
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Once the states have agreed to use the same type of plan, generation
practices and plans for the construction of new generation within each state are
likely to change. For example, utilities in State A are likely to build much more
wind generation or expand output from existing wind facilities, creating extra
credits and allowances that can be purchased by utilities in States B and C to
help those utilities comply with their states‘ plans. Further, natural gas units in
State C, which emit less CO2 than coal units, might be operated more
frequently, while coal units would run less frequently, perhaps to generate
additional credits or allowances that could be sold to utilities in State B.
The regional grid operator in each of these states will need to know about
these changes due to the operators‘ above-described functions. For example, if
generating units in States A and C will likely operate more frequently and will
want to send more electricity into the grid, both to comply with the plans in
each of their states and to generate additional credits or allowances to be sold to
the other states, the regional grid operator will need to know this in order to
accommodate the additional flow of electricity from these units into the
regional grid used by the generating units. Moreover, regional grid operators
will need to inform states about potential constraints that might prevent certain
generating units from maximizing their ability to generate electricity and create
credits and allowances for trading. For example, transmission lines take years
to plan and construct, and utilities in State A might not be able to expand their
output from new wind farms as quickly as they would hope. In addition,
regional grid operators will have to talk with each other and with states in
different regions to consider how power flows within each regional grid might
increase and how expanded grid connections, including across different
regional grids, could help certain types of generation expand. And finally,
regional grid operators may need permission from the Federal Energy
Regulatory Commission (FERC)—which governs their activities—to change
certain policies, for example, policies prioritizing which new generation
resources get to connect with and use the grid.
Figure 1 depicts the four types of expanded cooperation and coordination
that will be necessary under the CPP.

2016]

REGIONAL ENERGY GOVERNANCE

153

approaches.30 Regional transmission organizations (RTOs) are also planning
for different scenarios under the CPP, and some are encouraging state
coordination while working with states to determine optimal compliance
strategies.31 Further, utilities and several regional grid operators note that
interstate and interregional planning processes already required by FERC are
―particularly suited to the challenges of implementing the CPP,‖ as they require
planning for coordinated, expanded transmission lines for resources such as
renewable generation.32 But these groups add that it is likely necessary to
convene grid operators to specifically consider CPP-related grid planning.33
CPP compliance that minimizes costs and maximizes the reliability of the
delivery of electricity to millions of customers will require much more
interstate, state-regional, and interregional cooperation than currently exists.34
Moreover, even if the CPP were struck down or substantially limited by
one of the numerous lawsuits lodged against it or by a new presidential
administration,35 interstate coordination and regional energy governance will
have to evolve to accommodate generation practices that are already changing
as a result of broader market forces. Indeed, the tools and relationships that
regional grid operators need in order to comply with the CPP are nearly
identical to many of the tools that these regional operators are already
developing to address shifts toward renewables and natural gas that are driven
by federal incentives, state and local renewable energy policies, and market
forces. For example, as the cost of renewable electricity generation has
declined and energy developers have built growing numbers of solar and wind
generating units,36 regional transmission grid operators have discussed the need
30. Implementation Options for EPA’s Proposed Clean Power Plan Highlights from a
Midcontinent States Regional Workshop, BIPARTISAN POL‘Y CTR. (2015), http://bipartisanpolicy.org/
wp-content/uploads/2015/05/EPA-CPP-Workshop-Summary.pdf (describing how energy and
environmental agency representatives, as well as utilities and environmental groups, have discussed
possible regional CPP cooperation).
31. See, e.g., Tom Kleckner, SPP to Push Regional Approach in First CPP Webinar, RTO
INSIDER (Sept. 21, 2015), http://www.rtoinsider.com/spp-clean-power-plan-17757/; MISO BD. OF DIRS.,
CLEAN POWER PLAN UPDATE 4 (Oct. 22, 2015), https://www.misoenergy.org/Library/Repository/
Meeting%20Material/Stakeholder/BOD/BOD/2015/20151022/20151022%20BOD%20Item%20VIA%2
0Clean%20Power%20Plan%20Update.pdf (noting that individual state approaches within the footprint
of the MISO RTO would increase the reserve capacity that each utility had to maintain and detrimentally
―re-balkanize[]‖ the grid).
32. WIRES, Preliminary Comments for the February 19 Technical Conference on Environmental
Regulations and Electric Reliability, Wholesale Electricity Markets, and Energy Infrastructure (Feb. 18,
2015), http://www.ferc.gov/CalendarFiles/20150219125246-Hoecker,%20WIRES,%20comments%20
with%20EPA%20filing.pdf.
33. Id. at 3–4.
34. See infra Part III & II.B.
35. See infra notes 280–282 and accompanying text.
36. U.S. ENERGY INFO. ADMIN., ELECTRIC POWER MONTHLY WITH DATA FOR OCTOBER 2015 at
14 tbl. 1.1 (2016), http://www.eia.gov/electricity/monthly/pdf/epm.pdf (showing net generation from
U.S. solar units increasing from 550 thousand megawatt-hours in 2005 to 17,961 in 2014, and for the
renewable category excluding hydroelectric and solar and including wind and biofuels, among other
renewables, increasing from 86,779 to 261,522).
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to expand their boundaries, or to better coordinate the planning of power flows
through the grid through market design, so that they can draw from different
renewable resources at different times.37
Despite this progress, developing enhanced approaches to coordination
across energy and environmental law and across different levels of governance
calls for further changes to existing models of federalism and governance. An
extensive environmental law literature maps out various forms of dynamic
federalism. This scholarship attempts to capture the many horizontal (among
entities at the same governance level, such as among states or regional energy
operators), vertical (among entities at different levels, such as federal and state
governments and regional energy operators), and even diagonal (simultaneous
vertical and horizontal) dynamics that occur in environmental regulation,
including how they evolve over time.38 Energy federalism is comparatively
underdeveloped, and our prior work has applied these dynamic approaches to
the project of conceptualizing energy governance.39 We have focused in

37. See infra note 244 and accompanying text. Renewable resources like wind and solar are
intermittent, meaning that their output changes at different times of day and in different seasons. YURI
V. MAKAROV ET AL., ANALYSIS METHODOLOGY FOR BALANCING AUTHORITY COOPERATION IN HIGH
PENETRATION OF VARIABLE GENERATION 1.1–1.2 (2010), http://www.pnl.gov/main/publications/
external/technical_reports/PNNL-19229.pdf. The more resources that a grid operator can draw from in a
broader region, the easier it is to ensure that adequate electricity will flow through the grid at any given
time. See, e.g., Malcolm McClellan & Carol Opatrny, Maintaining Balance Innovation in Power
System Balancing Authorities, 1 WASH. J. ENVTL. L & POL‘Y 1, 27 (2011) (noting that ―Balancing
Authority Areas with large geographic scopes can secure diversity of load and generation‖ but that
―there are other ways to combine diverse generation resources‖). Interstate, state-regional grid operator,
and interregional discussions have generated suggestions for identifying wind energy resources from
different regional grid operators and ―aggregating‖ them, or planning when and how electricity from all
of the different wind units located in different states and different territories of regional grid operators
will be sent through the grid. Id. at 28 (―Through the use of dynamic scheduling or pseudo-ties, some are
seriously considering certifying wind-based Balancing Authorities focused on the aggregation of wind
generation located in a number of adjacent Balancing Authority Areas for the specific purpose of
isolating, managing and operating intermittent renewable generation using dedicated AGC [Automatic
Generation Control].‖); CAL. INDEP. SYS. OPERATOR, DYNAMIC TRANSPORT ISSUE PAPER 6 (2009),
http://www.caiso.com/2476/2476ecfa5f550.pdf (―Pseudo-ties are employed to dynamically transfer
resources (generating resources or loads [demand for electricity]) from the BAA (Balancing Authority
Area—the entity that balances the amount of electricity demanded with the amount of electricity
supplied in the grid] to which they are physically interconnected (native BAA) into another BAA that
assumes operational control of the resources (attaining BAA).‖). Regional planning for transmission
lines to connect growing renewable resources to population centers is also underway, and has been
highly effective in some regions. See Recovery Act Interconnection Transmission Planning, DEPT. OF
ENERGY, http://energy.gov/oe/services/electricity-policy-coordination-and-implementation/transmission
-planning/recovery-act (last visited Jan. 31, 2016).
38. For an overview of the dynamic environmental federalism literature, see Kirsten H. Engel,
Harnessing the Benefits of Dynamic Federalism in Environmental Law, 56 EMORY L.J. 159, 176 (2006).
For a discussion of horizontal federalism in an environmental context, see Noah D. Hall, Toward a New
Horizontal Federalism Interstate Water Management in the Great Lakes Region, 77 U. COLO. L. REV.
405 (2006). For a discussion of iterative federalism in the climate change context, see Ann E. Carlson,
Iterative Federalism and Climate Change, 103 NW. U. L. REV. 1097, 1099 (2009).
39. See Hari M. Osofsky & Hannah J. Wiseman, Dynamic Energy Federalism, 72 MD. L. REV.
773, 835–36 (2013).
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particular on emerging hybrid regional structures that pull together different
levels of government, as well as public and private actors. And we have argued
that these governance structures have the potential to assist with transitions to
new and modified approaches to fuel extraction and electricity generation,
particularly at the energy-environment intersection.40
This broader federalism scholarship, and our work on hybrid energy
governance in particular, provides a helpful foundation for this Article‘s
federalism and governance analysis. Effective implementation of the CPP or of
similar carbon emissions reduction requirements requires institutions that can
bring together key actors at and within different levels of governance, often
doing both simultaneously.41 This implementation also necessitates integrating
key private actors, particularly utilities, which often operate in multiple states,
into public regulatory processes. Hybrid entities like RTOs—which are
governed by FERC but have largely private companies as members—play an
important role in that multilevel, multiactor interconnection, including in
RTOs‘ incorporation of the CPP into grid governance and markets.42 However,
CPP implementation and the current evolution of the energy system present
federalism and governance challenges for even these innovative institutions,
which this Article lays out and then proposes solutions for addressing.
The Article‘s approach contributes to the federalism and governance
literature and efforts at practical implementation by demonstrating that a key
aspect of effective implementation in this context—in contrast to traditional
federalism approaches focused primarily on the federal government and
states—is the role of regional-level governance and its integration of state and
federal governance. It analyzes existing interstate and regional institutions and
initiatives, as well as the gaps that remain in bringing together energy and
environmental law in this context. Its proposed pathways towards regional
institution building—focused on building upon existing and potentially crafting
new hybrid structures—contribute to conceptualizing how multilevel, and
particularly regional, governance can and should evolve in a context of
overlapping interstate and regional activity. In so doing, it demonstrates the
ways in which hybrid regional institutional development can help to address the
knotty federalism issues at the convergence of environmental and energy law.
This Article uses the CPP as a case study to explore how carbon emissions
reductions integrate environmental and energy law and require coordination of
state, regional, and federal energy governance. However, its lessons apply
equally to alternative regulatory approaches to carbon emissions that the EPA
might promulgate in the future and to the evolution of the power sector that is
already occurring without top-down regulatory forces. Any carbon emissions

40.
(2014).
41.
42.

Hari M. Osofsky & Hannah J. Wiseman, Hybrid Energy Governance, 2014 U. ILL. L. REV. 1
See Kleckner, supra note 31; MISO BD. OF DIRS., supra note 31.
Osofsky & Wiseman, supra note 40.
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reduction strategy will have to focus on the power sector—the predominant
contributor to carbon emissions in the United States43—and that sector relies
largely on utilities that routinely draw on power plants in different states and
send electricity through an interstate electricity grid.
Part I of the Article describes the CPP and its melding of environmental
and energy law, as well as the types of interstate implementation that the CPP
allows and encourages. Part II explores opportunities posed by implementing
interstate CPP approaches within regional energy markets as well as obstacles
that, although surmountable, might impede certain efforts toward regionalism.
Then, drawing both from a rapidly-emerging literature and from examples of
regional approaches in other contexts, Part III analyzes a menu of options for
developing new and enhancing existing hybrid institutions that will support
effective regional CPP approaches. The Article concludes by considering the
broader implications of its proposals for the transitions taking place in our
energy system. It argues that effective regional CPP implementation can serve
as an important model for the many other areas in which energy and
environmental governance must be brought together.
The CPP is an ambitious and important rule, one that has the potential to
form the basis of U.S. energy and environmental policy for the foreseeable
future.44 The CPP also forms a key aspect of the U.S. voluntary national
commitment to reduce emissions under the December 2015 Paris Agreement on
climate change.45 But states and regional grid operators must act quickly to
modify and enhance regional governance mechanisms to address the
surmountable yet important challenges described above.46 A failure to agree
upfront on compliance mechanisms that allow utilities to draw from carbon
reduction solutions in multiple states—and to enhance existing institutions or
form new institutions needed to support interstate implementation
43.
44.

See supra note 9.
Even if it does not survive judicial challenge and/or the 2016 presidential election, it is
already influencing industry decision making in important ways. See Clean Power Plan, supra note 1, at
64,663 (―[T]ransition to cleaner power generation . . . is already well underway in the utility power
sector‖); State Analysis of Clean Power Plan, W. RESOURCE ADVOCATES, http://westernresource
advocates.org/projects/state-analysis/ (last visited Jan. 29, 2016) (―[M]ajor utilities have taken proactive
measures to get ahead of carbon pollution regulations.‖).
45. The Paris Agreement adopted at the 21st Conference of the Parties to the United Nations
Framework Convention on Climate Change in December 2015 requires parties to ―prepare,
communicate and maintain successive nationally determined contributions‖ to global emissions
reduction and to ―pursue domestic mitigation measures‖ to that end. Paris Agreement to the United
Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change, art. 4 cl. 2, Dec. 12, 2015, https://unfccc.int/
resource/docs/2015/cop21/eng/l09.pdf. The United States intended ―nationally determined contribution‖
to contain ―an economy-wide target of reducing its greenhouse gas emissions by 26–28 percent below
its 2005 level in 2025,‖ which rests on CPP implementation, among other domestic measures. See
United States, Intended Nationally Determine Contribution, UNITED NATIONS FRAMEWORK
CONVENTION ON CLIMATE CHANGE (2015), http://www4.unfccc.int/submissions/INDC/Published%20
Documents/United%20States%20of%20America/1/U.S.%20Cover%20Note%20INDC%20and%20Acc
ompanying%20Information.pdf.
46. See infra Part II.
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approaches—could lead to the entrenchment of a patchwork of less-effective
state mechanisms.47
I. INTERSTATE AND REGIONAL IMPLEMENTATION OPTIONS
UNDER THE CLEAN POWER PLAN
The CPP, like many other federal environmental regulations, takes a
―cooperative federalist‖ approach to regulating power plant emissions; it
provides federal standards that states can choose how to implement.48 Yet
because the CPP applies to energy—which is regulated by states, regional
organizations, and standards issued by FERC—it requires more complex
coordination among agencies than a typical environmental regulation.49 As
noted in the Introduction, these coordination issues are at the core of the
federalism and governance challenges facing implementation. This Part frames
the rest of the Article‘s analysis by exploring relevant aspects of the CPP. It
describes how the CPP establishes federal environmental standards for a largely
state and regional energy system, and delineates the interstate and regional
approaches that the Plan allows.
Throughout this Article, the term ―interstate approaches‖ refers to state
efforts to regulate electric generation in a manner that is at least consistent with
other state efforts, even if not coordinated with these efforts. In other words,
any states that do not require a wholly independent plan—which prevents
sources in the state from trading with sources in other states to comply with the
CPP—are deemed to take interstate approaches under our definition. For
example, state rules that allowed electric generators within the state to trade
with generators in any other state that has signed on to a federal ready-forinterstate-trading plan for CO2 would be an interstate approach. The term
―regional approaches‖ refers to more detailed multistate efforts that might
emerge if states decide to combine CPP goals, coordinate electric generation
policy for CPP compliance, and form a new regional organization—or modify
an existing regional organization such as an RTO—to help implement these

47. For a discussion of path dependence in the context of energy transition, see PROMOTING
SUSTAINABLE ELECTRICITY IN EUROPE: CHANGING THE PATH DEPENDENCE OF DOMINANT ENERGY
SYSTEMS (Williams M. Lafferty & Audun Rund eds., 2008).
48. When a federal goal is set for states to implement, this is called a ―cooperative federalism‖
regime. The Clean Air Act is somewhat different from other cooperative federalism statutes, however, in
that it sets individual targets for states in order to achieve the national target. In certain other
environmental statutes and regulations, Congress and the EPA set national goals and ask the states to
meet these goals without defining individual state targets. For example, under the Clean Air Act the
EPA sets National Ambient Air Quality Standards, and states develop State Implementation Plans in
order to meet these standards. 42 U.S.C. § 7410 (2012). More recent approaches, however, are
somewhat similar to the CPP. Various iterations of the EPA‘s regional ozone rules have attempted to set
individual or regional ozone limits for states, for example, and to allow limited trading among states. See
EPA v. EME Homer City Generation, 134 S. Ct. 1584 (2014) (discussing the rule and reversing the D.C.
Circuit‘s vacatur of the rule).
49. Clean Power Plan, supra note 1, at 64,672–73.
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efforts.50 Regional governance also refers more generally to existing energy
markets, which are regionally governed and operated by RTOs or similar
organizations. Although regions are generally comprised of groups of
geographically proximate states, they may sometimes be more diffuse,
reflecting the organization of electricity regions; for example, the Midcontinent
Independent System Operator (MISO) includes members from states in the
Midwest and South, which would not generally be viewed as part of the same
geographical region.51
A. The Clean Power Plan’s Energy-Environment,
Federal-State Approach
The CPP sets emission standards for sources that emit CO2 and, based on
these estimates of emissions that individual sources can reduce, establishes
state targets for CO2 reductions. It then requires states, which are the regulated
entities under the CPP, to decide how sources within states will meet CPP
standards.52 To help states meet the CPP‘s carbon reduction goal, the CPP
establishes what is called a ―best system of emission reduction‖ (BSER) for
two types of existing (already built and operating) power plants.53 BSER,
which serves as the basis for the CPP ―goals‖ that states must meet, has two
components: (1) reductions in CO2 emissions that each plant within each power
plant category54 is estimated to be able to achieve, expressed as the maximum

50. The Regional Greenhouse Gas Initiative (RGGI), an organization of New England and MidAtlantic states that wrote model rules establishing a carbon cap and allowing trading among utilities in
the states to meet that cap, is an example of an existing regional carbon reduction institution. Program
Design, REGIONAL GREENHOUSE GAS INITIATIVE http://www.rggi.org/design (last visited Jan. 29,
2016). It is ―regional‖ because states created a separate regional institution and voting mechanisms
through which the institution adopted recommended rules. States then individually adopted these rules
through their respective legislatures. Id.
51. Regional Transmission Organizations (RTO)/Independent System Operators (ISO), FED.
ENERGY REGULATORY COMM‘N, http://www.ferc.gov/industries/electric/indus-act/rto.asp (last updated
Jan. 21, 2016). The distinction between interstate and regional is somewhat loose, as interstate efforts
with a high degree of coordination—even without the formation of a regional implementing
institution—could appear to be more ―regional‖ than interstate, and states that loosely agreed to form a
regional organization that would recommend CPP compliance strategies might be labeled as regional but
might engage in little coordination.
52. The EPA also establishes interim goals to be achieved prior to the final goal, which is to be
reached by 2030. Clean Power Plan, supra note 1, at 64,736 n.384. These interim goals are important
measures to ensure that states have achieved the final target by 2030.
53. These plants include both fossil fuel-fired electric steam generating units—plants that
typically use coal to produce steam and turn a turbine—and stationary combustion turbines, which use
the exhaust from burning natural gas to turn a turbine. Id. at 64,667. Combined cycle turbines also use
the heat from the exhaust to heat up water, which produces steam and turns a turbine. See supra note 2
and accompanying text.
54. The EPA calls these groups ―subcategories‖ because under the Clean Air Act, the EPA
regulates on the basis of stationary source categories and subcategories, which are groups of pollutionemitting facilities that have similar characteristics and similar pollution and can therefore be subject to
the same standard for reducing pollution. See Clean Power Plan, supra note 1, at 64,702 (describing the
general Clean Air Act approach to pollution from stationary sources).
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amount of CO2 emitted per MWh of electricity produced from a steam plant
and from a combustion turbine plant,55 and (2) the actions that these plants56—
as directed by states—could choose to take to achieve these emissions
reductions.57 These actions include three ―building blocks‖: (1) making
existing coal-fired steam power plants more efficient; (2) drawing more
electricity from existing natural gas combined cycle (NGCC) power plants that
emit less carbon and relying less on higher-CO2 plants; and (3) relying more on
newly built zero-carbon renewable power plants and less on higher-CO2
plants.58
After the EPA estimated the individual achievable amount or rate of
emissions for each type of plant, it used these individual amounts or rates to
establish state goals.59 For each state, the EPA took the nationally uniform
emission reductions that it estimated could be achieved for each steam
generating unit and stationary combustion turbine according to the BSER and
aggregated these reductions for the plants within the state.60 This aggregation
established the total emission reductions that each state must achieve under the
CPP, and thus the total carbon emissions allowed61 within each state by 2030,
with interim emission reduction measures starting in 2022.62 The total
emissions allowed within each state, which are expressed either as a rate (total
CO2 that may be emitted per net MWh of electricity generated) or total mass
55.
56.

Id. at 64,667.
States also may adopt an approach in which nonregulated plants help achieve the federallyestablished emission reduction or state-specific emission reduction goal. Id. at 64,675.
57. Id. at 64,667.
58. Id. The emission standard resulting from BSER is expressed as a permissible rate of
emissions from each type of plant—CO2 emissions per MWh of electricity generated (rate-based)—or
total allowed emissions from each plant (mass-based). Id. at 64,812. For the rate-based standard, by
2030, each existing steam generating unit within a state may only emit 1305 pounds of CO 2 per MWh of
electricity generated, and stationary combustion turbines may only emit 771 pounds of CO 2 per MWh.
Id. at 64,707, 64,812. The rates are ―adjusted output-weighted-average‖ emission rates, which reflect the
amount of carbon reductions that the CPP-affected plants are able to achieve by substituting higher
carbon generation for lower-and zero-carbon generation, and thus the total CO2 emissions or emissions
per MWh these plants are allowed to emit over two years. Id. at 64,812.
59. Id. at 64,743 (―[W]eighted-average state goals reflect the application of the uniform CO2
emission performance rates for affected steam EGUs and affected NGCC units to the respective units in
each subcategory in each state‖); id. at 64,824 (listing the state goals). The EPA did not establish state
goals for ―Alaska, Hawaii, Guam, and Puerto Rico‖ because these states have very small CO2 emissions,
the EPA does not have the necessary data to establish a BSER for them, and it believes that it can legally
omit these geographically isolated states from the final rule but establish a BSER for them later. Id. at
64,825–26. The EPA did not develop statewide emission performance goals for Vermont or
Washington, D.C. because it believes that neither of these jurisdictions has CPP-affected power plants.
Id. at 64,824 n.764.
60. Id. at 64,743.
61. The total emissions allowed are expressed as an annual mass-based cap, but compliance is
based on two-year periods that aggregate annual caps. Id. at 64,849, 64,866 (explaining that ―[f]or a
mass-based plan, emission performance is total tons of CO2 emitted by affected EGUs over the reporting
period‖ and noting that the reporting period is two years after the 2022–2029 interim compliance
period).
62. Id. at 64,667.
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(total CO2 that may be emitted within a year), are called an emission or carbon
intensity ―goal.‖63 These two ways of measuring emissions are crucial to the
governance issues that this Article explores because, as analyzed in the
following subpart, states will only be able to trade easily with states that choose
the same approach.
The CPP describes a variety of other compliance options that, although not
officially part of the building blocks within the BSER, can also be used to
achieve CPP required targets. These include, inter alia, keeping old nuclear
units running and relying on these units more for electricity generation, and
reducing energy use through energy efficiency programs.64 States are the
entities tasked with implementing the BSER within their jurisdiction, using the
specified building blocks and/or additional tools. The CPP allows states to
choose how they will comply with the federal requirements and to determine
whether they will work independently, regionally, or simply adopt a federal
plan.65 Specifically, the CPP allows states to (1) individually formulate and
implement plans; (2) coordinate to form a regional goal and determine how to
regionally implement the goal through, for example, trading of emission
reductions or allowances; (3) retain individual goals but regionally cooperate to
attain their goals, again, through trading or similar approaches; or (4) apply
federal emission rates directly to plants within the state.66
B. Opportunities for Multistate Collaboration
Under the Clean Power Plan
Trading—as well as other specific elements of CPP compliance—will in
many cases be most effective if multiple states coordinate compliance
approaches, or, more simply, if they sign on to the ready-for-interstate-trading
plan. The CPP therefore encourages states to take coordinated approaches to
implementation. The EPA has issued detailed technical guidance as to how this
would be done, along with a trading plan that would allow for instantaneous
regional or even nationwide cooperation.67 In particular, it provides two
63.
64.
65.

Id. at 64,849, 64,865–86.
Id at 64,729–30.
Other sections of the Clean Air Act are more preemptive. For example, with respect to motor
vehicle tailpipe emissions, the federal government sets a standard that all states must follow, with the
exception that California can obtain a waiver to set its own standard and that other states can then
choose to follow California‘s standard, if the California waiver is granted, or the federal standards. See
42 U.S.C. § 7543(b) (2012). This alternative federalism approach has shaped the development of motor
vehicle greenhouse gas emissions, with an initial waiver denial under the Bush administration, a later
waiver grant under the Obama administration, and now a move towards harmonization of California and
federal standards. For an in-depth analysis of this regime, see Hari M. Osofsky, Diagonal Federalism
and Climate Change Implications for the Obama Administration, 62 Ala. L. Rev. 237 (2011).
66. See Clean Power Plan, supra note 1, at 64,832–33.
67. Federal Plan Requirements for Greenhouse Gas Emissions from Electric Utility Generating
Units Constructed on or Before Jan. 8, 2014; Model Trading Rules; Amendments to Framework
Regulations, 80 Fed. Reg. 64,966 (Oct. 23, 2015) (to be codified at 40 C.F R. pts. 60, 62, 78)
[hereinafter ―Federal Plan Requirements‖].
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primary pathways for interstate cooperation: (1) multistate goals, with
multistate collaboration, such as trading and other mechanisms, and (2)
individual state goals with various forms of trading among utilities.68 These
interstate and regional approaches could be followed by states that had adopted
either a rate-based or a mass-based approach, although states collaborating
would have to collectively decide upon one approach69 or individually adopt
approaches that happen to be compatible.70
Under the CPP, states may combine their individual emission goals—the
term used by the EPA for each state‘s emission target—into one regional goal
through a multistate plan.71 States would then collaborate to achieve this
aggregate goal. For example, states could establish a multistate cap and allow
utilities to determine how to best comply with this regional cap, including
allowing the utilities to trade with utilities in other states that are part of the
multistate plan.72 The EPA included this multistate option within the CPP
largely to support the few existing state plans that include regional carbon
trading, such as the Regional Greenhouse Gas Initiative (RGGI)—a group of
Mid-Atlantic and New England states that have capped carbon and have
implemented a trading program73—and California‘s carbon trading program.74
Alternatively, through an approach that is likely to be more common than
multistate plans, a state may retain its individual goals set by the federal CPP
yet coordinate regionally by allowing utilities in the state to trade emission
allowances or reductions with utilities in other states that agreed to
68.
69.

Clean Power Plan, supra note 1, at 64,710.
See id. at 64,912 (noting that the rule restricts ―states to interstate trading with equivalently
denominated mass-based allowances or rate-based ERCs [emission reduction credits]‖). There is an
exception for renewable energy built in states that use a mass-based approach that applies only to
existing, affected EGUs, and thus requires those generating units to reduce CO 2 emissions at the units
rather than building new zero-carbon renewable energy. Id. at 64,897. Renewable measures that occur in
these mass-based states may be used by utilities in a rate-based state to reduce those utilities‘ emission
rates. Id.
70. JONAS MONAST ET AL., ENHANCING COMPLIANCE FLEXIBILITY UNDER THE CLEAN POWER
PLAN: A COMMON ELEMENTS APPROACH TO CAPTURING LOW-COST EMISSIONS REDUCTIONS 5 (2015),
https://nicholasinstitute.duke.edu/sites/default/files/publications/ni_pb_15-01.pdf.
71. Clean Power Plan, supra note 1, at 64,838 (indicating that multiple states may ―aggregate
their rate or mass CO2 goals and submit a multistate plan that will achieve a joint CO2 emission goal for
the fleet of affected EGUs located within those states‖). Through this approach, states would take each
of their individual goals and aggregate them. Id. The aggregate goal would be expressed as either the
maximum rate of CO2 emissions allowed per MWh of electricity generated from the two types of
regulated units in the states, or the total quantity of CO2 emissions allowed from regulated existing
sources annually plus a limit on total CO2 emissions allowed from new sources. Id. This emission limit
on new sources is called a ―CO2 emission complement.‖ Clean Power Plan, supra note 1, at 64,839.
72. MONAST ET AL., supra note 70, at 3 (―The state plan would allow the operator to determine
whether to use tradable compliance instruments (i.e., credits) or other means to meet its compliance
obligation.‖).
73. See supra note 50.
74. Carbon Pollution Emission Guidelines for Existing Stationary Source: Electric Utility
Generating Unit, 80 Fed. Red. 64,662, 64,783 (Oct. 23, 2015) (noting that states in RGGI, as well as
California, ―have indicated that they intend to maintain their current state programs‖ and noting that the
rule would allow the continuation of these state programs).
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coordinate—or in other states that happened to have uniform trading regimes.75
For example, if utilities in hypothetical State A would have trouble lowering
CO2 emissions to the point required by State A‘s goal, while utilities in
hypothetical State B would easily meet and even exceed State B‘s separate
goal, State A could allow utilities in State A to purchase additional CO2
emissions reductions from utilities in State B.76
Given the likelihood that most states will choose some variation of
individual goals plus trading, this subpart focuses on two key aspects of that
decision. First, it examines why the CPP‘s trading structure makes it difficult
for rate-based states to trade with mass-based states. Second, it examines the
options available to states, whether they opt for rate-based or mass-based
approaches, to trade under the CPP.
1. Rate-Based Versus Mass-Based Trading
For states that choose to set individual goals and trade, several options
exist. However, whichever trading option they decide upon, they will only
easily be able to partner with states that select the same mechanism for
measuring emissions. Specific trading approaches will differ depending on
whether a state has selected a rate-based or mass-based approach, and this will
impede collaboration with states that have made an alternative choice. For ratebased trading, the specific units of trading are emission reduction credits
(ERCs), which represent a MWh of electric power generated with no CO2
emissions and are created when plants ―emit below a specified CO2 emission
rate‖ or substitute low-carbon generation that avoids generation from a CPPregulated unit.77 Buyers of ERCs will be plants for which it will be cheaper to
75. Id. at 64,838 (allowing ―states to retain their individual state goals for affected EGUs and
submit individual plans, but to coordinate plan implementation with other states through the interstate
transfer of ERCs or emission allowances‖).
76. Id. at 64,839 (―Under this approach, a state plan could indicate that ERCs or CO2 allowances
issued by other states with an EPA-approved state plan could be used by affected EGUs for compliance
with the state‘s rate-based or mass-based emission standard, respectively.‖). Many states welcome this
cheaper approach to complying with the CPP, although some will be reluctant to share inexpensive
electricity produced by utilities in their state with other states. See, e.g., Elizabeth Harball & Emily
Holden, Carbon Trading Finds a Foothold in at Least 20 States, CLIMATEWIRE (Jan. 19, 2016),
http://www.eenews.net/stories/1060030764; Clean Power Plan, supra note 1, at 64,674 (noting that state
and utility commenters recommended that final plan guidelines ―facilitate interstate trading‖). The
concern about sharing inexpensive energy with other states or relying more on energy imported from
other states is why some states have resisted the formation of RTOs in their region, citing to the fact that
these states currently enjoy low electricity rates and that RTOs naturally encourage cross-state transfers
of electricity. See Regional Transmission Organizations, 65 Fed. Reg. 810, 935–36 (Jan. 6, 2000)
(codified at 18 C.F.R. pt. 35) (summarizing state objections to a FERC regulation regarding RTOs).
77. Clean Power Plan, supra note 1, at 64,834. An ERC is a ―tradable compliance instrument that
represents a zero-emission MWh‖ from an action that qualifies as an allowed action under the CPP, and
which ―may be used to adjust the reported CO2 emission rate‖ of an EGU subject to a rate-based
emission standard. Id. at 64,908. For example, the CPP counts the increased use of an existing NGCC
plant as a qualifying action. A plant that increased its reliance on an NGCC unit and decreased its
reliance on a coal-fired reduces its CO2 emissions per MWh of electricity generated and thus creates a
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purchase ERCs than to limit their emissions as is required to meet the state
goal.
The units of trading for mass-based programs are carbon allowances.78
Under the allowance trading regime that would apply under the CPP, total CO2
emissions that sources within a state could emit would be quantified into
allowances, each of which would represent the ability to emit one short ton of
CO2 annually.79 These allowances would be distributed—either given away or
sold—among the existing power plants in the region.80 Thus, individual plants
would start out with a certain limited number of allowances that was set based
on the overall cap and a particular method of dividing up and distributing or
auctioning off allowances81 to the plants. The allowances allotted would
function as individual caps on plants; plants could emit up to the amount of
allowances they had, ―spending‖ the allowances in order to emit a certain
amount of CO2 annually.82 Plants that needed to emit more CO2 than the
allowances they had could purchase allowances from plants that could easily
reduce CO2 below their individual allotment.83 Because the total allowances
available for sale would be equal to the total, capped amount of CO2 that could
be emitted under the CPP, this trading approach would ensure CPP compliance
while giving power plants within a region the flexibility to either reduce CO2
emissions, or continue emitting and buy an allowance from another plant that
had over-reduced CO2 emissions.84
In a simplified hypothetical example of how trading would work under a
mass-based program, picture a certificate stating: ―This allowance permits the
power plant holding this allowance to emit one ton of CO2 in 2025.‖ Say that
there were seventeen power plants in States A, B, and C, which had maintained

valid ERC. See, e.g., Federal Plan Requirements, supra note 67, at 64,994 (noting incremental natural
gas combined cycle unit generation (from existing plants) above 2012 levels can receive an ERC). An
―allowance‖ is ―an authorization for each specified unit of actual CO2 emitted from an affected EGU or
a facility during a specified period,‖ meaning permission for a power plant regulated by the CPP to emit
a certain amount of CO2 over a certain amount of time. Id. at 64,959. Thus, an ERC certifies that CO2
emissions have been reduced, whereas an allowance certifies that an entity is allowed to emit a certain
amount of CO2. Both of these instruments can be traded under the CPP. See Clean Power Plan, supra
note 1, at 64,709. Under an allowance system, ―the owner or operator of each affected EGU is required
to hold an allowance for each specified unit of CO2 emitted from that affected EGU facility during a
specified period,‖ and the total amount of authorizations issued is capped, thus limiting total CO 2
emissions from all units that hold allowances. Id.
78. Id. at 64,709.
79. Id. at 64,835, n.794.
80. The power plants in a given state would receive, divided among the plants, allowances
totaling the quantity of emissions allowed under that state‘s goal. See Federal Plan Requirements, supra
note 67, at 233 (―The total amount of allowances distributed in each state for each year would sum to the
state‘s mass goal for that year.‖).
81. The CPP allows the states to choose how allowances are distributed—such as by auction or
direct distribution from the state. Clean Power Plan, supra note 1, at 65,012.
82. Id.
83. Id.
84. Id.
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their original goals but established a multistate trading regime. At the beginning
of 2025, each power plant received one CO2 allowance from the regional
compliance authority governing CPP matters for these states, meaning that the
plant would be allowed to emit one ton of CO2 in 2025. To prove compliance,
at the end of 2025, each power plant would surrender one CO2 allowance to the
regional authority and demonstrate through emissions measurements and
reporting that it had emitted only one ton of CO2.85
To understand how trading would benefit these plants, assume that two of
the seventeen power plants were older natural gas plants that ended or
substantially reduced generation and built new renewable generation to offset
the lost natural gas generation, reducing emissions to zero tons of CO2 in 2025,
whereas one plant in the region was a coal-fired plant that would have trouble
reducing its CO2 emissions to one ton in 2025. Each of the natural gas plants
could sell its CO2 allowances to the coal plant since they no longer needed
them due to their reduced emissions. If the coal plant needed to emit three tons
of CO2 in 2025, it could use the one CO2 allowance allotted to it and the two
additional allowances purchased from the natural gas plants that had built
renewable generation.86 At the end of 2025, the coal plant would relinquish its
three allowances and demonstrate that it had emitted only three tons of CO2.
The two natural gas plants that had sold their CO2 allowances to the coal plant
would demonstrate that their net emissions were zero tons of CO2.87
Some utilities are already making decisions that demonstrate how
interstate trading among generating units in different states can be beneficial.
For example, Xcel Energy—a Minnesota-headquartered utility with customers
in Minnesota, Michigan, Wisconsin, North Dakota, South Dakota, Colorado,
Kansas, Oklahoma, Texas, and New Mexico—announced in October 2015 that
it would retire two of its three units at the Sherco coal-fired power plant, which
is Minnesota‘s largest power plant. Xcel explained that the closures were part
of its strategy to cut carbon emissions by sixty percent by 2030.88 These
Minnesota-based actions could, however, count towards reductions in other
states where Xcel operates if those states allowed such an approach. Even
broader benefits could be realized if utilities traded with each other across

85.
86.
87.

See id.
See id.
The EPA notes in the CPP that its allowed trading schemes build from existing trading
approaches, including the sulfur dioxide and nitrous oxide trading regimes to reduce emissions from
power plants that contribute to acid rain. This hypothetical describes this type of trading regime. For
examples that provide more granular detail of trading approaches, see, for example, Dallas Burtraw et
al., Economics of Pollution Trading for SO2 and NOx, 20 ANN. REV. ENVTL. RESOURCES 253 (2005);
Robert W. Hahn & Gordon L. Hester, Where Did All the Markets Go? An Analysis of EPA’s Emissions
Trading Program, 6 YALE J. ON REG. 109 (1989).
88. Steve Karnowsky & Kyle Potter, Xcel Energy Says It Plans to Retire 2 of Its 3 Coal-Fired
Units at Sherco Power Plant, STAR TRIB. (Oct. 2, 2015), http://www.startribune.com/xcel-energy-plansto-retire-2-of-3-coal-fired-sherco-units/330454161/.
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numerous states, thus finding the cheapest and most effective compliance
options.
However, in order for states to gain these economic benefits, their plans
must be designed to allow this kind of trading. The following subpart explores
their many options for structuring plans under the CPP.
2. Options for Trading Programs
This subpart considers the numerous options available to states that opt to
have individual plans but allow some form of trading, whether mass-based or
rate-based. The first and potentially simplest approach is for states to rely on
the ready-for-interstate-trading system.89 Many states are likely to sign on to
this plan because they requested that the EPA provide a trading-ready option.90
Instead of setting up their own system for creating, tracking, and trading
allowances, a state through its CPP plan would allow CPP-regulated sources in
the state to trade with sources in any other state that had an EPA-approved CPP
plan and used an allowance tracking system approved or administered by the
EPA.91 In other words, the EPA has already established a model emissions
trading program that, if used by states, has been reviewed by the EPA and is
pre-approved as a presumptively acceptable CPP compliance measure.92
Although this option is simple in theory, it contains some constraints that
create challenges for aligning all states within an energy region. Most
fundamentally, as explored in the previous part, under the ready-for-interstatetrading program, sources in rate-based states may only trade with sources in
other rate-based states, and sources in mass-based states may similarly only
trade with sources in other mass-based states.93 Moreover, as we discuss
further in Part II, increased interstate trading could require enhanced regional
grid governance, including more coordination among states, between states and
regional grid operators, among regional grid operators, and between regional
grid operators and FERC.94 Regional governance is already changing as
renewable generation is built and renewable credits are traded among states,95
thus making enhanced regional CPP governance feasible. But more institutional
development will be needed to operationalize cooperation effectively.

89.
90.

Clean Power Plan, supra note 1, at 64,910 n.1007.
See, e.g., Scott Detrow, Regulators Study a ―Trade-Ready‖ CO2 Emissions Trading System
that Would Not Require State Legislative Approval, CLIMATEWIRE (July 14, 2015), http://www.
eenews.net/climatewire/2015/07/14/stories/1060021738 (noting that, prior to the final CPP‘s release, ―a
growing number of analysts and state officials are rallying around the idea of ‗trade-ready‘ multistate
compliance plans as the best way to meet the rule‘s ambitious carbon-reduction goals‖).
91. See id.
92. See id.
93. Clean Power Plan, supra note 1, at 64,912 (noting that the rule ―restrict[s] states to interstate
trading with equivalently denominated mass-based allowances or rate-based ERCs‖).
94. Infra Part II.
95. See infra Part II.B.2.a.
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Second, a group of states with individual goals could create, through a
multistate plan, its own emissions tracking and trading system to be reviewed
and approved by the EPA.96 All states in the region would have to agree on
how ERCs or allowances would be created and tracked as well as whether their
plans would all be mass-based or rate-based, and they would share the task of
reviewing credits or allowances issued.97 Each state would individually
implement a ―materially consistent‖ trading program, meaning that the states
would regionally agree on an approach and then individually confirm through
legislation or regulation that they were implementing that approach.98 It is
unclear whether states beyond those in RGGI and those that participate in
California‘s trading program will make the effort to form a complex regional
trading scheme in light of the easier ready-for-interstate-trading option, but the
possibility remains on the table.
Third, under what is called the ―bilateral‖ or ―multilateral‖ trading
approach (not to be confused with ―bilateral investment‖ implemented by a
utility that is discussed below), states could take a slightly less coordinated
approach, identifying just one or several other states that had similar or
interoperable emission reduction tracking systems. Sources in State A could
trade with sources in the other states that State A identified as trading partners
in its plan.99 Finally, the CPP allows for several utility-specific compliance
options. States may establish multistate plans for one specific utility or several
utilities, meaning that power plants of the participating utility or utilities in
different states may work together and trade with each other to meet an
aggregated goal.100 Each utility within a state could participate in a different
multistate plan101 if the individual state plans allowed this. Similarly, even
without a multistate plan in place, states may allow one utility that is attempting
to meet a plant-specific emission standard102 to make bilateral investments in
other units that are part of that utility‘s network of power plants or part of
another utility‘s infrastructure.103 In a state that allowed trading of credits as a

96.
97.
98.
99.
100.
101.
102.

Clean Power Plan, supra note 1, at 64,910–11.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 64,892.
Id. at 64,838–40.
Id. at 64,840.
Utilities also may use this bilateral investment option to contribute to an aggregate state goal
for regulated plants. See supra note 100 and accompanying text.
103. Clean Power Plan, supra note 1, at 64,724, 64,734 (noting that trading is not the ―only
transactional approach‖ that ―states could use to effectuate the building blocks‖ and noting ―bilateral
investment of various kinds‖ as a mechanism separate from allowance and emissions reduction credit
trading). Utilities may enter into bilateral partnerships in which they pay other generators on the same
interconnected grid to generate more electricity from an NGCC plant or build a renewable plant, among
other cooperative options. Id. at 64,753 (noting that bilateral transactions ―could but need not involve an
organized market‖ of emission reduction credits‖); id. at 64,731 (providing examples of bilateral
transactions); but see id. at 64,734 (noting that bilateral transactions will likely ―develop into discrete,
tradable commodities‖ such as an emission reduction credit).
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compliance strategy, the utility would obtain credits for making these
investments, which would help it achieve compliance with the state plan.104
Indeed, several states fall within the jurisdiction of several grid operators,
so utilities operating within varying parts of these states would likely prefer
different multistate plans that overlay the energy region in which they
participate.105 For example, some parts of eastern Texas are within the
jurisdiction of MISO, which extends into portions of Louisiana, Arkansas, and
Mississippi and through numerous Midwestern states to the north, whereas
other parts of northern and eastern Texas are within the jurisdiction of another
regional grid operator called the Southwest Power Pool, which extends into
portions of Arkansas, Oklahoma, Kansas, and Nebraska, among other states.106
Utilities that operate in these parts of Texas and in nearby states might prefer
participating in the multistate plans that encompass states within the
jurisdiction of their regional grid operator, or in the ready-for-interstate-trading
approach, which would allow utilities to independently decide when, where,
and how to fuel switch. Even with the ready-for-interstate-trading option,
however, as we discuss in Part II, utilities and states would likely have to
coordinate more closely with the regional grid operator that manages the
generating units involved in fuel switching so that the operator was aware of
the units that would be used more often or less often. Other generators in Texas
that operate in the portion of the state that remains largely isolated from other
states‘ transmission networks might prefer a Texas-only plan. This divergence
would be possible under the CPP, which allows an individual state plan for
certain utilities and a multistate plan or plans for other utilities.107
Together, these options help to facilitate interstate cooperation. Due to the
CPP‘s flexibility, states can gain the benefits of collaboration without high
levels of agreement (other than the crucial mass-based versus rate-based
decision). States need not formally coordinate to create a trading regime that
would allow for regional compliance with individual state goals, and they need
not specifically list the states with which utility trading is allowed, although
they can choose to do so. As researchers at Duke University note, states could
each individually adopt a trading scheme with ―common elements‖—a uniform
definition for credits or allowances and the use of the same system for tracking
the creation and use of credits or allowances.108 As long as states had such
materially consistent plans, and the states within their individual plans made
104.
105.

Id.
See, e.g., id. at 64,840 (noting that states might choose ―to cover affected EGUs in different
ISOs or RTOs in different multi-state plans‖).
106. Regional Transmission Organizations (RTOs)/Independent System Operators (ISOs), supra
note 51.
107. Clean Power Plan, supra note 1, at 64,840 (noting that a plan ―could involve a subset of
affected EGUs that are subject to a multi-state plan, with the remainder of affected EGUs subject to a
state‘s individual plan. Alternatively, different affected EGUs in a state may be subject to different
multi-state plans.‖).
108. MONAST ET AL., supra note 70, at 5.
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clear that utilities within the state could trade with utilities in states with
materially consistent plans, these alignments would enable an interstate
compliance approach.109
However, these many options do not necessarily translate neatly into
collaboration that fits existing energy governance. The next Part explores
economic, institutional, and political challenges that must be addressed to
achieve the needed enhancement of existing intrastate, interstate, state-regionalfederal, and interregional coordination. It also discusses the existing regional
structures that provide opportunities for overcoming these challenges. Part II
focuses particularly on hybrid, regional grid governance organizations that
include private utilities as members but are ―public‖ in the sense that they are
regulated by FERC. We have explored in our prior work the substantive and
structural roles that such organizations can play in facilitating transitions in the
energy system,110 roles that are crucial to the CPP‘s melding of environmental
and energy law.
II. CHALLENGES AND OPPORTUNITIES FOR REGIONAL GOVERNANCE
This Part focuses on the economic, institutional, and political dimensions
of cooperative CPP compliance. The economic dimension is the most
straightforward of the three. The economic benefits of combining state, federal,
and interstate generation policies within regional governance structures are
extensive—when monetized, they add up to billions of dollars in savings as
compared to individualized state approaches.111 Although the CPP itself is
controversial, broad consensus exists among regulators and industry regarding
the advantages of working together toward carbon reduction and the costs of
going it alone.
The institutional dimension, though, provides greater challenges for three
primary reasons. First, environmental and energy law involve different
implementing institutions, with different federalism arrangements, that must
collaborate within states. If state environmental and energy agencies work
together to develop ideas for best implementing the CPP, this integration of
institutions will be more effective. Second, the aspects of energy law
implicated by the CPP are governed by both states and regional operators;
intrastate, state-state, state-regional-federal, and interregional cooperation will
need to increase to facilitate effective implementation. Third, as analyzed
above, the inability to trade easily between mass-based and rate-based states
means that states within energy regions must make the same choice or face the
additional complexity of CPP cooperation and trading not matching existing
energy markets.

109.
110.
111.

Id.
Osofsky & Wiseman, supra note 40.
See infra note 119 and accompanying text.
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Finally, the CPP is mired in partisan politics over energy. States
attempting to coordinate with each other and with regional institutions have
differing stances toward the CPP and, at times, fraught relationships with each
other. However, as we explore, unless the CPP is struck down by courts or
eliminated by a future president, the political barriers will likely be less
significant than the institutional ones. Even states opposed to the CPP have
largely been planning for compliance to avoid a federal plan being imposed
upon them. Under the CPP or a similar carbon reduction scheme, states have
strong incentives to comply in an economically effective way that works with
existing energy markets.
A. Economics
Part I explored the extensive interstate and regional approaches that the
EPA allows and encourages within the CPP, including trading among sources
in any state that has adopted the federal plan, trading among sources in states
that have independently adopted materially consistent trading regimes, trading
among sources in states that are part of a multistate plan, and bilateral
investments by utilities. The growing literature analyzing these types of
interstate and regional approaches makes clear that they will be far superior to
individualized state approaches economically.
The important economic benefits of interstate and regional approaches
arise from the simple fact that the emission standards within the CPP—which
are calculated based on the emission reductions that the EPA believes utility
operators can feasibly achieve—are based on assumptions of regional
coordination. Specifically, in setting individual emission standards for each
affected source subcategory (the two types of generating plants regulated under
the CPP), the EPA assessed existing power plant operations within the three
large U.S. grid interconnections. It identified the CO2 reductions that each type
of regulated plant within each interconnection could achieve, investigating how
these plants had increased certain efficiencies of operation, drawn more from
natural gas-fired units in certain states and less from coal-fired units (thus ―fuel
switching‖ among states on a regional grid), and built new renewables in
various states.112 The EPA then determined the interconnection in which the
lowest carbon reductions were achieved for each type of regulated plant and set
that as the national standard.113 If states do not allow for cooperation across
state borders, including allowing utilities within an interconnected grid to rely
112.
113.

Clean Power Plan, supra note 1, at 64,727, 64,738.
Id. at 64,727 (―[T]he EPA has quantified the emission reductions achievable through building
block 1 [heat rate improvements, relating to making old power plants more efficient] on a regional
basis.‖); id. at 391–92 (noting the agency‘s ―consistent regionalized approach to quantification of
emission reductions‖ in which ―each of the building blocks is quantified and applied at the regional
level, resulting in the computation for each region of a performance rate for steam EGUs and a
performance rate for NGCC units,‖ and a national performance rate was set by taking the ―least stringent
subcategory-specific performance rates‖ from one region and applying those rates to all regions).
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on a variety of power plants in different states to make efficiency
improvements and other CO2 reductions, these states will have more difficulty
achieving the CPP goals, which expressly rely on assumptions relating to
interstate fuel switching.
Beyond the fact that the EPA assumed that utilities would switch among
plants on a regional grid when determining feasible CO2 reductions, both
trading and bilateral investment also have the advantage of drawing from
numerous types of CO2 reductions and allowing utilities to locate the cheapest
and most effective CO2 reductions for CPP compliance. One agency‘s
calculation of steam and combustion turbine plants‘ ability to reduce CO2
emissions per MWh of electricity generation inevitably has limitations because
no entity—private or public—can fully know the costs of an approach until that
approach is implemented. As states, and utilities following state requirements,
work to reduce the rate of CO2 emitted per MWh from these plants, they will
discover that some tools work better than others.114 Some renewable power
plants will be more or less effective than expected, some existing plant
improvements will reduce CO2 more or less than expected, and so on. Plants
will be able to experiment with the cheapest and most effective options
because, as the PJM RTO (a regional grid operator that has members in several
Northeastern and Midwestern states)115 observes, ―regional compliance
provides more ‗degrees of freedom‘ in available abatement options across a
wider area.‖116 Further, it is already clear that some states have far more
opportunities for cheap, relatively easily-implemented CO2 reductions than
others—as PJM notes, ―low-cost abatement options are not evenly distributed
across states.‖117 Thus, as introduced in the trading example above, a utility
that has relatively high costs of CO2 reduction could benefit by, instead of
implementing its own high-cost reductions, encouraging its power plants to
simply purchase a neighboring state power plant‘s excess—beyond that
neighboring state‘s CPP goal—CO2 reductions.
The estimated cost savings for interstate and regional approaches as
compared to individual state approaches support the theoretical justifications
for state collaboration. PJM concludes that if states were to primarily use instate generation resources to comply with the CPP, the CO2 allowance price
114. Cf. MONAST ET AL., supra note 70, at 4 (noting the benefit of allowing EGUs to ―choose the
compliance strategy or strategies that are best suited for the firm‖ and that ―[t]he state plan could
delegate the compliance choice to the EGU operators, who have the best understanding of the short-term
and long-term plans for their EGUs and the broader trends affecting the electricity system‖).
115. About PJM Who We Are, PJM INTERCONNECTION, http://www.pjm.com/about-pjm/who-weare.aspx (last visited Jan. 23, 2016) (explaining that PJM is an RTO and describing the states in which it
operates).
116. PJM INTERCONNECTION, PJM INTERCONNECTION ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF THE EPA CLEAN
POWER PLAN PROPOSAL 78 (2015), https://www.pjm.com/~/media/documents/reports/20150302-pjminterconnection-economic-analysis-of-the-epa-clean-power-plan-proposal.ashx.
117. Meredith Fowlie et al., An Economic Perspective on the EPA’s Clean Power Plan, 346
SCIENCE 815, 816 (2014).
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would be higher due to supply and demand dynamics. There would be fewer
plants available that could overcomply and sell their CO2 allowance to plants
that had more difficulty reducing CO2 emissions, thus limiting the supply of
CO2 allowances.118
MISO concluded that for similar reasons ―[r]egional compliance options
save approximately $3 [billion] annually compared to sub-regional
compliance,‖119 and MISO stakeholders have accordingly begun developing an
interstate trading platform for CPP compliance.120 Another economic analysis
noted that ―efficiency is enhanced when states form regional trading
markets‖121 and that substantial deadweight losses will occur if states operating
within a particular interconnection take an individualized approach.122 Yet
another model found that ―production costs of [CPP] compliance decreased
with increasing cooperation.‖123
Interstate and regional approaches are also important to reducing costs and
smoothing market function due to the existing physical nature of the electric
grid and its regional and federal regulation. Because transmission lines cross
state lines, utilities frequently import electricity from other states in order to
meet their customers‘ needs, or they export excess electricity out-of-state.124
But if states retain individual goals and compliance approaches, they might
ignore this regional reality. For example, assume that there are two identical,
efficient NGCC power plants with the same technology and emissions—one in
118. See PJM INTERCONNECTION, supra note 116, at 77 (―In a state-by-state approach, CO2 prices
in each state will differ, perhaps significantly, from the single, regional CO 2 price due to the available
abatement options and resource mix within a state. For example, a state with very little renewable
energy or natural gas combined-cycle resources will likely find it much more expensive to redispatch
resources and likely could face a much higher CO2 price than the regional price.‖).
119. MISO, GHG REGULATION IMPACT ANALYSIS—INITIAL STUDY RESULTS 11 (Sept. 17, 2014)
(PowerPoint presentation), http://www.eenews.net/assets/2014/09/18/document_ew_01.pdf.
120. Rich Heidorn, Jr., MISO, SPP Stakeholders Developing Trading Plan to Comply with EPA
Carbon Rule, RTO INSIDER (Apr. 2, 2015), http://www.rtoinsider.com/epa-ferc-clean-power-plan-misospp-14140/.
121. James B. Bushnell et al., Strategic Policy Choice in State-Level Regulation The EPA’s Clean
Power Plan 5 (Energy Institute at Haas, Working Paper No. 255, 2014), https://ei.haas.berkeley
.edu/research/papers/WP255.pdf.
122. Id. (analyzing the Western Interconnection).
123. David L. Oates & Paulina Jaramillo, State Cooperation Under the EPA’s Proposed Clean
Power Plan, 28 ELECTRICITY J. 26, 39 (2015).
124. States vary in how they regulate imports and exports, and these regulations have at times
become controversial. For example, North Dakota‘s dormant Commerce Clause challenge of
Minnesota‘s renewable energy law focuses on a provision that limits imports from coal-fired power
plants. See North Dakota v. Heydinger, 15 F. Supp. 3d 891, 915–19 (D. Minn. 2014). Renewable energy
targets in one state also can drive these utility transfers, such in the case of Oregon‘s exporting
renewable energy to California. See Cassandra Profita, Why Oregon Imports Power from Fossil Fuels
and Exports Renewable Energy, OR. PUB. BROADCASTING: ECOTROPE (June 1, 2011), http://www.
opb.org/news/blog/ecotrope/why-oregon-imports-power-from-fossil-fuels-and-exports-renewableenergy/. Idaho imports approximately 40–50 percent of its electricity from other states, such as
Wyoming, and often from coal-fired power plants. See Peter Jensen, Idaho Weighs Response to Climate
Plan, IDAHO MOUNTAIN EXPRESS (Aug. 5, 2015), http://www.mtexpress.com/news/environment/idahoweighs-response-to-climate-plan/article_b524f3f8-3b03-11e5-ba96-3be072084c5c.html.
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State A, the second in State B, with both plants serving the same customers in
States A and B. With state-based approaches to the CPP, these utilities could
face very different regulations, with one power plant being used much more
than another. Assume that State A could easily achieve its CPP goal by
switching from coal to the NGCC plant, yet State B would need to rely mostly
on building new renewable technologies. Without interstate coordination, State
A might rely heavily on the NGCC plant in State A but not on the NGCC plant
in State B, even though both plants serve State A through the regional grid and
have identical technologies. States could easily overcome this hurdle simply by
recognizing the existing nature of the grid; customers in State A could continue
drawing from the NGCC plants in both States A and B to help State A achieve
its CPP goal. Indeed, because many multistate generation units are owned by
one utility, it would be artificial for states to force utilities to focus on their
generation assets in only one state when making the utilities reduce CO2 to
support compliance with the CPP.125
Just as forcing utilities to rely on single-state measures would sometimes
prevent utilities from benefiting from low-carbon generation that already
operates on a regional grid, regional grid operators worry that single-state CPP
solutions will ―re-balkanize[]‖ the grid and increase the costs of grid
operations.126 Regional grid operators must constantly balance the amount of
electricity demanded by consumers and the amount of electricity generated.
This balancing requires them to carefully calculate needed generation
―reserves‖—ensuring that utilities have excess generation capacity to draw on
during times of peak demand. But the more generation from varied places a
regional grid operator can access, facilitated by more market participants across
a broader geographic area, the fewer individual reserves any one utility must
maintain. Not only will the operator have more options to cover a deficit in
particular generators, but geographically specific interruptions, like severe
storms or localized outages, will also be less of an issue.
The CPP or similar carbon emissions reduction strategies would seem to
encourage even more use of the grid in this manner. For example, the
construction of additional renewable generation, which any emissions
reductions strategies will have to encourage, requires more careful balancing of
reserves; drawing from reserves across a broader region can help address the
intermittency of renewable resources. MISO estimates that if states within its
region do not coordinate to implement the CPP, utilities‘ reserve margins will
have to increase from the current 9 percent to 18 to 20 percent, meaning that
utilities will have to ensure that they have generation that is typically not

125. For example, Xcel has a diverse set of generating stations in Colorado, Minnesota, New
Mexico, North Dakota, South Dakota, Texas, and Wisconsin. For plant lists that include fuel types for
each state, see Power Generation, XCEL ENERGY, http://www.xcelenergy.com/Energy_Portfolio/
Electricity/Power_Generation (last visited Jan. 31, 2016).
126. See MISO BD. OF DIRS., supra note 31, at 5.
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needed but could be called on to meet 18 to 20 percent of peak demand.127
Further, regional grid operators require individual generators to demonstrate
that they are able to closely ―regulate‖ (control) the exact amount of electricity
they send to the grid at any given time and can immediately increase or
decrease generation when called upon to do so. Regional grid operators‘
―regulation‖ requirements for generators will become more stringent128 if each
state implements an individual CPP plan, which could cause the use of
renewable resources or natural gas units to suddenly spike or of coal units to
suddenly decline in one state, thus necessitating that the regional grid operator
quickly draw upon other generation.
Although the economic benefits of interstate and regional cooperation are
uncontroversial, translating the EPA‘s interstate options into an effective
approach that works well with existing regional governance will be complex.
Not only does the rate-based versus mass-based choice make it possible that
interstate collaboration will not match the footprint of existing energy regions
but also additional forms of state-state, state-regional, and regional-regional
coordination will be needed. The next subpart examines in depth the new types
of coordination that will be required by CPP implementation and the challenges
that they pose for existing institutions.
B. Institutions
As Part I discusses, the CPP—like many environmental statutes—relies on
traditional cooperative federalism, setting federal standards for states to
implement. Yet the CPP is also, in many respects, an interstate rule in large part
because the CPP establishes environmental standards for electric generating
units that operate in multiple states and send their electricity through a regional
grid. The interstate approaches encouraged by the CPP—ready-for-interstatetrading, multistate goals with multistate implementation, individual state goals
with multistate coordination, individual state approaches that include
compatible trading approaches, and cross-state utility solutions such as bilateral
investment and utility-specific multistate plans—will be essential tools for
matching CPP governance with the realities of regional energy markets. And
interstate approaches will benefit from the strong regional institutions already
present in energy law.
However, the challenges of developing and refining regional rules and
governing organizations, which we define here as ―institutions,‖ will arise in
(1) enhancing intrastate coordination of the environmental CPP requirements
with state generation policy; (2) developing further interstate cooperation
among states on generation issues, including planning for new generation and
expanded operation of certain plants owned by utilities that operate in multiple
127.
128.
note 15.

Id.; Reserve Electric Generating Capacity, supra note 15 (describing reserve margins).
See MISO BD. OF DIRS., supra note 31, at 5; Reserve Electric Generating Capacity, supra
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states; (3) ensuring that the regional entities that currently operate the grid
incorporate these state decisions and request any federal approval that may be
required to incorporate these decisions (enhancing state-regional-federal
cooperation); and (4) bolstering existing interregional coordination among
regional grid operators.
First, states will have to meld new CPP environmental requirements with
state generation policy that does not currently incorporate these requirements.
If a state‘s energy regulatory agency is not the entity that writes the state‘s CPP
compliance plan, it will have to communicate more extensively with the state
agency responsible for the CPP, which is generally the state environmental
agency, to understand how this policy is likely to change utilities‘ choices
about generation and operation. For example, in states where each new
generating unit must be approved as ―needed,‖129 the state is likely to
experience an uptick in requests for new construction due to the CPP. The state
will also often need updated criteria for addressing these requests.
Second, states will have to enhance interstate cooperation to develop
multistate CPP approaches or, more simply, agree on a rate-based or massbased approach that would allow for ready-for-interstate-trading with other
states that select the same approach. Regional institutions will also have to be
enhanced to integrate interstate CPP approaches, as explored in more depth in
Part III. These dynamics create the governance dilemma framed in the
Introduction, and the need for analysis of how institutions can most effectively
bring together environmental and energy law and their different federalism
structures.
Third, in addition to necessitating coordination among state energy and
environmental agencies, the CPP demands careful integration of state
generation and regional/federal grid expansion, interconnection, and generation
dispatch decisions. Some sophisticated state-regional-federal coordination has
already occurred in this area, with states working closely with some RTOs to
plan for new transmission lines that improve reliability and connect more
renewable resources to population centers, and with RTOs obtaining FERC
approval for allocating the costs of these new lines among different generators
that use the lines.130 This demonstrates that the enhanced state-regional-federal
coordination necessary under the CPP will be possible, but will require more
detailed coordination throughout the country.131

129. In states like Florida, even entities that propose to build merchant plants that will mostly sell
wholesale electricity must apply for a siting certificate, and in order to obtain a siting certificate they
must obtain a certificate of need. See Nassau Power Corp. v. Deason, 641 So. 2d 396, 398–99 (Fla.
1994) (per curiam).
130. See infra note 224.
131. Midwest Indep. Transmission Sys. Operator, Inc., 137 F.E.R.C. ¶ 61,704, pp. 8–12, (2011)
(order denying in part and granting in part rehearing) (describing the MISO planning process for new
regional transmission to support reliability and new generation—particularly renewable generation
required by individual state policies).
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Finally, interstate CPP approaches will require regional grid operators to
coordinate more closely with each other, as some states are likely to cooperate
with other states that are not within the same regional grid. Regional grid
operators making decisions about transmission planning and interconnection,
capacity, and dispatch will need to monitor changes in neighboring grids,
particularly where neighboring grids are interconnected and exchange
electricity with each other. If large amounts of renewable generation are likely
to be built in one region because of abundant wind or solar resources in that
region, which can be used to provide credits through the EPA‘s ready-forinterstate-trading program, regional grid operators will need to be aware of this
additional generated electricity that might flow through their wires to utilities in
another part of the country.132 Similarly, certain types of generation—
particularly coal—will decrease in some regions, and regional grid operators
need enhanced knowledge of the generation that is likely to increase or
decrease within their region and in other regions with which they are connected
so that they have a better idea of likely power flows.
This subpart explores these issues in turn. For each issue it analyzes the
challenges and opportunities presented by the existing mix of state, regional,
and federal authority over energy law—much of which is implemented by
regional grid operators that run energy markets—and the environmental law of
the CPP, which interacts with these markets.
1. Coordinating Intrastate Energy Regulation and CPP Requirements
By melding environmental and energy law, the CPP requires state public
utility commissions (PUCs), which decide how much and what type of new
generation may be built in states that regulate retail electricity, to become
experts in a particular area of environmental law. PUCs already engage in some
analysis of environmental issues when they make certain energy law decisions.
For example, when a utility in a regulated state requests to build a new plant or
make changes to an existing plant to comply with Clean Air Act requirements
for conventional and hazardous air pollutants, PUCs typically approve these
requests and allow the utility to recover the costs of the changes from

132. See, e.g., WIRES, supra note 32, at 3 (noting how the interregional planning already required
by FERC helps grid operators coordinate their planning for the expansion of transmission lines across
regions to help support new generation capacity, and the allocation of costs for these new lines).
Although a utility need not receive the electricity generated from a renewable plant in order to obtain a
credit or allowance from that plant, the excess renewable electricity generated in order to create credits
or allowances will require some wires through which to flow. The electricity does not have to physically
follow the allowance or credit, but under the CPP one utility may not count both the generation of
renewable electricity and the credit created by this generation for CPP compliance. This would
constitute impermissible double counting.
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ratepayers.133 Further, many states have renewable portfolio standards and
goals that PUCs and other state energy agencies help design and implement.134
But the CPP‘s top-down federal requirements will require PUCs to make
CPP-specific determinations of acceptable and necessary changes to existing
plants and construction of new plants. These needed changes will vary among
states because some states regulate retail electricity, including the types of
generation that may be built and the rates that may be charged for generation,
whereas others have restructured the retail electricity sector, making it a largely
competitive market and relying less on PUC approval of generation and retail
rates. This subpart discusses intrastate coordination challenges in each of these
types of states.
In the ―traditional‖ states that have not restructured retail electricity, state
PUCs make decisions about the construction and operation of generation plants
through regulation, requiring each generator to prove that new generation is
―needed‖ and setting the rates that the generator may charge to recover the
costs of construction, operation and maintenance, financing, and equity.135
Because many generators will likely build more renewable generation to
comply with state plans and generate credits or allowances for sale elsewhere,
CPP considerations—or similar carbon-based considerations that would arise
under an alternative EPA carbon regulation—will have to be incorporated into
the need determination. States will have to pay particular attention to the issue
of whether plants built primarily to generate credits or allowances to be sold to
sources in other states are considered ―needed,‖ and, if some of the electricity is
also sold retail rather than just to other utilities, how ratepayers and utility
shareholders should proportionately pay the capital and operational costs of
these plants.
Restructured states leave generation decisions to the market.136 In these
states, if there is demand for generation, a developer may simply build a power
plant, although the developer still must get siting approval from the state or a
local government and typically a license from the state government.137 CPP
133.
134.

See supra note 11 and accompanying text.
See Database of State Incentives for Renewable Energy, Renewable Portfolio Standard
Policies, NC CLEAN ENERGY TECHNOLOGY CTR. (Oct. 2015), http://ncsolarcen-prod.s3.amazonaws.
com/wp-content/uploads/2014/11/Renewable-Portfolio-Standards.pdf (showing that 29 U.S. states,
Washington, D.C., and three U.S. territories have renewable portfolio standards).
135. For a discussion of the differences among state regulatory structures, see supra note 13.
136. Id.
137. Federal regulation only influences state generation decisions through its influence on
wholesale markets. Utilities that sell electricity retail to customers within states typically build new
power plants (a state-regulated decision) and purchase wholesale electricity from other power plants to
fulfill retail needs (a federally-regulated activity). States may prohibit utilities from purchasing certain
wholesale power on economic grounds, but once they allow a wholesale purchase, states may not
interfere with the federal regulation of that purchase. For example, states may not prohibit a utility from
recovering certain costs of wholesale power purchases from its retail customers, although ex ante states
may simply prohibit a utility from purchasing certain wholesale power on the basis of its expense. More
specifically, states may not determine that the wholesale price that the utility paid was inaccurate—
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compliance will affect both of those categories as utilities rework their
generation portfolios and have to address stranded costs of infrastructure built
under an old regulatory system.138 PUCs might have to reenter the governance
sphere in order to address these issues—either by adding a new factor to the
generation market, such as a carbon price, or by intervening in purely marketbased decisions to favor certain generation resources over others.139 Because
the CPP will indirectly create a carbon price, there are likely to be natural
incentives to build low-carbon generation both to ensure utility compliance
with the CPP and create potentially lucrative trading opportunities. But even if
the CPP naturally incentivizes this construction and intervention in the
generation market is unnecessary, states will need to update transmission siting
policies to accommodate new generation.
Texas—a restructured state—exemplifies one approach that these types of
states could take to the extent that they need to incentivize new low-carbon
generation under the CPP, and to address transmission needs. Although anyone
may build new generation in the restructured areas of Texas, provided that
power plant developers meet local land use requirements and obtain a basic
license, Texas encouraged the construction of particular types of generation by
requiring the construction of transmission lines to wind farms140 and
implementing a renewable portfolio standard.141
PUCs also will have to consider comprehensively how all utilities with
affected plants in the state—and, for plans that rely on both CPP-regulated and
nonregulated sources, how nonregulated sources—might collectively achieve
the state‘s carbon goal. More simply, states could just allow their CPPregulated sources to participate in a ready-for-interstate-trading program. But
even under this approach, PUCs will need information about how utilities
participating in trading will likely rely more or less on certain generating units
and will need to build new units. This, in turn, will require more interstate
coordination and discussions about potential approaches to CPP compliance, as
well as agreements with other states about the types of plan—mass-based or
rate-based—to implement in order to enable trading.

states may not determine that the utility, through its purchase of the wholesale electricity, should not
have had to cover certain costs of the wholesale generation and transmission that should have been
borne by other purchasers.
138. Stranded costs are the infrastructure costs of prior investments that are generally included in
rates to repay that outlay even when the infrastructure is no longer needed. For discussion of generation
changes that will be needed to achieve carbon emissions reduction goals, see supra Part I.
139. Id.; see also supra notes 11–12.
140. 16 TEX. ADMIN. CODE § 25.174(c)–(d) (2016).
141. § 25.173. The renewable portfolio standard ended up being largely unnecessary and was
easily and quickly met, however, because the wind industry expanded rapidly with an assurance of the
availability of transmission lines and because of the favorable economics of wind projects in Texas.
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2. Coordinating State Generation Policies
States will be centrally involved in CPP governance not only because they
are responsible for writing plans and reporting to the EPA but also because, as
discussed in Part II.B.1., they have important governmental control over
electricity generation—the target of the CPP. In addition to working with
regional grid operators to ensure that state CPP goals are incorporated into
regional systems, the focus of Part II.B.3, states will have to coordinate with
each other to determine how they will regulate utilities that operate in multiple
states, and how they can work together to ensure lower-cost CPP compliance.
This subpart discusses the need for augmented discussions and coordination
among states and legal constraints that states will have to consider when
implementing the CPP.
a. The Need for Enhanced State Coordination
States already collaborate in a variety of ways relevant to CPP
implementation and compliance with similar carbon regulations that the EPA
might promulgate in the future. However, the new demands on PUCs and the
benefits of collaborative CPP compliance will require more cooperation. This
subpart considers how states are already interacting to address relevant energy
policy and analyzes the additional coordination needs created by the CPP.
If states were to approach the CPP regionally through a multistate plan or
multistate coordination toward individual state goals, PUCs, state
environmental agencies, and other entities could benefit from collective,
enhanced knowledge of potential approaches to achieving federal CPP
requirements. Indeed, a group called the Midcontinent States Environmental
and Energy Regulators (MSEER) is already fostering these types of interagency
discussions in the Midwest; state energy and environmental regulators from
numerous states, as well as environmental groups and utilities, have been
meeting for a number of months to discuss issues such as how to collaborate if
they choose different pathways to CPP compliance.142 Similar groupings are
taking place in other regions, as Part III.C.2 discusses.
Beyond these new CPP-focused meetings, states have many formal and
informal groupings to help them collaborate on energy policy and decisionmaking approaches. Most broadly, state PUCs coordinate informally through
their existing organizations. For example, the National Association of
Regulatory Utility Commissioners (NARUC) organizes educational sessions on
the state of the utility industry and utility regulation, suggests regulatory best
practices and compares state energy regulation, conducts policy advocacy on
certain shared views of PUCs, and publishes reports on utility regulation,

142. Implementation Options for EPA’s Proposed Clean Power Plan
Midcontinent States Regional Workshop, supra note 30.

Highlights from a

2016]

REGIONAL ENERGY GOVERNANCE

179

among other functions.143 NARUC‘s work and meetings provides a mechanism
for states to coordinate on CPP implementation, among a variety of other
energy issues.
In addition to sharing ideas and strategies for the most effective
compliance mechanisms for the CPP and agreeing on the type of plan to
implement in order to allow trading, regulated states with utilities that operate
in several states will need to discuss how the costs of new and expanded CPP
generation will be shared among ratepayers. Some states currently coordinate
generation policy and ratemaking to a limited extent. For example, in the
Pacific Northwest, one utility—PacifiCorp—owns the largest share of the
remaining coal plants.144 Many of these coal plants are located in Montana but
service other states like Idaho and Oregon.145 Because PacifiCorp owns
generation in multiple states and this generation services multiple other states,
PacifiCorp must approach each state PUC to obtain approval for the cost of
building new generation and importing electricity from out-of-state plants. The
states served by PacifiCorp have developed a regional approach that lessens the
burden on the utility, through which the six states served by PacifiCorp use a
formula that calculates the construction, operation, and financing costs incurred
by the utility in all six states and allocates costs among the states. However,
individual states may reject the costs that the formula suggests ratepayers in
each state should bear.146
A number of states also work together in the context of limiting carbon
emissions. In the most extensive examples of coordination, Mid-Atlantic and
Northeastern States through RGGI have already developed and implemented a
regional cap on greenhouse gas emissions and trading among power plants to
achieve this cap,147 drawing from the advice and expertise of states‘ utility and
environmental agencies. California has a similar cap148 on carbon emissions
from certain sources, including power plants,149 and it allows sources to trade
carbon allowances, including with sources in Canada that have linked their
trading system to California‘s.150 This degree of interstate (or, in California‘s
case, international) coordination requires relatively complex regional
governance structures, as discussed in further detail in Part III.151 These

143. Welcome, NAT‘L ASS‘N OF REGULATORY UTIL. COMM‘RS, http://www.naruc.org/ (last visited
Feb. 1, 2016).
144. Duncan, supra note 18, at 312.
145. Id. at 309.
146. Id. at 313.
147. Welcome, REG‘L GREENHOUSE GAS INITIATIVE, http://www.rggi.org/ (last visited Feb. 1,
2016).
148. CAL. CODE REGS. tit. 17, § 95841 (2016).
149. CAL. CODE REGS. tit. 17, § 95811 (2016).
150. Summary, CTR. FOR CLIMATE AND ENERGY SOLUTIONS, http://www.c2es.org/us-statesregions/key-legislation/california-cap-trade (last visited Jan. 24, 2016) (noting that in January 2014,
Quebec linked its carbon market to California‘s carbon market).
151. See infra Part III.
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interstate governance structures help inform efforts toward CPP coordination,
although states that choose to retain individual goals but engage in coordinated
compliance may not require such complex interstate coordination.
Indeed, some states produce opportunities for regional coordination
without formally working together. Researchers at Duke University note that
states like Missouri and Kansas have independently formed mechanisms for
trading credits created when renewable energy is generated, and these
mechanisms allow for interstate trading. These states define credits using the
same units, and they use the same ―bank‖ for tracking when the credits are
created and used.152 North Carolina, too, which requires utilities to generate or
purchase a certain percentage of renewable electricity, allows the utilities to
buy renewable energy certificates from other states to comply with this
regulation, provided that those states use a particular platform for tracking the
creation and use of the credits.153
Finally, many states coordinate in another area that will be essential for
CPP compliance—planning for the siting of transmission lines. For example,
the Committee on Regional Electric Power Cooperation, which consists of
representatives from state energy agencies, utility commissions, and facility
siting agencies within the Western Electricity Coordinating Council (WECC),
has been active since 1984. This group holds webinars to inform its state
members of issues such as the National Renewable Energy Laboratory‘s study
on better integrating wind and solar into energy systems and CPP compliance.
Many of the states that are members of this Committee were involved in an
extensive Western Governors‘ Association planning effort to identify the most
abundant, accessible renewable energy resources in the West and to prioritize
areas where transmission lines might be built based on this renewable energy
assessment.154
Although these various efforts at coordination—not to mention the many
regional efforts that convene states to facilitate aligning CPP compliance
discussed below—are valuable, CPP compliance will require some additional
forms of collaboration. This need stems in part from the fact that, as discussed
above, individual states have different fundamental regulatory systems for
energy based on whether they have a traditional system of vertically integrated
utilities or have restructured electric utilities to encourage more competition.155
Beyond the coordination issues made more complicated by the different
state energy systems, states will have to agree on several other issues specific to
the CPP. These include not only the choice between mass-based or rate-based
plans but also how compliance will be measured, whether states will rely only
on CPP-regulated sources or also on additional sources in order to comply, and
152.
153.
154.

MONAST ET AL., supra note 70, at 5.
Id.
W. RENEWABLE ENERGY ZONES, PHASE I REPORT (2009), www.westgov.org/component/
docman/doc_download/5-western-renewable-energy-zones-phase-1-report?Itemid=.
155. For sources on restructured versus nonrestructured states, see supra note 13.
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whether to develop an aggregate CPP goal or to retain individual state goals
and rely on coordinated compliance, among other decisions. None of the
current interstate entities discussed above are facilitating coordination at this
level of specificity with respect to CPP compliance. This enhanced
coordination will occur most effectively if a regional governance mechanism
exists through which states may discuss options, deliberate, and vote to approve
particular CPP approaches. Part III uses examples of other regional
organizations to suggest the types of regional CPP organizations states could
potentially create, and the voting mechanisms and procedures that the
organizations could potentially use, to agree upon the many facets of CPP
compliance.
b. Legal Considerations
Regardless of the approach chosen, in enhancing interstate coordination
under the CPP, states will have to navigate potential constitutional constraints
on their regulatory approaches. The dormant Commerce Clause156 limits the
ways in which state regulation can affect other states, while the Compact
Clause affects their ability to create agreements.157 These two constraints
interact, but both likely can be addressed through careful framing of CPP
implementation. The more that states cooperate in CPP implementation, the
less vulnerable their approaches are to dormant Commerce Clause challenges.
However, as they collaborate, states must be careful to structure institutional
arrangements in a way that does not raise Compact Clause concerns. This
subpart focuses on the potential dormant Commerce Clause challenges, and
Part III examines how states can develop regional approaches that avoid
Compact Clause hurdles.
Three recent dormant Commerce Clause lawsuits in the context of state
efforts to address climate change—California‘s Low Carbon Fuel Standard
(LCFS),158 Colorado‘s Renewable Energy Standard,159 and Minnesota‘s
Minnesota Next Generation Energy Act160—produce valuable lessons for CPP
implementation approaches. To date, courts have upheld the California and
Colorado provisions that were challenged, and struck down the Minnesota
one.161 However, these results may change upon appeal.
Although the California lawsuit focuses on transportation rather than
electricity, the Ninth Circuit‘s reasoning is relevant to CPP implementation.
The challenge to the LCFS focused on the law‘s use of lifecycle analysis in
assessing transportation fuel carbon intensity.162 Specifically, the LCFS takes
156.
157.
158.
159.
160.
161.
162.

This constraint has been inferred from the Commerce Clause. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 3.
Id. art I, § 10, cl. 3.
Rocky Mountain Farmers Union v. Corey, 730 F.3d 1070 (9th Cir. 2013).
Energy & Env‘t Legal Inst. v. Epel, 793 F.3d 1169, 1173 (10th Cir. 2015).
North Dakota v. Heydinger, 15 F. Supp. 3d 891 (D. Minn. 2014).
See sources infra notes 165, 168 & 169 and accompanying text.
Rocky Mountain Farmers Union, 730 F.3d at 1080–81.
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into account the greenhouse gas emissions resulting from the fuels‘ production
and transportation, which Midwestern ethanol producers claimed discriminated
against them due to the higher carbon emissions (and costs) associated with
out-of-state transport into California.163 The Ninth Circuit rejected this
reasoning, explaining:
Under dormant Commerce Clause precedent, if an out-of-state ethanol
pathway does impose higher costs on California by virtue of its greater
[greenhouse gas] emissions, there is a nondiscriminatory reason for its
higher carbon intensity value. Stated another way, if producers of out-ofstate ethanol actually cause more [greenhouse gas] emissions for each unit
produced, because they use dirtier electricity or less efficient plants, [the
California Air Resources Board] can base its regulatory treatment on these
emissions.164
In 2014, the Ninth Circuit denied en banc review and the Supreme Court
denied certiorari, though litigation continues over other issues regarding the
LCFS.165 For purposes of CPP implementation, the Ninth Circuit‘s reasoning
suggests that measures that affect other states‘ electricity markets should be
upheld if they have the nondiscriminatory purpose of greenhouse gas emissions
reduction.
The district court‘s reasoning in Energy and Environmental Legal Institute
v. Epel, which struck down a challenge by a pro-coal nonprofit and one of its
members to the Colorado Renewable Energy Statute, relates even more directly
to CPP implementation. In that case, petitioners claimed that the Colorado
law‘s requirement that Colorado electricity providers meet a ―Renewables
Quota‖ should be treated as constitutionally forbidden extraterritorial regulation
of out-of-state businesses. The district court took a similar approach to the
Ninth Circuit, with reasoning directly on point for CPP implementation.
Specifically, the opinion distinguishes between direct regulation of another
state‘s electricity markets and taking steps that affect those markets.
[T]he fact that [the incentive for Colorado utilities to buy renewable
electricity] may negatively impact the profits of out-of-state generators
whose electricity cannot be used to fulfil [sic] the Quota does not make the
Renewables Quota invalid. The dormant Commerce Clause neither protects
the profits of any particular business, nor the right to do business in any
particular manner.166
On appeal, the Tenth Circuit upheld this approach, noting that the
Colorado law ―isn‘t a price control statute, it doesn‘t link prices paid in
163.
164.
165.

Id. at 1092.
Id. at 1089–90.
Rocky Mountain Farmers Union v. Corey, 740 F.3d 507 (9th Cir. 2014) (denying rehearing
en banc); Rocky Mountain Farmers Union v. Corey, 134 S. Ct. 2875 (2014) (denying certiorari). The
district court considered some of these additional issues on remand. See Am. Fuels & Petrochem. Mfrs.
Ass‘n v. Corey, Nos. 1:09–cv–2234–LJO–BAM, 1:10–cv–163–LJO–BAM, 2015 WL 5096279 (E.D.
Cal. Aug. 28, 2015).
166. Energy & Env‘t Legal Inst. v. Epel, 43 F. Supp. 3d 1171, 1180 (D. Colo. 2014).
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Colorado with those paid out of state, and it does not discriminate against outof-staters.‖167 Petitioners filed a writ of certiorari with the Supreme Court,
which the Court denied in December 2015.168
The district court‘s and Tenth Circuit‘s reasoning in Energy and
Environmental Legal Institute fits CPP implementation well. When states
create individual plans to meet CPP targets, even if they affect other states‘
implementation due to their interconnected markets, the dormant Commerce
Clause should allow states to act with respect to their own generators. If they
collaborate, the issue becomes even easier; they are explicitly agreeing to the
ways in which they affect each other‘s implementation.
However, the district court opinion in North Dakota v. Heydinger, which
upheld a challenge by North Dakota, lignite coal industry representatives, and
multistate electric cooperatives to a provision of Minnesota‘s Next Generation
Energy Act, takes a very different approach from the other two opinions that
potentially raises issues for CPP implementation.169 The provision at issue in
Heydinger requires carbon dioxide offsets for imports of electricity into
Minnesota from new out-of-state coal-fired power plants. The district court‘s
opinion finding a violation of the dormant Commerce Clause indicated, in
particular, that the interstate electricity industry‘s participation in MISO gives
the regulation extraterritorial effect.170 If a court were to apply this broad view
of the reach of the dormant Commerce Clause to CPP implementation, it could
create a hurdle for all of the state implementation plans, whether states are
collaborating or not. Any effort by a state to reduce CO2 will likely affect
electricity markets across states, as discussed in the previous subpart.
Given the Supreme Court‘s denial of certiorari in the other two dormant
Commerce Clause cases, though, it seems unlikely that it will agree with the
Minnesota district court. Such reasoning would potentially have far-reaching
and problematic implications for state power well beyond CPP implementation;
it is hard to see how state PUCs could make almost any decision regarding
generation, or how state environmental agencies could implement cooperative
federalist environmental regulatory schemes, without implicating markets in
this way. In light of the embedded nature of states‘ powers in these areas and
the Supreme Court‘s approach thus far, it seems unlikely that the courts will
hold that nondiscriminatory action to meet CPP goals that impacts other states‘
electricity generators and markets is unconstitutional, even if Minnesota‘s
particular provision is still found to be problematic on appeal. The Colorado
district court‘s and Tenth Circuit‘s approach in Energy and Environmental
Legal Institute, on which the Supreme Court declined to grant certiorari, seems
to comport better with longstanding dormant Commerce Clause
167.
168.

Energy & Env‘t Legal Inst. v. Epel, 793 F.3d 1169, 1173 (10th Cir. 2015).
Energy & Env‘t Legal Inst. v. Epel, 136 S. Ct. 595 (2015) (denying certiorari); Petition for
Writ of Certiorari, Energy & Env’t Legal Inst., 136 S. Ct. 595 (No. 15-471), 2015 WL 5996408.
169. North Dakota v. Heydinger, 15 F.Supp. 3d 891 (D. Minn. 2014).
170. Id. at 915–19.
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jurisprudence.171 Further, states can avoid certain dormant Commerce Clause
challenges by entering into formal agreements with each other, although in
these cases, the Compact Clause might apply in minor ways, as discussed in
Part III.B.
3. Coordinating State, Regional, and Federal Generation Policies
Regional entities, in addition to states, impact decisions about the
construction of generation resources and how often these generation resources
operate; they will therefore be centrally involved in CPP implementation. Fully
capturing the governance challenge of melding a federal-state CPP with a
federal-regional-state energy system requires an understanding of the different
forms of regional grid operators. This subpart begins by providing this
overview, and then explores the challenges that CPP implementation provides
for coordinating among these multi-level entities, with a particular focus on the
evolving role of regional operators in melding energy and environmental law.
a. Regional Grid Divisions and Governance
This subpart explores the regional nature of the physical grid and the ways
in which governance has developed to match these physical characteristics. To
conceptualize regional grid operators, picture the national grid, which consists
of three large sets of interconnected transmission lines.172 Most of the
transmission lines in the western United States are connected to each other
through an array of lines, and this connected area of lines is called the Western
Interconnection.173 Similarly, most lines in the eastern United States are
connected to each other, forming the Eastern Interconnection. Texas only has
limited interconnections across its borders, which comprise the final
independent Texas Interconnect.174
Within each massive maze of wires that forms a large interconnection,
there are smaller portions of connected wires that form a natural, physical,
smaller unit of lines. An entity that has governance authority over a smaller unit

171. For scholarly analyses of these cases and their implications, see JACQUELINE PEEL & HARI M.
OSOFSKY, CLIMATE CHANGE LITIGATION: REGULATORY PATHWAYS TO CLEANER ENERGY? 296–98
(2015); Alexandra B. Klass & Elizabeth Henley, Energy Policy, Extraterritoriality, and the Dormant
Commerce Clause, 5 SAN DIEGO J. CLIMATE & ENERGY L. 127 (2013–2014); Daniel K. Lee & Timothy
P. Duane, Putting the Dormant Commerce Clause Back to Sleep Adapting the Doctrine to Support State
Renewable Portfolio Standards, 43 ENVTL. L. 295 (2013). For an analysis of the interaction between the
dormant Commerce Clause and broader efforts at interstate coordination in energy law, see Alexandra
B. Klass & Jim Rossi, Revitalizing Dormant Commerce Clause Review for Interstate Coordination, 130
MINN. L. REV. 129 (2015).
172. See Learn More About Interconnections, U.S. DEP‘T OF ENERGY, http://energy.gov/oe/
services/electricity-policy-coordination-and-implementation/transmission-planning/recovery-act-0 (last
visited Jan. 24, 2016).
173. See id.
174. See id.
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of connected lines within an interconnection is called a balancing authority.175
These balancing authorities, as well as balancing authorities that have merged
into larger units, are the regional grid operators that we described in the
Introduction. Every portion of each of the three large interconnections is
governed by a balancing authority,176 and these authorities play a central role in
ensuring grid reliability—a role that causes them to centrally impact decisions
regarding which types of fuels are used to generate electricity through capacity,
interconnection, dispatch, and transmission planning decisions.
In some cases, a regional authority controls an area that covers multiple
balancing authorities.177 This regional authority, which is called a coordinating
175. See FRANK DELEA & JACK CASAZZA, UNDERSTANDING ELECTRIC POWER SYSTEMS: AN
OVERVIEW OF THE TECHNOLOGY, THE MARKETPLACE, AND GOVERNMENT REGULATIONS 172 (2d. ed.
2010) (―The Balancing Authority operates within a predefined part of the electric grid whose boundaries
are metered. Each balancing area is unique and in the aggregate cover the entire grid. Every generator,
transmission facility, and end-use customer is in a Balancing Authority Area. The Balancing Authority‘s
mission is to maintain the balance between loads and resources in real time within its Balancing
Authority Area by keeping its actual interchange equal to its scheduled interchange and meetings.‖).
176. See id.
177. There are several types of regional grid operators due to federal law. From a geographic
(extent of the wires) perspective, the balancing authority is the smallest regional operator. The federal
entity that regulates electricity reliability—the North American Electric Reliability Corporation
(NERC)—requires that these authorities exist in order to ensure that the amount of electricity flowing
through the wires exactly matches demand, that wires are not overly congested, and that last-minute
sources of electricity can be brought on to the grid to address last-minute spikes in demand, in addition
to other reliability requirements. Sometimes, a balancing authority is simply one utility that owns and
operates wires within a particular portion of a state or region. Further, a higher-level authority, which
also typically operates at a broader geographic level than the balancing authority, must also ensure grid
reliability under NERC standards. This is called the Reliability Coordinator. Id. at 172 (―The Reliability
Coordinator is the highest operating authority; the underlying premise is that reliability of a wide area
takes precedence over reliability of any single local area.‖); N. AM. ELEC. RELIABILITY CORP. STD. IRO001-3 at 1, http://www.nerc.com/files/IRO-001-3.pdf (―Each Transmission Operator, Balancing
Authority, Generator Operator, and Distribution Provider shall comply with its Reliability Coordinator‘s
direction‖); Florida Reliability Coordinating Council (FRCC), N. AM. ELEC. RELIABILITY CORP.
http://www.nerc.com/pa/RAPA/ra/Pages/FRCC.aspx (last visited Feb. 16, 2016) (explaining that the
Florida Reliability Coordinating Council includes ten balancing authorities). Beyond the legally required
transmission authorities that must implement reliability standards, there are regional grid authorities that
have voluntarily developed in order to better coordinate generation markets. These grid authorities tend
to cause several balancing authorities to coordinate their transmission planning and dispatch activities
with each other. In some cases, these balancing authorities are combined into one larger balancing
authority that serves electricity market coordination functions in addition to reliability functions, or the
authorities maintain their separate status but coordinate their actions in order to better coordinate
electricity markets. Where several balancing authorities have been pulled together, either forming a
larger, single authority or causing numerous authorities to cooperate in operating electricity markets, this
is typically called a coordinating council, power pool, RTO, or ISO. See Clean Power Plan, supra note
1, at 64,693 (―In states with cost-of-service regulation of vertically-integrated utilities, the utilities
themselves form the balancing authorities who determine dispatch based upon the lowest marginal cost.
These utilities sometimes arrange to buy and sell electricity with other balancing authorities. RTOs and
ISOs coordinate, control, and monitor electricity transmission systems to ensure cost-effective and
reliable delivery of power, and they are independent from market participants.‖); id. at 64,691
(―[U]tilities began building larger transmission lines to deliver power in times when large generators
experienced outages. Eventually, some utilities that were in reserve sharing agreements formed electric
power pools to balance electric load over a larger area. Participating utilities gave control over
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council, independent system operator (ISO), or RTO, depending on its role in
the energy system,178 governs many aspects of generation resources and has
balancing responsibilities over this broader area.179 If individual balancing
authorities remain within the region, the coordinating council or RTO must
coordinate among these authorities, telling them when new generation will be
constructed and determining how these authorities will decide when and how
much electricity from this new generation can be sent through the wires at a
given time.180 (Intermittent resources like solar and wind can have a sudden
decline in electricity,181 thus requiring the grid operator to quickly draw
electricity from another source, and addressing this possibility requires
planning.) In some coordinating councils and RTOs, rather than having a
regional authority act as the go-between for various balancing authorities, the
balancing authorities are consolidated and cover the same region that is covered
by the council or the RTO.182
RTOs are different from coordinating councils primarily in the sense that
they have received official certification from FERC in the form of a tariff
issued to the RTO and approval of the organization itself. This tariff confirms
that the RTOs have full operational control over all of the lines in the region
and can call on various generation sources throughout the region when needed.
It also states that RTOs meet other requirements of being an official regional
grid operator—one with jurisdiction that extends well beyond the small unit of
an interconnection operated by a small balancing authority.183 To determine the
amount of generation that will dispatched at any given time, these RTOs—

scheduling and dispatch of their electric generation units to a system operator. Some power pools
evolved into today‘s RTOs and ISOs.‖). To be an RTO or ISO that runs sophisticated electricity
markets, a grid entity must meet certain FERC requirements and receive a tariff from FERC that allows
it to act as a regional grid operator and run energy markets. Where a regional grid entity like an RTO,
ISO, or coordinating council has formed in order to coordinate markets, this entity is typically also
designated as the Reliability Coordinator that answers to NERC. See Reliability Coordinators, N. AM.
ELEC. RELIABILITY CORP., http://www.nerc.com/pa/rrm/TLR/Pages/Reliability-Coordinators.aspx (last
visited Jan. 24, 2016) (listing the reliability coordinators as including RTOs and ISOs like MISO and
PJM Interconnection).
178. FERC approved ISOs under the Order 888 standards for regional organizations and approved
RTOs under the very similar Order 2000 standards. See Promoting Wholesale Competition Through
Open Access Non-Discriminatory Transmission Services; Recovery of Stranded Costs By Public
Utilities and Transmitting Utilities, 61 Fed. Reg. 21,540 (May 10, 1996) (codified at 18 C.F.R. pts. 35,
385). Since all current ISOs have nearly identical characteristics to RTOs, we do not treat ISOs as a
separatee category for the purposes of CPP analysis.
179. See supra note 177.
180. For a more detailed institutional analysis of the institutional roles of RTOs and coordinating
councils, see infra Part II.B.3.
181. Other power plants can also experience outages, and the grid can experience interruptions;
intermittent resources are therefore not the only cause of reliability concerns. All regional authorities
plan for plant outages and grid interruptions and for the resources needed to avoid and address these
problems. See MAKAROV ET AL., supra note 37, at 1.1 (describing regional entities‘ functions).
182. Id. at 1.2 (describing consolidation of balancing authorities in MISO).
183. Regional Transmission Organizations, 65 Fed. Reg. 810 (Jan. 6, 2000) (codified at 18 C.F.R.
pt. 35) (establishing the requirements for entities to be approved as RTOs).
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unlike less sophisticated balancing authorities and many coordinating
councils—also run complex wholesale energy markets, in which load-serving
entities that need electricity make bids in RTO-run auctions, generators that
provide electricity place offers through the auction, and a clearing price
emerges.184 Some coordinating councils similarly have this broad regional
control and have coordinated different balancing authorities,185 but they do not
operate regional auction-based markets for wholesale electricity. Instead, they
rely on utilities entering into bilateral contracts for electricity, which are
commitments to send a particular amount of electricity to the grid to another
utility. These coordinating councils also use additional commitments—
provided by independent generators and/or generators in bilateral contracts—to
satisfy demand and avoid outages when the grid needs more electricity.186
These regional entities—whether an RTO, coordinating council, or
balancing authority—are functionally separated from the states implementing
the CPP, although they frequently interact with the states and are influenced by
state groups designed to influence RTO policies. They also are not regulated
entities under the Clean Air Act that the CPP is implementing, and the
geographic territories that they serve differ substantially. For example, some
RTOs and coordinating councils operate a regional grid that stretches across
many states, while others cover only one state.187 However, they are essential
to CPP implementation because of their responsibilities for capacity,
interconnection, dispatch, and transmission planning.188 The following subpart
184. See ISO/RTO COUNCIL, PROGRESS OF ORGANIZED WHOLESALE ELECTRICITY MARKETS IN
NORTH AMERICA 1 (2007), http://web.mit.edu/cron/project/urban-sustainability/Old%20files%20from
%20summer%202009/Ingrid/Urban%20Sustainability%20Initiative.Data/Progress_of_Organized_Who
—-rom_10_ISOs___RTOs.pdf (―Two-thirds of the United States and more than 50 [percent] of
Canadian populations are supplied wholesale electricity through markets run by ISOs or RTOs.‖).
185. The Western Electricity Coordinating Council is an example of a highly developed entity with
many functions that parallel that of an RTO. It is organized into thirty-eight separate balancing
authorities, and ―is charged with coordinating and promoting Bulk Electric System reliability.
Additionally, WECC coordinates the operating and planning activities of its Western Interconnection
members.‖ Western Electricity Coordinating Council (WECC), W. INTERST. ENERGY BD., http://west
ernenergyboard.org/reliability/western-electricity-coordinating-council-wecc/ (last visited Feb. 3, 2016).
186. Udi Helman et al., The Design of US Wholesale Energy and Ancillary Service Auction
Markets Theory and Practice, in COMPETITIVE ELECTRICITY MARKETS: DESIGN, IMPLEMENTATION,
PERFORMANCE 179, 180 (Fereidoon P. Sioshansi, ed., 2008) (noting that only ISOs and RTOs operate
―organized regional bid-based auction markets for spot energy, various types of ancillary services, and
possibly capacity‖ and that other regions lack a ―co-ordinated spot energy market that encompasses the
territory of multiple utilities‖); MICHAEL MILLIGAN ET AL., NAT‘L. RENEWABLE ENERGY LAB.,
EXAMINATION OF POTENTIAL BENEFITS OF AN ENERGY IMBALANCE MARKET IN THE WESTERN
INTERCONNECTION at ix–x (2013), http://www.nrel.gov/docs/fy13osti/57115.pdf (describing the current
approach in the Western Electricity Coordinating Council to ensure that there is adequate electricity
flowing through the grid to meet ―load‖ (demand) and thus to avoid grid imbalances).
187. Single-state RTOs include the Electric Reliability Council of Texas and the California
Independent System Operator. See About ERCOT, ELECTRIC RELIABILITY COUNCIL TEX.,
http://www.ercot.com/ (last visited Aug. 9, 2015); About Us, CALIFORNIA INDEP. SYS. OPERATOR,
http://www.caiso.com/about/Pages/default.aspx (last visited Aug. 9, 2015).
188. Within these RTOs and coordinating councils, individual utilities own the transmission lines,
but they give up certain responsibility over operating the wires to regional entities. As we discuss in the
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explores how the roles of regional operators in the energy system present
opportunities for effective environmental-energy CPP governance, but will
need to change in some ways to accommodate evolving energy practices
caused by the CPP.
b. The Role of Regional Operators in CPP Implementation
Although states control many aspects of generation and will use those
powers in their implementation of the CPP or similar carbon rules, states do not
make all of the decisions relevant to that implementation because generated
electricity flows through regional transmission grids.189 The entities that
govern these regional grids, with guidance from the federal government, ensure
that: (1) enough generation capacity will be built to match future demand, and
that this capacity will fulfill both constant ―baseload‖ demand and peak
demand, pursuant to federal reliability requirements;190 (2) new generators can

Introduction, these regional entities must plan for new transmission needs in their regions, including
transmission to support grid reliability and state generation policies, such as policies that require a
certain amount of electricity to come from renewable resources. 18 C.F.R. 35 (2011); ISO/RTO
COUNCIL, INCREASING RENEWABLE RESOURCES: HOW ISOS AND RTOS ARE HELPING MEET THIS
PUBLIC POLICY OBJECTIVE (Oct. 16, 2007); Press Release, Midcontinent Indep. Sys. Operator, MISO
Furthers Wind Integration into Market (Jun. 1, 2011), https://www.misoenergy.org/AboutUs/Media
Center/PressReleases/Pages/MISOFurthersIntegrationofWindResources.aspx;
Market
Committee,
MIDCONTINENT INDEP. SYS. OPERATOR (Mar. 1, 2011), https://www.midwestiso.org/Library/
Repository/Meeting%20Material/Stakeholder/MSC/2011/20110301/20110301%20MSC%20Item%2012
a%20DIR%20Implementation%20Update.pdf. Regional grid operators also determine, with FERC
approval, how the costs of building new portions of the transmission grid and maintaining and operating
the grid will be allocated among grid users. These entities charge a fee of the utilities that use the grid to
transmit electricity, and this fee is allocated to different grid users based on how many costs these users
impose on the grid and how many benefits they receive from it. See Alexandra B. Klass & Elizabeth J.
Wilson, Interstate Transmission Challenges for Renewable Energy A Federalism Mismatch, 65
VANDERBILT L. REV. 1801, 1824–25 (2012) (discussing cost allocation policy); Ill. Commerce Comm‘n
v. Fed. Energy Regulatory Comm‘n, 721 F.3d 764 (7th Cir. 2013) (reiterating the cost allocation rule
that applies when FERC approves fees charged of utilities that use transmission lines—fees that cover
the costs of line construction and operation).
189. The extent of regional coordination required by the CPP and similar potential carbon
emissions governance strategies will differ geographically. Some states, like Florida, tend to have
relatively few regional transmission connections, and utilities operate a grid that is largely within the
state of Florida. See Home, FLA. RELIABILITY COORDINATING COUNCIL, INC., https://www.frcc.com
/default.aspx (last visited Feb. 3, 2016) (showing that one entity, the Florida Reliability Coordinating
Council, addresses the reliability aspects of Florida‘s grid solely within Florida, with the exception of
the panhandle, which is part of a larger reliability entity that covers much of the Southeast); Florida
Reliability Coordinating Council (FRCC), supra note 177 (showing sixty-eight balancing authorities
within the FRCC that dispatch electricity in order to balance supply). But even these relatively isolated
states might prefer to rely on more imported electricity to meet CPP goals, or export more electricity to
benefit their state‘s comparative advantage in low-carbon generation, and will still likely need to engage
in a moderate degree of regional coordination.
190. ERIK ELA ET AL., NAT‘L RENEWABLE ENERGY LAB , OPERATING RESERVES AND VARIABLE
GENERATION 1, 12 (2011), http://www.nrel.gov/docs/fy11osti/51978.pdf (―Power system operators have
a number of responsibilities that focus on maintaining reliability. System generation must be as close as
possible to the system load and electrical losses to ensure that system frequency is maintained at or very
close to nominal levels. . . This is achieved through numerous procedures on different time scales using
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interconnect with the transmission grid and thus generate electricity and send it
to customers; (3) at any given moment, enough electricity is dispatched (sent
through) the grid to exactly meet the quantity of electricity demanded;191 and
(4) there are adequate transmission lines to service existing generation and
allow new generators to come online. Thus, the regional grid operator
influences the type and amount of new generation constructed, as well as how
often this generation operates.
With respect to the construction of new plants, regional grid operators192
must follow federal guidelines for grid reliability. These operators must ensure
that there is adequate electricity to meet demand, and that the amount of
electricity demanded exactly matches the amount of electricity supplied, thus
avoiding voltage problems.193 Specifically, these operators must ensure that for
the transmission wires they control, there will be adequate generation
resources—called ―capacity‖—to satisfy all electricity demand within the
region now and in the future.194 These operators run auctions or use similar
mechanisms to obtain commitments from companies to build specific types of
generation.195
both economic response and deployment of reliability reserves with both centralized control and
autonomous response . . . [M]any of the properties of the power system, including its generation output,
load [electricity use] levels, and transmission equipment availability are both variable and unpredictable.
Therefore, additional capacity (generation and responsive load availability) above that needed to meet
actual load demands are made available either on-line or on-standby.‖).
191. These authorities must ensure that there is enough generation available ―to keep electric
energy supply and demand in balance at all times.‖ CHRISTENSEN ASSOCS. ENERGY CONSULTING,
MARKET STRUCTURES AND TRANSMISSION PLANNING PROCESSES IN THE EASTERN INTERCONNECTION
1, 18 (2012), http://www.naruc.org/grants/Documents/EISPC%20Market%20Structures%20Whitepaper
_6_15_12.pdf. Balancing authorities therefore must be able to dispatch generators at a given time to fill
generation need. N. AM. ELEC. RELIABILITY CORP., GLOSSARY OF TERMS USED IN NERC RELIABILITY
STANDARDS 1, 10 (2015), http://www.nerc.com/files/glossary_of_terms.pdf. A balancing authority is
―[t]he responsible entity that integrates resources plans ahead of time, maintains load-interchangegeneration balance within a balancing authority area, and supports the Interconnection frequency in real
time.‖ Id. at 10.
192. The EPA also refers to regional grid operators as ―system operators.‖ See Clean Power Plan,
supra note 1, at 64,693.
193. Regulators call markets that ensure that generation will be built and/or available in the future
―capacity markets.‖ Capacity Market (RPM), PJM INTERCONNECTION, https://learn.pjm.com/threepriorities/buying-and-selling-energy/capacity-markets.aspx (last visited Feb. 1, 2016).
194. See N. AM. ELEC. RELIABILITY CORP., 2014–2015 WINTER RELIABILITY ASSESSMENT at iii
(2014),
http://www.nerc.com/pa/RAPA/ra/Reliability%20Assessments%20DL/2014WRA_final.pdf
(―While NERC does not have authority to set Reliability Standards for resource adequacy—e.g., reserve
margin criteria—or to order the construction of resources or transmission, NERC can independently
assess where reliability issues may arise and identify emerging risks. This information, along with
NERC recommendations, is then made available to policy makers and federal, state, and provincial
regulators to support decision making within the electric sector.‖).
195. See Capacity Market (RPM), supra note 193. The ability of federally-regulated regional
authorities to influence generation through capacity decisions has recently been challenged. See N.J. Bd.
of Pub. Utils. v. Fed. Energy Regulatory Comm‘n, 744 F.3d 74, 79 (3d Cir. 2014) (affirming a FERC
order for the PJM RTO that ―required that load serving entities (LSEs) [utilities that provide retail
electric power] in the PJM market procure a certain amount of energy capacity—that is, additional
generation resources that the market may access during times of peak load‖); PPL EnergyPlus v.
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Capacity markets offered in some RTOs accept offers (bids) from
generators to provide needed generation capacity (such as a NGCC unit) in the
future.196 The RTO selects the capacity primarily on the basis of cost—not on
the type of generation—but some types of generation are treated differently in
capacity markets, which can influence the types of generation built.197 For
example, in the PJM capacity market, wind, solar, and hydroelectric generation
units are not required to meet certain capacity market rules—such as a
guarantee that the resources will be available at peak hours or during peak
seasons—and accordingly do not receive what is called a ―performance
incentive‖ payment for providing these types of services.198 States in areas with
RTOs that have capacity markets or RTOs willing to form capacity markets
will need to coordinate with RTOs to meld carbon reduction strategies, such as
enhanced construction of renewable plants, with reliability requirements in
capacity markets. Reliability requirements require RTOs to recognize the
intermittency of renewable resources, and the fact that these resources cannot
be called on at any hour of the day for a specific amount of electricity, when
RTOs allow these resources to bid into markets.199
RTO and state preferences for capacity do not always intersect, however,
and these conflicts could increase under the CPP. States can reject certain types
of generation altogether on economic grounds, thus influencing the type of
generation bid into regional capacity markets. For example, if a regional
operator held a capacity auction in which utilities offered to build generation
capacity, and a state prohibited utilities from building new nuclear plants
because it deemed these plants to be too expensive, the utility bidding into the
regional auction would avoid offering to build any new nuclear plants in that
state.200 But within the bounds of the types of generation allowed by states,

Nazardian, 753 F.3d 467 (4th Cir. 2014), cert. granted, 136 S. Ct. 382 (2015); PPL EnergyPlus v.
Solomon, 766 F.3d 241 (3d Cir. 2014) (certiorari petitions pending) (affirming a district court decision
finding that federal law, which applies to wholesale sales of electricity, preempted New Jersey law
aiming to require the construction of new generation capacity).
196. Capacity Markets, DIRECT ENERGY BUS., https://www.business.directenergy.com/
understanding-energy/managing-energy-costs/deregulation-and-energy-pricing/capacity-markets
(last
visited Aug. 12, 2015) (identifying four RTOs with capacity markets).
197. See Nat‘l Ass‘n of Clean Air Agencies, Revise Capacity Market Practices and Policies, in
IMPLEMENTING EPA‘S CLEAN POWER PLAN: A MENU OF OPTIONS 19-1, 19-4 (2015), http://www.4
cleanair.org/sites/default/files/Documents/Chapter_19.pdf (noting that many capacity markets have a
―near-term‖ (three-year) focus and thus do not create a certain market opportunity for generation
resources that cannot be built quickly, such as nuclear and hydroelectric projects).
198. Joseph Bowring, Capacity Markets in PJM, 2 ECON. ENERGY & ENVTL. POL‘Y 46, 54–55
(2013).
199. Id. at 49–50.
200. States may not deny nuclear plants on safety grounds but may deny them on the grounds that
they are too expensive for ratepayers. See Pac. Gas & Elec. v. State Energy Comm‘n, 461 U.S. 190
(1983) (California‘s moratorium on new nuclear plants was not preempted because the moratorium was
based on economic concerns regarding the costs of disposing of nuclear wastes); Entergy Nuclear
Vermont Yankee, LLC v. Shumlin, 733 F.3d 398 (2nd Cir. 2013) (state legislation requiring legislative
approval of nuclear plant preempted because the legislation was not required to open up electricity
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regional processes for securing generation reserves substantially influence the
type of new generation built. These processes likely will need to be redesigned
with increases in renewable generation and more frequent operation of natural
gas plants in mind.
Regional grid operators also influence power plants‘ construction and
operation, such as whether coal plants may reduce their generation and whether
renewable plants may increase their generation, in several ways. First, these
operators determine which new plants may connect to the grid, and when.201 If
a developer contemplating building a new renewable plant believes that the
wait for interconnection with a transmission line is too long—indeed, the
queues are notoriously long202—the developer might not choose to construct
the plant. RTOs, with FERC approval, have developed some procedures to
allow certain generation resources to reserve a spot earlier in the long
interconnection queue.203 However, operators may need to update
interconnection policies further—again, with FERC approval—to prioritize
low-carbon resources within the interconnection queue. An existing FERC
order specifying that interconnection decisions are to be made on a first-come,
first-served basis already provides some flexibility to operators to give certain
generators priority even if they joined the queue later,204 but additional updates
may be necessary.
Once a generation plant has been built, has connected to the grid, and is
able to send electricity through the grid, regional grid operators make
continuous dispatch decisions to determine how much electricity the generator
may send through the grid at any given time. Because electricity storage is

markets to competitors like renewable generators, and state legislators had made comments regarding
safety concerns). States do not face similar constraints for denying other types of generation, aside from
certain capacity decisions; nuclear is the only type of generation decision for which states face partial
federal preemption.
201. See, e.g., INTERCONNECTION REQUESTS FOR NEW ENGLAND CONTROL AREA: GENERATION,
ELECTIVE TRANSMISSION UPGRADE AND TRANSMISSION SERVICE REQUESTS, PROJECTS AS OF 2/1/2016
(2016) (showing the many generators waiting to be approved for interconnection with the transmission
lines controlled by the New England ISO); Standardization of Small Generator Interconnection
Agreements and Procedures, Order No. 792, 70 Fed. Reg. 71760 (Nov. 22, 2013) (codified at 18 C.F.R.
pt. 35); Open Access and Priority Rights on Interconnection Customer‘s Interconnection Facilities,
Order No. 807, 80 Fed. Reg. 17654 (Apr. 1, 2015) (codified at 18 C.F.R. pt. 35); Interconnection for
Wind Energy, Order No. 661, 70 Fed. Reg. 34993 (June 2, 2005) (codified at 18 C.F.R. pt. 35).
202. See, e.g., ISO New England Application Portal, INDEP. SYS. OPERATOR NEW ENG., INC.,
https://portal.iso-ne.com/uniquesigfc5f1422bcd98327808787b72cf49729/uniquesig0/SecurePORTAL
PortalHomePage/ (last visited Feb. 3, 2016).
203. For example, some grid operators hold ―open seasons‖ in which generators may commit to
interconnecting to the grid and pay a certain amount of money to demonstrate their sincere desire to
build generation and use the grid and to move ahead of certain other, less committed generators in the
queue. See, e.g., Fact Sheet, Bonneville Power Admin., Transmission to Offer Network Open Seasons
(Mar. 2008), https://www.bpa.gov/news/pubs/FactSheets/fs200803-Network%20Open%20Season.pdf.
204. Standardization of Generator Interconnection Agreements and Procedures, 106 F.E.R.C. ¶
61,220 (Mar. 5, 2004) (codified at 18 C.F.R. pt. 35).
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constrained,205 regional operators must constantly balance the exact amount of
electricity demanded with the exact amount of electricity supplied.206 As
introduced above, they do this through auctions (in the case of RTOs) or
contracts with generators in which generators commit to provide electricity
when it is needed.207
Regional operators dispatching electricity typically choose the least-cost
generation first208—thus often favoring fossil fuels over lower-carbon sources.
However, some RTOs have policies for the priority of dispatch that take into
account state carbon and renewable portfolio standards, as well as
considerations other than the lowest marginal cost of generation, which could
serve as a model for CPP implementation.209 A pre-CPP example from the
Pacific Northwest illustrates the ways in which regional operators, interacting
with FERC, will need to address these dispatch issues. California‘s renewable
portfolio standard and carbon cap led to a surge in wind farm construction.210
Yet the regional grid operator had an electricity ―redispatch‖ policy at the time
that prioritized certain hydroelectric power resources over certain wind
resources. This situation sometimes led to curtailment of electricity from wind
resources, which is a reduction in the amount of electricity accepted from these
resources, and led to a drawn-out battle before FERC. FERC ultimately

205. See Roger Lueken & Jay Apt, The Effects of Bulk Electricity Storage on the PJM Market, 5
ENERGY SYS. 677, 677 (2014) (noting that ―[e]lectric power systems‖ have storage capacity that is only
three percent of generation capacity and that this requires ―grid operators to continuously balance
generation and load‖).
206. Id.; DELEA & CASAZZA, supra note 175 (describing the role of balancing authorities in
matching electricity supply with load (use)).
207. See, e.g., EXETER ASSOCS. & GEN. ELEC. INTL., INC., REVIEW OF INDUSTRY PRACTICE AND
EXPERIENCE IN THE INTEGRATION OF WIND AND SOLAR GENERATION 5 (2012), http://www.pjm.
com/~/media/committees-groups/subcommittees/irs/postings/pris-task3b-best-practices-from-othermarkets-final-report.ashx (comparing some of the markets).
208. See id. Operators also tend to first dispatch baseload generation, which includes plants that
operate most efficiently if they run constantly rather than frequently shutting down and starting up.
209. See Electric Generator Dispatch Depends on System Demand and the Relative Cost of
Operation, ENERGY INFO. ADMIN. (Aug. 17, 2012), http://www.eia.gov/todayinenergy/detail.cfm
?id=7590 (―The exact order of dispatch varies across the United States, depending on such factors as
fuel costs, availability of renewable energy resources, and the characteristics of local generating units.‖);
Natalie Karas, Recommendations for Inter-Agency Regulatory Coordination Analyzing Reliability
Impacts of the EPA’s Clean Power Plan, 27 ELECTRICITY J. 103, 105 (2014) (―For economic and
technical reasons, nuclear plants in the United States are almost invariably operated as baseload units at
maximum output.‖). Plants that designate themselves as ―self-scheduled output‖ and notify the regional
entity of this designation are ―price-taking resources that prefer to operate regardless of the market price
for energy.‖ Further, considerations other than cost can be and already are considered in dispatch
decisions through ―self-scheduled output.‖ N.Y. INDEP. SYS. OPERATOR, COMMENTS OF THE ISO RTO
COUNCIL IN RESPONSE TO THE FEDERAL ENERGY REGULATORY COMMISSION‘S NOTICE OF INQUIRY
SEEKING PUBLIC COMMENT ON THE INTEGRATION OF VARIABLE ENERGY RESOURCES 75 (2010),
https://www.caiso.com/Documents/April12_2010Comments-ISO_RTOCouncil-notice-inquiry
inRM10-11_Integration-variableenergyresources_.pdf.
210. See CAL. ENERGY COMM‘N, RENEWABLE ENERGY OVERVIEW http://www.energy.ca.
gov/renewables/tracking_progress/documents/renewable.pdf; CAL. EPA, CAP-AND-TRADE-PROGRAM,
http://www.arb.ca.gov/cc/capandtrade/capandtrade.htm (last updated Jan. 13, 2016).
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directed the operator to change its redispatch policy to better accommodate
wind generators.211
Similarly, carbon reduction priorities will have to be added to and melded
with pre-existing grid operator dispatch priorities, and states and regional
entities will have to agree on these new rules. For example, a high-efficiency
natural gas or renewable energy plant should have high dispatch priority under
the CPP or similar rules addressing carbon emissions. But, that plant will not be
dispatched at certain times if it will cause grid reliability problems, or would
force a plant that generally must run without much interruption in order to be
economically and environmentally efficient, like an old coal-fired plant, to
ramp down (decrease electricity output) or temporarily shut down.
Furthermore, regional entities, which already have curtailment policies for
reducing the amount of generation from certain plants during times of low
demand, will have to modify these policies to incorporate CPP goals.212
Regional entities that dispatch electricity will also have to incorporate
states‘ energy efficiency approaches, including programs being designed as part
of CPP compliance and ones already being implemented for other purposes.
Although energy efficiency is not an official building block in the final plan,
the EPA indicates that states may use energy efficiency and other strategies that
are not ―building blocks‖ in the final version of the rule to achieve CPP
goals.213 Where sources in states that send electricity through a regional grid
rely on improving energy efficiency and reducing the use of electricity during
times of peak demand, thus reducing the need for the use of carbon-intensive
―peaker‖ power plants, regional grid operators will need to modify electricity
markets to accommodate this approach.
When a regional entity faces a certain amount of electricity demand, it has
two options: it can dispatch the amount of generation required to meet that
demand, or it can reduce the demand, thus reducing the need for new
generation. Reducing the demand for electricity in lieu of calling on new
generation is sometimes called ―virtual‖ generation: a regional entity can either
call on a power plant to generate more electricity, or it can call on a virtual
generator to reduce its electricity use.214 Many RTOs already allow virtual
211. Timothy P. Duane & Kiran H. Griffith, Legal, Technical, and Economic Challenges in
Integrating Renewable Power Generation in the Electricity Grid, 4 SAN DIEGO J. CLIMATE & ENERGY
L. 1, 20–32 (2012–2013). In California, the state has established a ―loading order‖ that directs utilities in
the priorities they should follow in dispatching electricity. Utilities are to prioritize, first, energy
efficiency and demand response (encouraging customers to reduce electricity use during peak demand
so that additional generation is not needed), second, renewable resources, and third, ―efficient natural
gas-fired power plants.‖ Letter from Mary D. Nichols, Chairman, Cal. Air Res. Bd., to Gina McCarthy,
Adm‘r, EPA 14 n.23, (Dec. 27, 2013), www.regulations.gov/contentStreamer?documentId=EPA-HQOAR-2014-0020-0085&disposition=attachment&contentType=pdf.
212. LORI BIRD ET AL., NAT‘L RENEWABLE ENERGY LAB., WIND AND SOLAR ENERGY
CURTAILMENT 5–15 (2014), http://www.nrel.gov/docs/fy14osti/60983.pdf.
213. See supra note 64 and accompanying text.
214. For a discussion of the role of virtual power plants in renewable energy integration, see Tildy
Bayar, Virtual Power Plants A New Model for Renewables Integration, RENEWABLE ENERGY WORLD
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generators to bid electricity ―negawatts‖ (nonuse) into markets, but the types of
markets vary and may need to be modified to accommodate states‘ CPP
planning for energy efficiency and demand response.215
Regional operators already have useful information about states‘ reliance
on energy efficiency and demand response, which will help these operators
forecast likely decreases in generation in certain areas. States that use
integrated resource plans, which address future generation capacity needed in
the state and how electricity demand can be reduced, typically incorporate
energy efficiency goals or mandates into their plans.216 Similarly, when utilities
submit information to states regarding their likely generation build-outs in the
future and their available generating capacity to demonstrate that they will be
able to fulfill demand, utilities also submit information about energy efficiency
that will reduce the need for certain new generation and demand response that
lowers peaking plant use, and regional operators can access this information.217
Finally, regional grid operators already incorporate energy efficiency and
demand response into their ―load forecasts,‖ which project future energy
demand.218 Enhanced state CPP programs for energy efficiency and demand
response could be plugged into these forecasts.
Beyond helping to plan for likely increases and reductions in certain types
of generation under the CPP for dispatch planning purposes, this information
will be critical for regional grid operators‘ timely development of new or
expanded transmission lines. These lines will be necessary to service new
power plants under the CPP—particularly renewable power plants219—and
plants operating more frequently.220 Enhanced transmission planning for the

(Sept. 30, 2013), http://www.renewableenergyworld.com/articles/print/volume-16/issue-5/solar-energy/
virtual-power-plants-a-new-model-for-renewables-integration.html.
215. Selling It by the Negawatt, THE ECONOMIST (Dec. 2, 2014), http://www.economist.com/
news/business-and-finance/21635404-demand-response-industry-consolidating-selling-electricitynegawatt. The Supreme Court‘s decision in Fed. Energy Reg. Comm‘n v. Elec. Power Supply Ass‘n,
136 S.Ct. 760 (Jan. 25, 2016) (revised Jan. 28, 2016), upheld FERC‘s authority to incentivize demand
response, which will help support these efforts by RTOs. Id.
216. See RACHEL WILSON & PAUL PETERSON, SYNAPSE ENERGY ECON., INC., A BRIEF SURVEY OF
STATE INTEGRATED RESOURCE PLANNING RULES AND REQUIREMENTS (2011), http://www.clean
skies.org/wp-content/uploads/2011/05/ACSF_IRP-Survey_Final_2011-04-28.pdf.
217. See, e.g., FLA. PUB. SERV. COMM‘N, REVIEW OF THE 2014 TEN-YEAR SITE PLANS FOR
FLORIDA‘S ELECTRIC UTILITIES (2014), http://www.psc.state.fl.us/Files/PDF/Utilities/Electricgas/Ten
YearSitePlans/2014/TYSP2014.pdf.
218. See, e.g., PJM INTERCONNECTION, PJM LOAD FORECAST REPORT 65 (2015), https://www.
pjm.com/~/media/documents/reports/2015-load-forecast-report.ashx.
219. Cf. CALVERT ET AL., LOW WIND SPEED TECHNOLOGY DEVELOPMENT IN THE U.S.
DEPARTMENT OF ENERGY WIND ENERGY RESEARCH PROGRAM 2 (2002), http://www.nrel.gov/docs/
fy02osti/32512.pdf (noting an average distance of five hundred miles between load centers (areas of
high electricity demand) and the best wind energy sites—those with high and relatively constant wind
speeds).
220. See Ill. Commerce Comm‘n v. Fed. Energy Regulatory Comm‘n, 721 F.3d 764, 781 (7th Cir.
2013) (affirming FERC‘s approval of MISO‘s allocation of costs among utilities that use the new
transmission lines and pay fees for use of the lines).
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CPP will require regional operators to have more detailed and regular
communication with states and with utilities operating within and across states.
Given the very limited federal eminent domain authority to site
transmission lines,221 regional transmission entities like RTOs have already
played a key role in planning for needed new transmission—indeed, they are
required by FERC to conduct regional transmission planning.222 In addition,
these operators determine how the costs of paying for the new transmission
lines will be divided among the utilities that use the lines, and FERC approves
or rejects these cost allocation approaches.223 One ISO‘s pre-CPP experience in
planning for how to expand and pay for new transmission lines provides
valuable lessons for how RTOs can facilitate the transmission planning needed
to meet CPP goals and expansions of renewable generation that are occurring
even without the CPP. Through a process called multi-value planning (MVP),
MISO coordinated closely with states and other stakeholders to develop a
successful plan to build new transmission lines and allocate costs among
utilities for the purposes of improving grid reliability and connecting renewable
generation to more population centers.224
Finally, beyond their important specific governance functions related to
the CPP, RTOs have hundreds of members, which include states, electricity
consumers, and utilities, and the RTOs often convene stakeholder groups that
influence RTO decisions.225 Moreover, RTOs already have developed
sophisticated regional governance structures relevant to CPP planning, as
shown by the MISO MVP example.226 But RTOs may need to include more
and different stakeholders in CPP decision-making processes, and states and
state PUCs will likely need to have more influence within these processes. A

221. See Klass & Wilson, supra note 188. For discussion of state siting issues, see Ashira Pelman
Ostrow, Process Preemption in Federal Siting Regimes, 48 HARV. J. ON LEGIS. 289 (2011).
222. Under a recently-released FERC order, all regional entities are required to conduct
transmission planning to support reliability and state resources plans such as renewable portfolio
standards, which require a certain percentage of electricity to come from renewables. Transmission
Planning and Cost Allocation by Transmission Owning and Operating Public Utilities, 76 Fed. Reg.
49,842 (Aug. 11, 2011) (codified at 18 C.F.R. pt. 35) (discussing the Order 1000 requirements).
223. See Ill. Commerce Comm’n, 721 F.3d 764 (affirming an independent system operator‘s
method of allocating costs among utilities for new transmission lines built to connect new wind energy
to the grid and to improve reliability of electric power provided within the region); Ill. Commerce
Comm‘n v. Fed. Energy Regulatory Comm‘n, 756 F.3d 556 (7th Cir. 2014) (invalidating FERC‘s
methodology for approving the PJM RTO‘s plan for allocating costs among utilities that the RTO
believed would all benefit from new high-voltage lines to be built within the eastern portion of the
RTO).
224. MIDCONTINENT INDEP. SYS. OPERATOR, CANDIDATE MVP PORTFOLIO STUDY, https://
www.midwestiso.org/Planning/Pages/MVPAnalysis.aspx (last visited July 16, 2012) (―High-level study
updates were provided at the Planning Advisory Committee (PAC), Planning Subcommittee (PS) and
the Subregional Planning Meetings (SPMs).‖).
225. See, e.g., Membership List, MIDCONTINENT INDEP. SYS. OPERATOR, https://www.misoenergy
.org/StakeholderCenter/Members/Pages/MembershipList.aspx (last visited Feb. 3, 2016).
226. See MIDCONTINENT INDEP. SYS. OPERATOR, AT-A-GLANCE 24 (2015), https://www.miso
energy.org/Library/Repository/Communication%20Material/Corporate/At-A-Glance.pdf.
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range of other institutional decisions must be made, including whether a
subgroup of the RTO should make CPP decisions or whether an independent
regional organization should be formed that would advise the RTO on needed
changes to its curtailment and dispatch policies. Among other changes, these
decisions would include who should be a member of the RTO subgroup or
independent group; how much voting power each member should have; what
type of vote would be required to change regional procedures to accommodate
the CPP—for example, whether a majority vote would be required to change
the curtailment and dispatch policies to incorporate CPP resources—and so on.
Part III provides examples of other regional organizations that have had to
make similarly thorny institutional decisions. Their experiences provide models
for how states might best coordinate—through existing RTOs or newly formed
regional groups—in meeting CPP goals or similar carbon reduction
requirements.
Thus far this subpart has explored ways in which regional operators, in
their interactions with states, will need to evolve their approaches to address the
CPP. However, energy governance—and the challenge of mapping
environmental law onto energy law regimes—is further complicated by the fact
that the federal government guides regional grid governance, but not to the
extent that all regional grid policies are identical. Regional entities make gridbased determinations under FERC and North American Electric Reliability
Corporation (NERC) rules. NERC, overseen by FERC,227 requires regional
operators to ensure grid reliability—that there will be enough electricity to
satisfy demand at all times and that the amount of electricity supplied matches
the amount of electricity drawn from the grid, thus ensuring proper voltage
within the wires.228 Different regions have different reliability policies—for
example, different RTOs have different reserve capacity requirements229—but
all must comport with these federal goals. The CPP will require certain high
CO2 generation resources to be used less often or to be fully retired and will
thus demand changes to reliability policies. Regional entities will need new
mechanisms for harmonizing CPP goals with reliability standards230 and for
better quantifying the reliability impacts of the CPP—a project that has already
begun but must substantially expand.

227. Reliability Standards, N. AM. ELEC. RELIABILITY CORP., http://www.nerc.com/pa/Stand/
Pages/ReliabilityStandards.aspx (last visited Feb. 3, 2016). We have analyzed NERC in depth in
Osofsky & Wiseman, supra note 40. FERC reviews and can change NERC reliability standards and, in
addition to NERC, can penalize utilities and regional entities that fail to meet reliability standards.
228. See Frequently Asked Questions, N. AM. ELEC. RELIABILITY CORP. 1–2, http://www.nerc
.com/AboutNERC/Documents/NERC%20FAQs%20AUG13.pdf (last visited Feb. 6, 2016).
229. See supra note 194.
230. See, e.g., Karas, supra note 209, at 108 (noting the need to understand how regional entities
that have incorporated renewable energy requirements into their markets have dealt with reliability
concerns and to discuss ―[t]he methodologies used to analyze the reliability impacts of the Clean Power
Plan‖).
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In addition, FERC requires the transmission lines run by the regional grid
operator to be available on an open-access basis and sets the procedures the
grid operator must follow to accept and honor interconnection requests.231 Any
generator who wishes to use the grid must have the opportunity to access
(interconnect with) the grid, and to send electricity through the grid if there is
adequate space and the interconnection and dispatch of electricity will not
negatively impact reliability. Thus, the regional entity that governs the grid
must obtain a tariff (―license‖) from FERC containing these and other terms of
service.232 The tariff also sets the fee that the regional entity may impose on
grid users.
Part of what makes these coordination efforts complex is that they must
integrate interrelated state, RTO, and federal authority. Many of these changes
will only require modification of PUC and regional grid organization policy,
and the fact that state PUCs and regional grid organizations already make many
of the types of generation decisions required by the CPP or potential similar
carbon reduction strategies presents opportunities for effective carbon
governance. But not all of these changes will be simple, and more coordination
as well as added decision-making criteria for certain efforts, such as
interconnection and transmission planning policy, will be necessary.
4. Coordinating Regional Grid Operators
The CPP will not only require better coordination between states and
regional grid operators and between grid operators and the federal government;
it will also necessitate enhanced interregional coordination. This complex
coordination will be important to addressing expanded transmission that
crosses the ―seams‖ between regions—areas where two regional grids come
together—as well as the interconnection of new renewables throughout several
regions. Further, regional grid operators will need to consider coordinating
reserve capacity across several regions and dispatching renewables from
different regions to balance out intermittency. This subpart focuses on these
interregional coordination issues.
Grid operators already work together—in part due to FERC requirements
for interregional coordination and in part due to the efficiencies gained when
grid operators cooperate across the seams. Balancing authorities, coordinating
councils, RTOs, and ISOs coordinate when planning for expanded transmission
lines, exploring how and to what extent new lines should interconnect across
regions. Through periodic reports, regional grid operators must describe to
FERC how they coordinate their plans for expanding transmission with
231. Promoting Wholesale Competition Through Open Access Non-Discriminatory Transmission
Services by Public Utilities; Recovery of Stranded Costs by Public Utilities and Transmitting Utilities,
61 Fed. Reg. 21,540 (May 10, 1996) (codified at 18 C.F.R. pt. 35, 385).
232. In cases where there is only minimal regional grid governance, individual utilities that own
the wires obtain a tariff from FERC.
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neighboring operators.233 Regional grid operators also discuss generation
reserves and, to some extent, coordinate planning for the amount of reserves
required in each region.234 In addition, certain interregional dispatch of
electricity occurs.235
However, this interregional planning and activity will have to increase
under the CPP for interstate approaches to be successful. WIRES, a group of
utilities and RTOs focused on facilitating the development of transmission lines
needed to advance energy transmission, has stressed the importance of
interregional planning particularly from the perspective of expanding the
transmission grid.236 Working group members note that interregional
coordination of planning for new transmission lines to accommodate new
renewable generation, and to enhance reliability when certain plants are retired
and other plants must be operated more frequently, will be essential to CPP
compliance.237 For example, if numerous states comply with the CPP by
signing up for ready-for-interstate-trading, in which sources in the state can
trade carbon allowances with sources in any other state that has also signed on
to the ready-for-interstate-trading plan,238 large quantities of new renewable
generation are likely to be built in areas of the United States with abundant sun
and wind. This renewable generation will create credits that can be sold to
sources that have trouble meeting their CO2 reduction requirements.
Compliance with the CPP thus will necessitate more sophisticated planning
across regions for new wires and interconnections; new dispatch policies; and
complex planning for generation reserves, or drawing from resources in a
broader region, in the event that intermittent renewable resources cause
reliability concerns.

233. See, e.g., INDEP. SYS. OPERATOR NEW ENG., INC., AMENDED AND RESTATED NORTHEASTERN
ISO/RTO PLANNING COORDINATION PROTOCOL (2015), http://www.pjm.com/~/media/documents/
agreements/NE_Protocol.ashx.
234. See, e.g., Electric Power Markets Northwest, FED. ENERGY REGULATORY COMM‘N,
http://www.ferc.gov/market-oversight/mkt-electric/northwest.asp (last updated Nov. 3, 2015) (noting in
the western United States, where there are few RTOs or ISOs, ―[a]lthough the BAs [balancing
authorities] operate autonomously, some have joint transmission-planning and reserve-sharing
agreements‖).
235. See ENERGY INFO. ADMIN., ELECTRICITY MARKET MODULE 113 (2015), http://www.eia
.gov/forecasts/aeo/assumptions/pdf/electricity.pdf (noting that the ―flow of power from region to region‖
occurs in the form of ―trading of capacity and energy to help another region satisfy its reserve margin
requirement‖ and ―economic transactions‖ that ―involve energy transactions motivated by the marginal
generation costs of different regions‖).
236. See WIRES, supra note 32, at 2 (supporting more interregional transmission planning and
observing that ―[a] strong grid can help ensure that the transformative impacts of the CPP on the
generation mix and system flows do not undermine electric reliability while also ensuring that the CPP
itself is achievable as a practical matter. In other words, transmission provides the optionality and
flexibility to accommodate the various possible end [] states that the rule will drive and about which we
now can only speculate‖).
237. Id.
238. Clean Power Plan, supra note 1, at 64,832–33.
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With respect to dispatch, in order to ensure that electricity can seamlessly
flow among regions, different regional markets have to adopt interchangeable
protocols for scheduling electricity flows—ensuring that the codes in the
computer systems used for dispatch, and dispatch procedures, are
compatible.239 When RTOs form and expand territories, they follow specific
protocols for melding together the many different seams between balancing
authorities and offering ―one stop shopping‖ for any entity that wishes to send
electricity through the grid or purchase electricity.240 Further, non-RTO
regional operators like coordinating councils also work to develop ―consistent
Market Interface practices and compatible commercial practices‖ among
balancing authorities.241
Despite this progress, much work remains to be done. For example, within
the WECC, which consists of more than thirty balancing authorities as well as
―subregional transmission planning groups,‖ different balancing authorities
have varying methodologies through which generators commit to provide
electricity when it is needed and determine how and when electricity should be
dispatched. In addition, some balancing authorities have systems for
automatically scheduling certain generators to come online, whereas others
require generators to do ―self-scheduling‖ to indicate when they will be sending
electricity through the grid.242 The WECC must coordinate these different
systems and methodologies,243 and there have been proposals to implement a
dispatch market within the WECC—one that would be uniform throughout the
region—to more efficiently schedule and dispatch generation.244
Moreover, to fully integrate electricity markets across different regions,
beyond more coordinated planning and new dispatch markets, computer
software that forms the backbone for the dispatch of electricity through the
transmission grid may have to be updated to recognize certain generation
priorities under the CPP.245 For example, new codes might be needed for CPPspecific dispatch.

239. WILLIAM W. HOGAN, INTERREGIONAL COORDINATION OF ELECTRICITY MARKETS 9 (2001),
http://www.hks.harvard.edu/fs/whogan/mult_hogan_FERC_061901.pdf.
240. KATHLEEN A. CARRIGAN, AN OVERVIEW OF THE PROPOSAL TO CREATE REGIONAL
TRANSMISSION ORGANIZATION FOR NEW ENGLAND (2003), https://www.google.com/url?sa=t&rct
=j&q=&esrc=s&source=web&cd=5&ved=0CDcQFjAEahUKEwislIW6hprJAhXDeSYKHW2yAso&url
=http%3A%2F%2Fwww.iso-ne.com%2Fcommittees%2Fcomm_wkgrps%2Fprtcpnts_comm
%2Fprtcpnts%2Fmtrls%2F2003%2Fsep52003%2F2003.09.05%2520CK%2520NPC%2520RTO%2520
update.PPT&usg=AFQjCNHRQEYqXwyyTqkmBFc7HUhaIqjIsg&sig2=hYkTcPGM0wV5fF3IsFAog&bvm=bv.107763241,d.eWE&cad=rja.
241. Market Interface Committee, W. ELECTRICITY COORDINATING COUNCIL, https://www.wecc.
biz/MIC/Pages/Default.aspx (last visited Feb. 3, 2016).
242. Id.
243. Milligan, supra note 186, at ix–x.
244. Id. at x (describing a proposed Energy Imbalance Market for rapid dispatch in the WECC).
245. Helman et al., supra note 186, at 236 (noting that ―software has been a limiting factor in the
development of efficient market designs,‖ that ―existing ISO software and data systems are a result of
market start-up decisions as well as patches resulting from continual change and improvement,‖ that
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Table 1 summarizes the many types of enhanced coordination discussed
throughout this institutional analysis that will have to occur under the CPP and
as a result of the current shift toward lower-carbon sources that is already in
progress due to market and other forces. It also summarizes potential barriers to
this coordination and the most promising opportunities for overcoming these
barriers.
Table 1. Factors Necessitating Institutional Changes, Potential
Barriers, and Opportunities for Overcoming Barriers
Coordination Needed

Barriers
Intra- and Interstate

Opportunities

Selecting a common
measurement/compliance
approach (mass- or ratebased) and addressing
environmental and energy
goals

Political differences
(see Part II.C)

States are coordinating
through organizations such
as NARUC246 and
MSEER.247

Restructured states: may
need to encourage the
construction of certain
types of generation

Some states currently
do not individually
approve the need for
construction of new
renewable energy
infrastructure or how
much it may cost.

Many states have
renewable portfolio
standards that encourage
renewable energy
construction.248

Certificate of need and
rate recovery processes
for new and expanded
generation have not
generally incorporated
carbon considerations.

States can update
environmental cost
recovery proceedings to
incorporate CPP factors.249

Regulated states

CPP will produce market
signals for construction of
lower-carbon generation.

―changes to a single software system may require changes to many software and data systems,‖ and that
―[c]urrently, there is a significant backlog of improvements in each ISO‖).
246. See supra note 143 and accompanying text.
247. See infra note 142 and accompanying text.
248. See supra note 134 and accompanying text.
249. See supra note 129 and accompanying text.
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Coordination Needed

Barriers
Sources that wish to
build low-carbon
generation in the state
to provide
allowances/credits for
other states may not be
considered ―needed‖
and may not be
approved.
States may need to
divide up costs of
newly built CPP
generation among
ratepayers in different
states.

201

Opportunities
States can modify process
for approving ―needed‖
generation to incorporate
CPP considerations.
PacifiCorp example
shows that some states
have developed model
calculations for sharing of
rates among ratepayers in
different states.250

State-regional-federal
Planning for the
construction of new
generation capacity

States, through siting
and certificate of need
determinations,
sometimes block
generation encouraged
by regional entities or
the federal
government.251

Regional grid operators
will need a better
understanding of which
new capacity is likely
to be built to comply
with the state plan and
to take advantage of

250.
251.
252.
253.

Some RTOs operate
capacity markets, and CPP
would impact which
resources tended to bid
into those markets.252
To the extent that the CPP
did not change bidding,
RTOs could add a CPP
factor when selecting
capacity bids.
States have organizations
to communicate with
RTOs and to support or
oppose certain RTO
efforts, including capacitybased efforts. 253

See supra note 146 and accompanying text.
See supra note 186 and accompanying text.
See supra note 13.
See, e.g., OMS Purpose, ORG. OF MISO STATES, http://www.misostates.org/ (last visited, Feb.
2, 2016) (describing the organization‘s functions).
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Coordination Needed

Planning for new
interconnections for new
and expanded CPP
generation

Barriers
trading opportunities.
Interconnection queues
are very long.254
Regional operators may
need to create uniform,
updated rules for
prioritizing the
interconnection of CPP
resources.

Generators will need to
balance intermittent
resources and
potentially expand
connections across
regions to enhance
geographic diversity.
Dispatching more
renewable energy and
natural gas

Currently, regional
operators rely on costbased dispatch,
prioritizing the lowestcost resources first.
For states that rely on
energy efficiency to
help achieve CPP
requirements, for
purposes of capacity
and dispatch regional

254
255
256
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Opportunities

Existing FERC orders
provide some flexibility in
the transmission queue,
and some regional
operators have already
implemented strategies,
such as open seasons, for
allowing certain types of
resources to move ahead in
the queue.255
Discussions for
interregional balancing of
intermittent resources or
the creation of new grid
authorities devoted to
balancing of intermittent
resources are underway.256
Due to the CPP‘s impact
on carbon prices and
generators‘ internalization
of CPP compliance needs,
generators‘ bids into
regional markets might
reflect priority of lowcarbon resources.
Some RTOs conduct
limited environmental
dispatch,257 and lessons

See supra note 202 and accompanying text.
See supra notes 203-204 and accompanying text.
See, e.g., Two New Western Balancing Authorities Proposed by Constellating Energy,
TROUTMAN SANDERS LLP, http://www.troutmansandersenergyreport.com/2012/07/two-new-westernbalancing-authorities-proposed-by-constellation-energy/
(last visited, Feb. 2, 2016) (discussing
proposed formation of two new balancing authorities within the WECC to support wind generation);
supra note 235–236; MICHAEL MILLIGAN ET AL., COMBINING BALANCING AREAS‘ VARIABILITY:
IMPACTS ON WIND INTEGRATION IN THE WESTERN INTERCONNECTION (2010), http://www.nrel
.gov/docs/fy10osti/48249.pdf (discussing possibilities for balancing wind variability through integration
of different balancing areas within the Western Interconnect).
257 See supra note 211.
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Coordination Needed

Planning for expanded
and new transmission to
newly built CPP plants
and plants that will
operate more due to the
CPP

Barriers
operators will need to
know which generating
units will likely operate
less due to lower
energy demands.

States, in projecting the
likely expansion of
generation that will
occur for compliance so
that plants can benefit
from trades, will need
to communicate
transmission needs to
regional operators.

Regional operators will
need to enhance and
speed up transmission
planning processes.

258.
259.
260.

See supra notes 214–215 and accompanying text.
See supra notes 241-244 and accompanying text.
See supra note 224 and accompanying text.
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Opportunities
from existing models could
be transferred to other
RTOs.

Regional operators allow
bidding of energy nonuse
into markets and
incorporate energy
efficiency into load
forecasts.258
Regional operators
currently must plan for
regional transmission
expansions under FERC
rules.259 Successful
planning for expanded
transmission to enhance
reliability and connect to
new renewable
infrastructure driven by
state policy260
demonstrates that regional
operators can work with
states to successfully
enhance planning
processes.
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Coordination Needed

Barriers
Region-region

Opportunities

Expanding transmission
across the seams where
regional grids
interconnect; balancing
intermittent renewable
generation; improving
dispatch across the seams

To accommodate more
renewable
infrastructure, operators
will need to address
intermittency by
expanding the
geographic diversity
and type of renewable
infrastructure; more
electricity may need to
be dispatched across
different regions.
Regions may need to
create more uniform
dispatch practices and
codes.

FERC requires some
interregional transmission
coordination, and groups
like WIRES have stressed
the importance of more
interregional planning for
cross-seam transmission
expansion.261 Regional
operators such as the
Western Electricity
Coordinating Council have
discussed potentially
uniform dispatch
markets.262

As this summary reinforces, the CPP‘s multistate options provide an
important foundation for states, states and regional organizations, and regional
organizations across regional lines, to cooperate in ways that will reduce costs
and maintain reliability. And existing institutions, including regional grid
operators, as well as existing rules and processes such as interregional
transmission planning, support interstate CPP compliance. But these existing
institutions—while presenting an important starting point due to their current
efforts to address the transitions in the energy system—do not fully address the
many ways in which environmental and energy institutions from all levels of
government will need to collaborate for effective implementation. As Part III
analyzes in depth, building from multistate options to facilitate effective
interstate cooperation in a regionally organized energy system will require key
choices about institutional structuring.
C. Political Differences
In addition to requiring changes to existing regional energy governance
and coordination of varied, independent state policies for generation, CPP
implementation takes place against the backdrop of significant partisan divides
261.
262.

See, e.g., WIRES, supra note 32, at 2.
See supra notes 241- 244 and accompanying text; (discussing possible integration of different
balancing authorities in order to integrate variable resources).
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over climate change and energy transition. The country is far more split along
partisan lines than it was two decades ago, with these issues being among the
most contentious.263 Moreover, states within the same energy regions often are
on opposite sides of these issues and have difficult political and legal
relationships around them, at times even involving lawsuits.264
To a large extent, however, the need to find practical implementation
solutions if the CPP survives judicial challenges—and solutions for a future,
similar rule that would likely replace the CPP if the CPP were reversed by the
Supreme Court or withdrawn by a new president—seems to be overcoming
these political differences. Even among states that vary greatly politically,
institutional complexities, such as the inability to trade easily between massbased and rate-based states, seem to serve as a greater barrier to cooperation
than political disagreements. The Supreme Court‘s February 2016 granting of a
stay of the CPP may slow cooperative efforts during the pendency of the
litigation, and the outcome of the 2016 presidential election will impact the
CPP‘s long-term prospects. But the efforts thus far at regional coordination and
state-level planning are a promising sign that practical considerations rather
than partisan politics will largely guide implementation decisions.265 This
subpart explores the politics of the CPP and how they interact with regional
governance.
1. Partisanship over the Clean Power Plan
For the purposes of regional implementation of the CPP, state partisanship
at first blush poses a formidable potential barrier because of the very different
positions states within the same energy regions have taken on the plan. When
the EPA released the final CPP in August 2015, the responses were predictable.
Just as with the release of the draft plan in 2014, Republicans were quick to
condemn the new standards as a ―war on coal,‖ while Democrats, with the
exception of some from major coal states, largely supported it.266 Opponents of

263. PEW RESEARCH CENTER FOR THE PEOPLE AND PRESS, PARTISAN POLARIZATION SURGES IN
BUSH, OBAMA YEARS: TRENDS IN AMERICAN VALUES 1987–2012, http://www.peoplepress.org/2012/06/04/section-1-understanding-the-partisan-divide-over-american-values/;
Hari
M.
Osofsky & Jacqueline Peel, Energy Partisanship, __ EMORY L.J. __ (forthcoming 2016).
264. See infra Part II.B.1.
265. See id.
266. Edward Felker, Lawmakers Take Partisan Swipes over EPA Carbon Rule, ENERGY
GUARDIAN (July 30, 2014), http://energyguardian.net/lawmakers-take-partisan-swipes-over-epa-carbonrule; Ben Kieffer & Katherine Perkins, Obama’s Clean Power and the GOP Response, IOWA PUB.
RADIO (Aug. 5, 2015), http://iowapublicradio.org/post/obamas-clean-power-and-gop-response#stream/0.
Support and opposition do not consistently break down neatly along partisan lines, however, and in
some states one political leader, such as the governor, supports the CPP, and another political leader,
such as the state attorney general, opposes it. For a discussion of different factors contributing to CPP
opposition and support and instances of split support and opposition, see Adelman & Spence, supra note
3.
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the plan have sought to block implementation along multiple pathways,
including through federal and state legislation and judicial challenges.267
In June 2015—a few weeks before the final plan was released—the House
of Representatives passed the Ratepayer Protection Act, a law introduced by
Energy and Power Subcommittee Chairman Ed Whitfield (R-KY).268 This bill,
which has little prospect of becoming law, focuses on extending the rule‘s
compliance dates and allowing states to avoid implementation if the governor,
in consultation with relevant state officials, determines that compliance would
adversely affect retail, commercial, or industrial ratepayers or the electricity
system‘s reliability.269 On November 17, 2015, in the lead up to the
negotiations in Paris on the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate
Change (UNFCCC), the Senate passed resolutions (with fifty-two votes in
favor and forty-six votes opposed) to block the CPP and the EPA‘s regulation
of new power plants.270
During the international negotiations, Congressional Republicans
continued to show their opposition, with the House passing the antiregulatory
resolutions and Senator Ted Cruz holding a hearing on climate change
science.271 As expected, President Obama vetoed these resolutions through
choosing not to act (known as a pocket veto) shortly after the international
negotiations concluded.272 So, like the Ratepayer Protection Act, these
resolutions and the hearings were primarily symbolic acts that reinforced the
political divisions in the United States.273 And despite this Congressional
opposition, the United States—represented by its executive branch—joined the
―high ambition coalition‖ pushing for a strong agreement and supported the
Paris Agreement.274 This new international treaty is structured to allow the
United States to ratify via an executive agreement, since Senate treaty

267. For an in-depth discussion of the partisan politics surrounding the CPP and the issues covered
in this Part, see Osofsky & Peel, supra note 263.
268. Kevin Rogers & Matthew Daly, House Approves State Opt-out for Existing Plant Rule,
ENERGY GUARDIAN (June 24, 2015), http://www.energyguardian.net/house-approves-state-opt-outexisting-plant-rule.
269. Press Release, U.S. House Representatives Energy & Commerce Committee, Whitfield
Unveils Ratepayer Protection Act to Address EPA‘s Overreaching Power Plant Rule (Mar. 23, 2015),
http://energycommerce.house.gov/press-release/whitfield-unveils-ratepayer-protection-act-addressepa%E2%80%99s-overreaching-power-plant-rule.
270. Coral Davenport, Senate Votes to Block Obama’s Climate Change Rules, N.Y. TIMES (Nov.
17,
2015),
http://www.nytimes.com/2015/11/18/us/politics/senate-blocks-obamas-climate-changerules.html.
271. Ben Adler, Republicans Still Hope to Throw Wrench in the Paris Climate Deal, NEWSWEEK
(Dec. 17, 2015), http://www.newsweek.com/republicans-still-hope-throw-wrench-paris-climate-deal406635.
272. Timothy Cama, Obama Vetoes GOP Push to Kill Climate Rules, THE HILL (Dec. 19, 2015),
http://thehill.com/policy/energy-environment/263805-obama-vetoes-gop-attempts-to-kill-climate-rules.
273. Id.
274. Matt McGrath, COP21 US Joins ―High Ambition Coalition‖ for Climate Deal, BBC NEWS
(Dec. 10, 2015), http://www.bbc.com/news/science-environment-35057282.
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ratification would surely fail.275 The U.S. pledge under the agreement relies,
however, on CPP implementation, among other past and current regulatory
steps.276
Given the limited prospects for Congress to overrule the CPP through
legislation, at least with the current administration‘s commitment to vetoing
such legislation, courtrooms and state-level governmental bodies have served
as the key battlegrounds for disputes over the plan. Lawsuits brought by several
states and Murray Energy Corporation, the largest privately owned U.S. coal
company, argued that the EPA‘s promulgation of national emission standards
for power plants under Clean Air Act section 112 in 2012 deprives the agency
of legal authority to establish state-by-state standards for those power plants.
An important issue in these initial legal challenges is that the House and Senate
versions of the 1990 amendments to the Clean Air Act conflict in a relevant
way; the House version bars regulation under section 111(d) of sources already
regulated under section 112, and the Senate one only bars such regulation if it
involves the same pollutant.277
The D.C. Circuit deemed these first challenges to the draft CPP to be
premature,278 but similar challenges were brought to the final plan. Even before
the Federal Register publication of the rule, sixteen states filed a stay request
on August 5, 2015,279 and an overlapping group of fifteen states filed an
emergency petition for extraordinary writ on August 13, 2015.280 Following the
final rule publication on October 23, 2015, twenty-seven states and numerous
industry groups filed another fifteen challenges to the plan, while eighteen

275. John B. Bellinger III & Jonathan Masters, Would a Paris Climate Deal Be Legally Binding on
the U.S.?, COUNCIL ON FOREIGN REL. (Nov. 24, 2015), http://www.cfr.org/united-states/would-parisclimate-deal-legally-binding-us/p37291.
276. United States—Intended Nationally Determined Contribution, UNITED NATIONS
FRAMEWORK CONVENTION ON CLIMATE CHANGE, http://www4.unfccc.int/submissions/INDC/Published
%20Documents/United%20States%20of%20America/1/U.S.%20Cover%20Note%20INDC%20and%20
Accompanying%20Information.pdf.
277. Petition for Extraordinary Writ at 15–22, In re Murray Energy Corp., 788 F.3d 330 (D.C. Cir.
2015) (No. 14–1112).
278. In re Murray Energy, 788 F.3d at 333–34; see Coral Davenport, Judges Skeptical of
Challenge to Proposed E.P.A. Rule on Climate Change, N.Y. TIMES (Apr. 16, 2015), http://www.ny
times.com/2015/04/17/us/legal-battle-begins-over-obama-bid-to-curb-greenhouse-gases.html.
279. The sixteen states are Alabama, Arizona, Arkansas, Indiana, Kansas, Kentucky, Louisiana,
Nebraska, Ohio, Oklahoma, South Carolina, South Dakota, Utah, West Virginia, Wisconsin, and
Wyoming. Application For Administrative Stay by the State Of West Virginia and 15 Other States, EPA
Docket No. EPA-HQ-OAR-20 13-0602 (Aug 5, 2015), http://www.ago.wv.gov/Documents/WV%20%20Administrative%20Request%20for%20Stay%20CPP.PDF; see also John Funk, Shelve Clean Power
Plan Until Courts Rule, Ohio, West Virginia and 13 Other States Ask EPA (Aug. 5, 2015), http://www.
cleveland.com/business/index.ssf/2015/08/shelve_clean_power_plan_until.html.
280. Those states include Alabama, Arkansas, Florida, Indiana, Kansas, Kentucky, Louisiana,
Michigan, Nebraska, Ohio, Oklahoma, South Dakota, West Virginia, Wisconsin, and Wyoming. In Re
West Virginia, Petition for Extraordinary Writ to the U.S. EPA (Aug. 13, 2015), http://www.ee
news.net/assets/2015/08/14/document_ew_04.pdf.
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states, the District of Columbia, five cities, and a county intervened in those
cases on the EPA‘s behalf.281
All of these cases were consolidated in the D.C. Circuit Court of
Appeals,282 which on January 21, 2016 denied the stay request and expedited
consideration.283 However, the Supreme Court granted the stay on February 9,
2016, which prevents CPP implementation and enforcement during the
disposition of the legal challenges.284 Although the Supreme Court‘s granting
of the stay was widely viewed as dampening the prospects for the CPP‘s
wholly surviving judicial challenge, Justice Scalia‘s sudden death four days
later285 complicates matters considerably. He was one of five votes supporting
the stay, and whether a ninth justice is in place before the case reaches the
Supreme Court and who that justice is will likely affect the outcome of the
case.286 A 4–4 Supreme Court split on the merits, which is quite possible given

281. See Emily Holden, 2016 Holds Flurry of State Planning, Legal Drama for Clean Power Plan,
CLIMATEWIRE (Jan. 4, 2016), http://www.eenews.net/stories/1060030047. The intervenors on behalf of
the EPA include: the States of New York, California (by and through Governor Edmund G. Brown Jr.,
the California Air Resources Board, and Attorney General Kamala D. Harris), Connecticut, Delaware,
Hawaii, Illinois, Iowa, Maine, Maryland, Minnesota (by and through the Minnesota Pollution Control
Agency), New Hampshire, New Mexico, Oregon, Rhode Island, Vermont, Washington, the
Commonwealths of Massachusetts and Virginia, the District of Columbia, the Cities of Boulder,
Chicago, New York, Philadelphia, and South Miami, and Broward County, Florida. Unopposed Motion
for Leave to Intervene as Respondents at 1, West Virginia v. EPA, No. 15-1363 (D.C. Cir. Nov. 11,
2015).
282. For a summary of the cases to date, exploration of these issues, and links to the filings, see
Legal Challenges – Overview and Documents, E&E NEWS, http://www.eenews.net/interactive/
clean_power_plan/fact_sheets/legal (last visited Jan. 10, 2016).
283. See Order, West Virginia v. EPA, No. 15-1363 (D.C. Cir. Jan. 21, 2016) (denying motion for
stay).
284. Order in Pending Case, West Virginia v. EPA, No. 15A773, 2016 WL 502947 (Feb. 9, 2016).
Democrats and Republicans reacted very differently to the granting of the stay. See Adam Liptak &
Coral Davenport, Supreme Court Deals Blow to Obama’s Efforts to Regulate Coal Emissions, N.Y.
TIMES (Feb. 9, 2016), http://www.nytimes.com/2016/02/10/us/politics/supreme-court-blocks-obamaepa-coal-emissions-regulations.html; Supreme Court Puts Obama’s Power Plant Regs on Hold, FOX
NEWS (Feb. 9, 2016), http://www.foxnews.com/politics/2016/02/09/supreme-court-puts-obamas-cleanpower-plan-on-hold.html.
285. Adam Liptak, Antonin Scalia, Justice on the Supreme Court, Dies at 79, N.Y. TIMES (Feb. 13,
2016), http://www.nytimes.com/2016/02/14/us/antonin-scalia-death.html.
286. Robinson Meyer, Will a Reconfigured Supreme Court Help Obama’s Clean-Power Plan
Survive?, ATLANTIC (Feb. 14, 2016), http://www.theatlantic.com/politics/archive/2016/02/antoninscalia-clean-power-plan-obama-climate-change/462807/. Within hours of Justice Scalia‘s death, partisan
battles began over whether his replacement would be confirmed prior to the 2016 presidential election.
Juliet Eilperin & Paul Kane, Supreme Court Nomination Process Sure To Be an Epic Debate, WASH.
POST (Feb. 14, 2016), https://www.washingtonpost com/politics/supreme-court-nomination-processsure-to-be-an-epic-debate/2016/02/14/63cd2cd6-d32a-11e5-b195-2e29a4e13425_story.html.
An
additional complexity immediately arose in the CPP context around the nomination process. One of the
leading contenders for the nomination, D.C. Circuit Judge Sri Srinivasan, is on the appellate panel
hearing the CPP case. If he had been nominated, he might have recused himself from the D.C. Circuit
panel (currently comprised of two Democratic and one Republican nominees) or Supreme Court review
depending on the timing of the nomination process. Robin Bravender & Jeremy B. Jacobs, New Era
Begins for Environmental Law, Obama’s Climate Rule, CLIMATEWIRE, Feb. 14, 2016, http://www.ee
news.net/stories/1060032374. However, when President Obama nominated Judge Merrick Garland, that
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the 5–4 decision on the stay, would result in the D.C. Circuit‘s decision on the
CPP being upheld.287
It is unclear how much the stay will constrain preparations for
implementation, especially in light of the uncertainty that Justice Scalia‘s death
creates. In its immediate response to the stay, the Obama Administration
reaffirmed its commitment to ―work with states that choose to continue plan
development and . . . prepare the tools those states will need,‖ as well as ―take
aggressive steps to make forward progress to reduce carbon emissions.‖288 As
of March 8, 2016, twenty states have committed to continuing to plan, nine
states are assessing whether to continue to plan, and eighteen states have
suspended planning.289 Some of the states that continue to plan are participating
in the legal challenges to the CPP but want to be prepared if it is upheld.290 All
of the states that have suspended planning are part of the challenges.291
However, state decisions only provide part of the implementation picture; even
before Justice Scalia‘s death, executives from electricity producers and industry
trade associations indicated that the industry-wide transition to cleaner and
cheaper forms of energy will likely continue and accelerate regardless of the
current stay and ultimate outcome of the litigation.292
The next major step in the litigation will be a D.C. Circuit hearing
scheduled for June 2, 2016, which will, among other issues, consider how to
address the conflicting versions of section 111(d).293 Another key substantive
issue for these cases involves what is often referred to as the ―fence line‖
dilemma. Two of the EPA‘s three building blocks go beyond a power plant‘s
site or operation, or ―fence line,‖ which opponents claim is the boundary of the
EPA‘s Clean Air Act enforcement authority. However, the ―farthest from the

uncertainty was resolved. While the case may still reach a Supreme Court with only eight justices, the
D.C. Circuit panel will remain unchanged. See Michael D. Shear & Gardiner Harris, Obama to
Nominate Merrick Garland to Supreme Court, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 16, 2016, http://www.nytimes
.com/2016/03/17/us/politics/obama-supreme-court-nominee.html?emc=edit_na_20160316&nlid=
52930963&ref=headline&_r=0.
287. Meyer, supra note 286. For an empirical analysis of past 4-4 splits and a proposal for how the
Supreme Court should handle future ones, see Justin R. Pidot, Tie Votes in the Supreme Court, Feb. 13,
2016, http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2732192.
288. Press Release, White House, Press Secretary Josh Earnest on the Supreme Court‘s Decision to
Stay the Clean Power Plan (Feb. 9, 2016), https://www.whitehouse.gov/the-press-office/2016/02/
09/press-secretary-josh-earnest-supreme-courts-decision-stay-clean-power.
289. Supreme Court Stay Response, E&E‘S PUBLISHING,http://www.eenews.net/interactive/clean
_power_plan/#planning_status_chart (last visited Mar. 8, 2016).
290. Id.
291. Id.
292. Joby Warrik & Steven Mufson, Move to Cleaner Power Is Proceeding, Regardless of
Supreme Court’s Ruling, WASH. POST, (Feb. 11, 2015), https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/energyenvironment/wp/2016/02/11/move-to-cleaner-power-is-proceeding-regardless-of-supreme-courtsruling/.
293. See Legal Challenges, supra note 282.

210

ECOLOGY LAW QUARTERLY

[Vol. 43:143

fence line‖ building block from the draft plan—energy efficiency—is not in the
final plan, which helps the EPA on this type of challenge.294
States have been active not only in litigation but also in commentary on
the plan and state-level action. A group of Democratic-leaning states—which
overlaps with the states supporting EPA climate change regulation in CPP and
other climate change cases295—filed joint comments in December 2014
expressing support for the CPP and suggesting some revisions.296 At smaller
scales, state and local leaders supporting the CPP have written similarly
supportive letters to governors. For example, numerous elected officials in
Minnesota wrote such a letter to Governor Mark Dayton a few weeks after the
issuance of the final plan.297
States opposing the CPP, which for the most part are Republican-leaning
and/or have major coal industries, have varied in whether they are preparing for
or resisting implementation, at times with internal division on this issue, such
as in Kentucky or Colorado.298 With the support of the American Legislative
Exchange Council, Senator Mitch McConnell (R-KY)—who also has opposed
replacing Justice Scalia before the 2016 election299—has led an effort to
encourage states to resist implementation.300 Few states chose to follow that
course prior to the Supreme Court stay because they wanted to avoid its
consequence—a federal implementation plan being imposed upon them if

294.
295.

Id.
See Hari M. Osofsky, Is Climate Change ―International‖? Litigation’s Diagonal Regulatory
Role, 49 VA. J. INT‘L L. 585 (2009); Hari M. Osofsky, The Intersection of Scale, Science, and Law in
Massachusetts v. EPA, 9 OR. REV. INT‘L L. 233 (2007).
296. See Joint State Comments in Response to EPA‘s Proposed Carbon Pollution Emission
Guidelines for Existing Stationary Sources: Electric Utility Generating Units, Docket ID No. EPA–HQ–
OAR–2013–0602 (2014), http://www.georgetownclimate.org/sites/www.georgetownclimate.org/files/
GCC-States_CPP_Support_and_Comments-Dec%202014.pdf.
297. Letter from Minnesota Elected Officials to Mark Dayton, Governor of Minnesota (Sept. 15,
2015),
http://www.alanmuller.com/wp-content/uploads/2015/09/MN-Elected-Officials-Letter-ofSupport-for-Clean-Power-Plan.pdf.
298. See Marjorie Haun, Clean Power Plan Pits Colorado AG Against Governor, WATCH DOG
ARENA (Aug. 5, 2015), http://watchdog.org/232739/clean-power-plan-coal-colorado/; Naveena
Sadasivam, Coal States Building Wall of Red Tape to Resist EPA’s Clean Power Plan, INSIDECLIMATE
NEWS (Feb. 17, 2015), http://insideclimatenews.org/news/17022015/coal-states-building-wall-red-taperesist-epas-clean-power-plan (mapping how coal states overlap with states bringing lawsuits); see also
infra note 302 and accompanying text.
299. Todd J. Gillman, Cruz, Rubio, McConnell Insist that New President Fill Scalia Seat on
Supreme Court, DALLAS MORNING NEWS: TRAIL BLAZERS BLOG (Feb. 13, 2016, 5:23 PM), http://trail
blazersblog.dallasnews.com/2016/02/cruz-rubio-mcconnell-insist-that-new-president-fill-scalia-seat-onsupreme-court.html/. For an analysis of Senator McConnell‘s role in the upcoming nomination process,
see Sarah Binder, The Fight over Justice Scalia’s Replacement Has Already Started. Here’s How It Will
Play Out, WASH. POST (Feb. 13, 2016), https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/monkey-cage/wp/
2016/02/13/the-fight-over-justice-scalias-replacement-has-already-started-heres-how-it-will-play-out/.
300. See John Eick, State Factor States are Engaging EPA on Clean Power Plan, AM. LEGIS.
EXCHANGE COUNCIL (Nov. 17, 2014), http://www.alec.org/article/state-factor-states-engaging-epaclean-power-plan/; EPA’s Regulatory Train Wreck, AM. LEGIS. EXCHANGE COUNCIL (NOV. 1, 2011),
http://www.alec.org/initiatives/epas-regulatory-train-wreck/.
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efforts to block the CPP fail.301In those initial months, states were more
inclined to pass resolutions reinforcing their authority or join courtroom
challenges to express their dissatisfaction with the CPP. In fact, most state
legislation involving the CPP has focused on taking steps to prepare for
implementation. Several Democratic senators authored an April 2015 letter to
the National Governors Association noting that even Senator McConnell‘s
home state of Kentucky had begun taking steps to develop a compliance
plan.302 Although the stay has led to many states suspending their efforts, as
noted above, some states opposing the CPP are continuing their planning
processes.303
2. Political Differences within Regions
These divergent state responses to the CPP and approaches to addressing it
could substantially impede regional implementation or interstate cooperation,
even if the CPP survives court challenges and thus moots many states‘
approaches to CPP opposition. Many states that have highly interconnected and
interdependent electricity markets—and thus operate in areas where regional
approaches would likely be most efficient and practical—take very different
stances on the plan, and at times have indicated that they would find it difficult
to cooperate.304 However, the on-the-ground reality seems to be more positive
thus far. States with different views or implementation approaches have shown
a willingness to meet regionally and try to cooperate. This subpart uses the
MISO region as a case example of how states with significant political
differences are attempting to forge a regional approach and the institutional
complexities that they are encountering.
The MISO market covers all or most of Illinois, Indiana, Iowa, Michigan,
Minnesota, Nebraska, North Dakota, South Dakota, Wisconsin, and parts of
Arkansas, Kentucky, Louisiana, Mississippi, Missouri, Montana, and Texas
(mostly covered by a single-state RTO—the Electric Reliability Council of

301. See DANIEL SELMI, SABIN CTR. FOR CLIMATE CHANGE LAW, STATES SHOULD THINK TWICE
BEFORE REFUSING ANY RESPONSE TO EPA‘S CLEAN POWER RULES (2015), https://web.law.
columbia.edu/sites/default/files/microsites/climate-change/selmi_-_states_should_think_twice_
before_refusing_any_response_to_epas_clean_power_rules.pdf (exploring the consequences of states
choosing not to submit a state implementation plan); Holden, supra note 281.
302. Letter from U.S. Senators Sheldon Whitehouse, Barbara Boxer, Elizabeth Warren, Al
Franken & Bernard Sanders to Nat‘l Governors Ass‘n (Apr. 14, 2015), http://www.white
house.senate.gov/download/?id=33ebe122-635e-4bd6-b59a-9246a3d256ac&download=1&utm_
source=EnergyGuardian. For additional materials on Kentucky‘s decision making around compliance,
see James Bruggers, Kentucky Defends Work Toward Climate Path, COURIER-J. (Mar. 5, 2015),
http://www.courier-journal.com/story/watchdog-earth/2015/03/05/mcconnell-tells-states-to-resist-cleanpower-plan-requirements/24457533/.
303. See infra note 291 and accompanying text.
304. See infra notes 317–318 and accompanying text.
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Texas (ERCOT)).305 Table 2 illustrates some of these states‘ actions supporting
or opposing the CPP, and divisions within the region.
Table 2. MISO States’ Political Involvement in CPP Support and
Opposition
State
States
States
States
States
States with
Intervening
Submitting
Petitioning for
Participating Bills or
on behalf of
Dec. 2014
Stay of Final
Lawsuits
Resolutions
307
the EPA in
Joint
CPP
Challenging
Expressing
Challenges
Comments
Final CPP308 Concerns
Supporting
with CPP,
to Final
Draft
Creating
CPP
CPP306
Implementat
-ion
Constraints,
or
Supporting
Coal as of
March
2016309
Arkansas
Illinois
Indiana

X

X

X

X

X
X

X

Iowa

X

Kentucky

X

X

X

Louisiana

X

X

X

305. Electric Power Markets Midcontinent (MISO), FED. ENERGY REGULATORY COMM‘N,
http://www.ferc.gov/market-oversight/mkt-electric/midwest.asp (last updated Nov. 17, 2015).
306. See supra note 296 and accompanying text.
307. See supra note 279 and accompanying text.
308. See supra notes 278-280 and accompanying text.
309. See States’ Reactions to Proposed EPA Greenhouse Gas Emissions Standards, NAT‘L
CONFERENCE OF STATE LEGISLATURES, (June 30, 2015), http://www.ncsl.org/research/energy/statesreactions-to-proposed-epa-greenhouse-gas-emissions-standards635333237.aspx. We treated some
procedural requirements as barriers, such as the impact report and public hearing requirement in
Nebraska. However, others, like Minnesota‘s requirement that the Commissioners submit their plan to
relevant legislative committees for review and comment did not seem sufficiently burdensome to be
treated as a barrier. Id.
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Submitting
Dec. 2014
Joint
Comments
Supporting
Draft
CPP306

States
Petitioning for
Stay of Final
CPP307

Michigan
Minnesota

States
Participating
Lawsuits
Challenging
Final CPP308
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States with
Bills or
Resolutions
Expressing
Concerns
with CPP,
Creating
Implementat
-ion
Constraints,
or
Supporting
Coal as of
March
2016309

States
Intervening
on behalf of
the EPA in
Challenges
to Final
CPP

X
X

X

Mississippi

X

X

Missouri

X

X

Montana

X

X

X

X

X

X

X

X

Nebraska

X

North
Dakota
South
Dakota

X

Texas

X

Wisconsin

X

X

Moreover, these official state actions do not fully capture the level of
political dissension within and among these states. A number of states in the
MISO region, including ones who supported the CPP, have had failed
legislation or resolutions introduced that opposed the CPP.310 In some
310.

Id.

214

ECOLOGY LAW QUARTERLY

[Vol. 43:143

instances, states with deeply interlinked electricity markets are in the middle of
active disputes regarding energy with relevance to CPP implementation. For
example, as discussed above, North Dakota sued Minnesota, claiming a
dormant Commerce Clause violation in a provision of a law establishing
renewable energy goals,311 and the district court‘s opinion justified its finding a
violation in part on the interconnection of states‘ electricity markets through
MISO.312
With respect to CPP cooperation, though, despite these differences, the
MISO states‘ environmental and energy regulators—and some key utilities—
have been meeting since soon after the June 2014 draft CPP was released
through the MSEER group introduced above.313 From a governance
perspective, this is a promising development along the lines we explore in more
depth in Part III.314 MISO states are among the most organized regionally
around the CPP, assisted by the highly developed RTO that brings together key
participants in its energy markets. A number of the states even signed joint
MSEER comments on the draft CPP aimed at ―giv[ing] states flexibility in
developing plans that include multistate coordination.‖315
Moreover, the MSEER dialogues have helped spur and support other
regional conversations. For example, many of the state regulators in the PJM
region—which abuts MISO and includes utilities in Delaware, Indiana, Illinois,
Kentucky, Maryland, Michigan, New Jersey, North Carolina, Ohio,
Pennsylvania, Tennessee, Virginia, West Virginia, and the District of
Columbia—began having similar discussions in June 2015.316 The PJM
discussions have been assisted by the fact that some of its member states are
partly in MISO, and some of the groups and individuals participating in
regional discussion therefore overlap.
But the MSEER meetings have also reinforced the complexities of
translating CPP interstate options into regional coordination, even if states can
overcome their political differences. For example, Nancy Lange of the
Minnesota Public Utilities Commission, the key energy regulatory body in one
of the states that is most supportive of the CPP, indicated that despite regional
cooperation making a great deal of sense ―in theory,‖ the states‘ different CO2
reduction goals under the CPP (which vary because different states have

311. For the Chamber of Commerce briefing to the Eighth Circuit expressing this view, see Brief
of Amici Curiae Chamber of Commerce et al. Supporting Appellees and Affirmance, North Dakota v.
Heydinger, No. 14-2156 (8th Cir. Jan. 27, 2015).
312. See supra Part II.B.2.b.
313. Jeffrey Tomich, Behind the Noise, Central States Study EPA Rule Cooperation,
ENERGYWIRE (Dec. 3, 2014), http://www.eenews.net/stories/1060009833.
314. See infra Part III.
315. Letter from Midcontinent States Envtl. & Energy Regulators Steering Committee to Gina
McCarthy, Adm‘r, EPA (Nov. 21, 2014), http://www.naruc.org/Publications/Final%20MSEER%20
Comment%20Letter%2011%2021.pdf.
316. Jeffrey Tomich, PJM State Officials Discuss Possible Carbon Rule Coordination,
ENERGYWIRE (Oct. 13, 2015), http://www.eenews.net/stories/1060026205.
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different numbers of CPP-regulated plants, all of which have nationallyuniform emission standards) make operationalizing cooperation complex.317
She noted, ―We‘ve spent a lot of time in the MSEER group gnashing our teeth
about our differences in goals.‖318
Indiana Department of Environmental Management Commissioner
Thomas Easterly also raised issues related to harmonizing among states if they
choose different ways of calculating compliance: ―We couldn‘t figure out any
viable way to trade between a rate-based and a mass-based state.‖319 The ratebased versus mass-based decision hopefully will not be a serious
implementation barrier; states within energy regions have strong incentives to
make a common choice. But at this stage, it is still unclear if all states within
energy regions will adopt compatible options.320 Moreover, as analyzed in Part
III.A, because the footprints of energy regions do not fully match those of
states, there could be difficulties if states in neighboring energy regions do not
choose the same option.321
These barriers to reaching agreement in the MISO region, even as states
that disagree politically try to work together, reinforce the importance of
developing effective institutional mechanisms for regional cooperation to
complement the approaches that the EPA has developed. States, particularly
given the deep political differences represented in many regions, need clear
pathways to achieving regional cooperation and its economic benefits.
III. TOWARDS EFFECTIVE REGIONAL GOVERNANCE
Parts I and II have explored the possibilities for interstate collaboration
under the CPP and the challenges and opportunities presented by interstate and
regional approaches to achieving such collaboration. Due to political gridlock,
agency ossification, and the generally ―sticky‖ nature of governance
approaches—as well as the danger of locking in second-best energy
infrastructure with a long operational life—it is essential to implement the best
possible institutional approach to the CPP and future, similar carbon emissions
regulations from the outset.322 But the melding of two very different types of
federalism—a federal-state CPP with federal-regional-state energy policy and
markets—will make this task particularly difficult. As we have explored in our
previous scholarship, the nature of federalism in energy law is particularly

317. Jeffrey Tomich, States to FERC Clean Power Plan Too Much, Too Fast, ENERGYWIRE (Apr.
2, 2015), http://midwestenergynewscom/2015/04/02/states-to-ferc-clean-power-plan-too-much-too-fast/.
318. Id.
319. Id.
320. See SELMI, supra note 301 (exploring the consequences of states choosing not to submit a
state implementation plan); Holden, supra note 281.
321. See infra Part III.A.
322. For discussion of agency inaction due to extensive judicial review and the need to develop
voluminous supporting records, see Thomas O. McGarity, Some Thoughts on ―Deossifying‖ the
Rulemaking Process, 41 DUKE L.J. 1385, 1385, 1387 (1992).
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complex, with regional entities like RTOs playing an unusually large and
important role in bringing together federal, state, and private actors to create
manageable energy markets and policies.
This Part contributes to efforts toward rapid, effective implementation of
the CPP and similar carbon emissions requirements likely to be promulgated by
the EPA, and the scholarly literature on federalism and governance, by
analyzing what it would take to achieve effective regional carbon emissions
governance that brings together the CPP‘s federal-state approach with current
regional energy governance. Building on our prior work on hybrid
governance,323 this Part proposes regional institutional development as a
strategy for helping to meld the divergent federalism structures at this legal
convergence. It argues that regional institutions, whether built from existing
regional energy architecture or newly created, can play a crucial role in
bringing together key public and private stakeholders at state, regional, and
federal levels.
As the MISO states‘ experience described in Part III.C.2 reinforces, even
in regions with strong regional energy institutions and active efforts to
collaborate, states may find coordinating their plans to be a complex endeavor
due to the constraints of the CPP (particularly the need to all choose massbased or rate-based in order to trade effectively) and to a lesser extent, their
political differences. In a step somewhat beyond MSEER—but one that still
substantially maintains state independence—states can simply engage in
informal discussions and sign a memorandum of understanding (MOU) in
which they agree to implement materially consistent trading regimes, thus
enabling sources within the states to benefit from regional approaches without
requiring a formal agreement among the states.324 But regional implementation
ideally will go beyond the important first step of MSEER‘s and other regions‘
collaborative discussion forums, and in some cases beyond informal
agreements and MOUs, to states making commitments and developing
decision-making structures that help them overcome differences and reap the
economic benefits of joint implementation.325 These hybrid regional structures
can play a crucial role in bridging the overlapping and fragmented governance
structures described in the previous parts in a manner that engages key
stakeholders effectively.
This Part focuses on four elements of regional institutional design that,
based on experiences of other regional U.S. institutions, likely will help address
the federalism and governance challenges that we have identified. In particular,
it examines the following key considerations in designing regional institutions
(agencies and rules) for multistate plans, or individual state targets with
regional compliance: (1) the choice of agency, including whether a new
323.
324.
325.

Osofsky & Wiseman, supra note 39; Osofsky & Wiseman, supra note 40.
MONAST ET AL., supra note 70, at 4.
See supra Part II.B.2.
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organization will be formed or an existing entity will be modified to develop
and implement regional CPP approaches; (2) the decision-making structure,
including whether the regional agency itself will make decisions that legally
bind the states, or whether the agency will provide model rules to be
implemented by the states; (3) selection of stakeholders and participation roles,
including who will have voting or less formal participatory powers; and (4)
decision-making procedures, including whether expert groups will be formed to
recommend rules, whether unanimous or supermajority votes will be required
to bind the states to regional approaches, and how rules defining how
stakeholders can make motions and vote on proposed modifications to the rules
and organizational membership over time will be structured.
The Part draws from examples from two existing regional regimes in
energy law, RGGI and the Northwest Power and Conservation Council
(NPCC), to frame its analysis of each of the four elements. Numerous regional
agencies could serve as similarly useful models. But the experiences of these
institutions, which already wrestle with intertwined environmental and energy
challenges and attempt to meld states‘ divergent energy policies, provide useful
lessons about the ways in which institutional design can help or hinder
interstate and regional cooperation in carbon emissions governance.326
A. Choice of Agency
The first critical issue to resolve in CPP implementation and similar
carbon emissions reduction strategies is how states want to build from existing
federalism and governance structures to provide the needed interstate
coordination—even if, in the CPP context, that coordination is simply agreeing
on a mass-based or rate-based plan so that trading between sources in different
states is possible. States will need an interstate organization, which might only
be loosely formed in some cases, through which to form initial rules and
guidance regarding the regional approach and to modify these rules over time.
States have several options for forming a regional agency that will serve as
the central point for discourse and deliberation. Depending on the degree of
state collaboration, the agency could also be the hub for technical research for
rule development; initial and modified rule making; and bringing together
various state officials who would collectively conduct monitoring,
enforcement, and reporting of rule implementation. As Part II demonstrates,
regional grid operators (or regional groupings of states formed around their
footprint) will provide a natural base for developing and implementing at least
326. The EPA in the CPP and scholars and policy groups have used similar analogies, often
looking to RGGI and other trading regimes to suggest how a regional CPP approach could operate. See,
e.g., PAUL HIBBARD ET AL., ANALYSIS GROUP, EPA‘S CLEAN POWER PLAN: STATES‘ TOOLS FOR
REDUCING COSTS AND INCREASING BENEFITS TO CUSTOMERS 17 (2014). Our analysis builds from these
sources and focuses primarily on the procedural aspects of RGGI, incorporating an analysis of how an
existing regional group—MISO—enhanced participatory procedures in order to accomplish a new
regional goal. A similar transition will be necessary for the CPP.
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some of these rules. The simplest solution would therefore be for states to
persuade an existing regional organization, such as a regional grid operator, to
enhance its existing processes to serve as this central hub or to enhance the
authority of a group like MSEER that includes all states in its energy region.
Using the RTO or other balancing authority as a convening point for state
discussions would also enhance state-regional communication. As discussed in
Part II, this communication will be necessary so that regional grid operators can
better predict capacity, interconnection, dispatch, and transmission changes
needed to support new and expanded generation infrastructure within each
state.327 Alternatively, states could form a new regional organization, as
occurred for RGGI, but this requires far more coordination and planning.
As highlighted above, one challenge to using existing grid governance
organizations as the entities through which states convene to develop and
implement regional CPP plans is that these organizations will not always
encompass the geographic area of a regional CPP scheme, or of a collection of
states that have agreed to allow their sources to trade with sources in other
states. Even if the RTO footprint maps well with states that choose to
collaborate, some states are covered by more than one RTO, which causes both
an RTO authority issue and a state coordination issue. Because RTOs are
comprised of entities in the electricity market, utilities within a state at times
divide in terms of RTO membership.328 As a consequence, some states are
partly covered by MISO and partly by PJM, the Southwest Power Pool, or
ERCOT. In addition, some states are partly covered by an RTO and partly not
covered by an RTO.329 This partial coverage poses an issue because forming
one regional collaboration around an RTO footprint would not fully integrate
the state‘s energy markets, whereas joining multiple regional plans will require
a great deal of effort.330 Further, states that sign on to the ready-for-interstatetrading plan or allow trading with any other states that have adopted consistent
plans will likely allow sources in the state to trade with sources that operate in
numerous RTOs, depending on how many other states sign on to uniform
trading frameworks. Right now, overlapping states are simply participating in
more than one conversation, such as the MSEER and PJM discussions,331 but
at an implementation stage, this participation in several different regional
planning processes will become harder if the regions‘ approaches do not
dovetail.
Assuming states can work through the partial coverage issues, in areas
with relatively sophisticated regional grid governance performed by RTOs, the
states that are part of these RTOs have developed comparatively strong
327.
328.
329.
330.
331.

See id.
See supra notes 105–106 and accompanying text.
Id.
Id.
See Emily Holden et al., Behind the Scenes, Most States Are Exploring the Benefits of Carbon
Trading, ENERGYWIRE (Oct. 13, 2015), http://www.eenews.net/stories/1060026225.
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horizontal (state-to-state, as opposed to vertical state-local or state-federal)
governance relationships. Specifically, these states have created non-profit
organizations consisting of state members. Through these organizations, state
representatives periodically meet to propose new policies to the RTO, review
proposed RTO policies and oppose or support them, and, in some cases, litigate
in support of or against RTO policies or FERC decisions to approve or reject
those policies.332 States‘ existing engagement through these and other
organizations involves some of the core subject matter that is addressed by the
CPP, such as discussing where and how renewable generation and associated
transmission lines should be expanded.333 This experience and history of
engagement on CPP-relevant issues is likely to make states that already work
together to influence RTO governance good candidates for creating a multistate
plan under the CPP. The MISO states‘ collaboration in MSEER, for example,
reflects how RTO links can translate into interstate collaboration, if not yet
cooperation, on implementation.334
In the case of the multistate RTOs more broadly, states that have chosen to
collaborate or allow trading might overlap with the territory of RTOs fairly
well aside from the issue of some states containing members of more than one
RTO. Even in states that lack RTOs, CPP discussions often seem to be
following regional grid governance geographically. Indeed, there is a
possibility that state collaboration within non-RTO areas—where energy
markets are not as well linked—is more active than in RTO areas because
greater in-depth cooperation among states is necessary for effective grid
planning. For example, states in the WECC are having collaborative
discussions organized by the Colorado-based Center for the New Energy
Economy.335 This effort is perhaps not a surprise, as the western states have
several long-running groups that convene to address regional energy issues.336
Multistate plans within the geographic area already covered by the RTO,
or individual plans with state coordination of compliance, might also emerge as
a result of utility lobbying. Utilities often operate within the jurisdictional
boundaries of an RTO because they have generation and transmission lines in
332.
333.

See Osofsky & Wiseman, supra note 40.
See, e.g., Committee on Reg’l Electric Power Cooperation What We Do, W. ENERGY BD.,
http://westernenergyboard.org/crepc/what-we-do/ (last visited Feb. 3, 2016) (―CREPC is comprised of
the public utility commissions, energy agencies and facility siting agencies in the western states and
Canadian provinces in the western electricity grid, and works to improve the efficiency of the western
electric power system.‖).
334. See supra notes 313–319 and accompanying text.
335. See Holden et al., supra note 331.
336. See, e.g., supra note 333; Western Renewable Energy Zones, W. GOVERNORS‘ ASS‘N
http://www.westgov.org/rtep/219-western-renewable-energy-zones (last visited Feb. 3, 2016) (However,
the Western Renewable Energy Zones initiative is no longer active.); Agenda Joint Meeting of the
Committee on Regional Electric Power Cooperation and the Western Interconnection Regional
Advisory Body, W. ENERGY BD. (Apr. 8–9, 2009), http://www.westernenergyboard.org/wieb/meetings
/crepcsprg2009/04-09agen.htm (showing discussions of transmission policy for renewables, long-term
transmission planning, and other regional issues).
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multiple states that are part of an interconnected grid governed by the RTO.337
These utilities might push states to coordinate CPP compliance within the
geographic RTO region in order to make utility compliance easier; a utility can
rely on a range of its generating units in many different states to reduce its
carbon emissions, and once a regional regime is up and running, the utility
might only have to report compliance to one organization rather than multiple
states. But some large utilities operate around the country and have generation
in several grid interconnections. These utilities might push for multistate plans
beyond the geographic area covered by the RTO. Indeed, the CPP expressly
allows select utilities within a state to be part of different multistate plans.338
Despite some examples of relatively extensive state coordination within
RTOs and within somewhat less cohesive coordinating councils, states that are
geographically part of an RTO are sometimes only linked by the mere existence
of an interconnected physical grid. As discussed in Part II.C.2, states within
even a fairly collaborative RTO may have strong political or other differences
that make regional CPP governance within the full RTO footprint difficult.339
If some of the current regional coordination efforts were to fail and particular
states were to work with only a portion of the RTO states in their region and/or
other states outside of the RTO, they might choose to form a new regional
organization that would have to harmonize policy among RTOs and with other
regional grid entities.340 As analyzed in Part I.B, the potential for trading and
associated state coordination that does not match energy regions is enhanced by
the fact that the CPP is designed so that mass-based and rate-based states can
only trade among states that make the same choice; states within regional grids
that choose a mass-based approach will be blocked from trading with states in
their region that choose a rate-based approach, but can trade out of their region
with other mass-based states.341
Beyond RTOs and similar regional grid governance authorities, and the
groups of states convening around them, there are very few existing regional
entities that could potentially be used for regional CPP governance. The
exception is RGGI, which covers certain Northeastern and Mid-Atlantic States.
Through RGGI, governors of ten states signed an MOU creating the multistate
337.
338.

See supra note 182 and accompanying text.
See RAYMOND L. GIFFORD ET AL., WILKINSON, BARKER, KNAUER, LLP, THE CLEAN POWER
PLAN: CARBON TRADING, STATE LEGISLATION AND POLITICAL ECONOMY ISSUES 1, 3 (2015),
http://www.wbklaw.com/uploads/White%20Paper%20%20Carbon%20Trading%20State%20Legislation
%20and%20the%20Political%20Economy%20Issue%20Oct15.pdf.
339. See supra Part II.B.2.
340. Similar proposals have been made in the past for coordinating states‘ transmission siting
policies and preferences for allocating the costs of new transmission lines within a regional grid. See,
e.g., NAT‘L GOVERNORS ASS‘N, INTERSTATE STRATEGIES FOR TRANSMISSION PLANNING AND
EXPANSION 9 (2002), http://www.hks.harvard.edu/hepg/Papers/NGA_Interstate.Strategies.Planning.
for.Transmission_9-3-02.pdf (―Governors should form Multi-State Entities (MSEs) to facilitate state
coordination on transmission planning, certification, and siting at the regional level. The MSE should
reflect the boundaries of regional electricity markets as defined by participating states.‖).
341. Holden et al., supra note 331.
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initiative and establishing a cap on the greenhouse gases emitted annually in
these regions. The states created a 501(c)(3) nonprofit organization to develop
and support this initiative.342 This organization has no ―regulatory or
enforcement authority,‖ as states that are part of the initiative retain
independent rulemaking and enforcement authority and simply adopt model
rules to implement RGGI, but it conducts much of the technical and operational
work required to make RGGI run smoothly.343 This work includes, inter alia,
―[d]evelopment and maintenance‖ of a CO2 allowance trading, tracking, and
reporting program; creating and implementing ―a platform to auction CO2
allowances‖; technical research to help review states‘ proposals to offset
greenhouse gas emissions; and ―technical assistance to the participating states
to evaluate proposed changes to the States‘ RGGI programs.‖344 However,
some but not all PJM states are in RGGI, reinforcing that other relevant
regional organizations may not align fully with regional grid operators.345
Companies have largely been supportive of the constructive role that RGGI has
played, though NRG energy filed comments in January 2016 opposing
expanding RGGI as part of CPP compliance.346
Another organization with responsibilities somewhat similar to those that
a regional CPP agency would have is the NPCC, which provides potentially
useful lessons for CPP approaches to organization, membership, and
stakeholder inclusion. Congress created the NPCC in 1980 to prepare ―a
regional conservation and electric power plan‖ and ―a program to protect,
mitigate, and enhance fish and wildlife‖ because much of the power in the
Northwest comes from hydroelectric dams that impact fish and wildlife.347 Just
as states under the CPP will have to select generation sources that will reduce
CO2 emissions (and thus environmental impacts) while continuing to ensure the
reliability of the electric supply, states through the NPCC must ―assure the
region of a safe, reliable, and economical power system with due regard for the
environment.‖348
Where states planning to coordinate on CPP issues are unable to form a
new unit within an RTO or other regional grid governance organization, build
on interstate groupings that match those regional entities, or rely on an existing
regional organization like RGGI or the NPCC, they will have to form a new
interstate agency, or at a minimum a loosely organized interstate entity, to
342. RGGI, Inc., REG‘L GREENHOUSE GAS INITIATIVE, http://www.rggi.org/rggi (last visited Aug.
7, 2015).
343. Id.
344. Id.
345. Holden et al., supra note 331.
346. Robert Walton, NRG Opposes Expanding RGGI for Clean Power Plan Compliance, UTIL.
DIVE (Jan. 8, 2016), http://www.utilitydive.com/news/nrg-opposes-expanding-rggi-for-clean-powerplan-compliance/411772/.
347. Pacific Northwest Electric Power Planning and Conservation Act, 16 U.S.C. § 839b (2012).
348. Council Bylaws, NW. POWER & CONSERVATION COUNCIL (Oct. 15, 2003), https://www.nw
council.org/about/policies/bylaws.
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assist states in agreeing upon and implementing regional solutions. And
regardless of whether they form a new agency or a new unit within an existing
organization, they will have to carefully consider the decision-making authority
of this unit or entity, including whether the agency or entity itself will develop
regional rules applicable to the states or, as with RGGI, the states will retain the
authority to choose whether or not to implement model rules suggested by the
agencies.349 This choice of structure might implicate the Compact Clause in
minor ways,350 as discussed in the following subpart.
B. Decision-Making Authority
As introduced in Parts I and II, states can choose a variety of regional
approaches to implementing the CPP. In selecting among these approaches—
including aggregating state goals into a multistate goal and coordinating
compliance, retaining individual goals and coordinating compliance, or
implementing a variety of trading schemes351—states, after selecting an
interstate entity, will need to decide how much and what type of authority that
entity will wield. However, existing federalism structures constrain those
possibilities for governance innovation somewhat. Namely, as states work to
craft new hybrid regional institutions, they will need to briefly assess what is
allowed under the Compact Clause—which prevents states from entering into
agreements or compacts without Congressional approval.352
This subpart explores these options from an institutional design
perspective, which range from, at the strongest, forming an aggregate state goal
and writing uniform model rules for states to implement, to, at the weakest,
providing a forum for states to interact with no binding authority—an
arrangement similar to MSEER and other regional dialogues. Of course, at the
very weakest, there could be no institution at all, but we focus on the situations
in which states choose to develop a new institution or give an existing one new
powers. The analysis here focuses on the implications under the Compact
Clause for the creation of such organizations, arguing that states can form even
a strong interstate entity to enforce the CPP without encountering constitutional
issues so long as the entity is structured appropriately.
States that engage in the strongest form of cooperation under the CPP
could form a regional entity, or enhance an existing entity, through which states
would combine their individual CPP goals and vote on a multistate plan for
achieving the aggregated goal.353 These states could also give the regional
349.
350.
351.
352.
353.

See infra note 364 and accompanying text.
U.S. CONST. art. I, § 10, cl. 3.
See infra Part I.B.
U.S. CONST. art. I, § 10.
See Clean Power Plan, supra note 1, at 64,859 (allowing ―common‖ multistate submittals of a
single multistate plan that would be ―signed by authorized officials for each of the states participating in
the multi-state plan and would have the same legal effect as an individual submittal for each
participating state‖).
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authority the power to write a model rule for regional CPP implementation but
provide that states would individually have to adopt the model rule—the RGGI
approach.354
A question that potentially arises with the strongest forms of interstate
entities, when created by states directly without the involvement of Congress, is
whether their formation will trigger application of the Compact Clause. This
clause of the Constitution provides that ―[n]o State shall, without the Consent
of Congress . . . enter into any Agreement or Compact with another State.‖355
However, the only agreements and compacts that fall within the Clause and
require congressional approval are those that ―enhance state power quoad the
National Government,‖356 ―increase the political power‖ of the states, or
―encroach upon or interfere with the just Supremacy of the United States.‖357
Compacts and agreements that affect the sovereignty of states that are not
members of the agreement are also reviewed carefully by courts. All other
agreements and compacts, regardless of their form, are outside of the scope of
the Compact Clause358 and do not require congressional approval.
In the case of the Clean Air Act, Congress has already granted individual
states the power to regulate in an area that would otherwise involve federal
Commerce Clause authority—specifically, they are empowered to regulate
pollutant emissions from power plants operated by multistate actors on a
multistate grid.359 And the fact that multiple states coordinate to exercise this
power granted to them by Congress does not mean that these states
automatically encroach into federal turf. After all, FERC already regulates
RTOs, so if states coordinated and ceded interstate or regional CPP authority to
the RTO, FERC would continue to have regulatory authority over that RTO.
Even states that coordinated through an institution other than an RTO would
not create new powers vis-à-vis the federal government—they would simply be
shifting powers among states in different ways.
Promisingly for states that wish to create a strong regional or other
interstate entity to assist CPP implementation, the Supreme Court has allowed
states to exercise authority collectively—authority they independently wielded
prior to acting together—without having to obtain congressional permission. In
354. The former approach of giving a regional entity authority would be somewhat more likely to
implicate the Compact Clause than the latter approach, but neither approach would likely be probleatic
from a Compact Clause perspective as discussed below. See supra notes 355–358 and accompanying
text.
355. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 3, cl. 10.
356. U.S. Steel v. Multistate Tax Comm‘n, 434 U.S. 452, 459 (1978) (emphasis in original).
357. Cuyler v. Adams, 449 U.S. 433 (1981).
358. See id. at 440 (―Where an agreement is not ‗directed to the formation of any combination
tending to the increase of political power in the States, which may encroach upon or interfere with the
just supremacy of the United States,‘ it does not fall within the scope of the Clause and will not be
invalidated for lack of congressional consent.‖); U.S. Steel, 434 U.S. at 469 (after reviewing previous
Compact Clause cases, reaffirming that ―not all agreements between States are subject to the strictures
of the Compact Clause‖).
359. 42 U.S.C. § 7426 (c)(2) (2012).
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U.S. Steel Corp. v. Multistate Tax Commission, twenty-one states, without the
consent of Congress, entered into a Multistate Tax Compact that coordinated
the states‘ approaches to taxing corporations that operate in multiple states (an
approach that a prior Supreme Court case suggested was permissible).360 Under
their newly formed compact, the states created a Multistate Tax Commission
that had the authority to ―study state and local tax systems,‖ propose uniform
tax approaches, study improved taxation approaches that could assist the states,
and ―adopt uniform administrative regulations.‖ These uniform ―advisory‖
regulations did not bind the states unless the states individually adopted
them.361 The Supreme Court held that this Multistate Tax Compact did not fall
within the scope of the Compact Clause because it did not ―enhance the
political power of the member States in a way that encroaches upon the
supremacy of the United States.‖362
The U.S. Steel case provides solid ground for states avoiding Compact
Clause concerns when implementing interstate CPP approaches, regardless of
whether they give a regional authority independent rule-making authority that
would bind the states or whether they work through a regional authority to
adopt model CPP rules that the states would individually implement. Indeed, in
the CO2 regulation context, RGGI followed a somewhat similar model to U.S.
Steel.363 RGGI states that agreed upon a carbon emissions cap and trade
scheme carefully structured the form and extent of its authority. Specifically,
through RGGI, the regional authority writes model rules that the states then
implement. The regional authority itself cannot bind the states,364 although
states must follow their own constitutions and laws in order to properly
withdraw from the agreement.365 A similar approach in the CPP context would
likely avoid constitutional difficulties.

360. U.S. Steel, 434 U.S. at 454. The states formed this compact after a Supreme Court case
determined that individual states could tax ―net income from the interstate operations of a foreign
corporation‖ if the tax was nondiscriminatory and showed ―sufficient nexus‖ to the state. Id. at 455
(citing Nw. States Portland Cement Co. v. Minnesota, 358 U.S. 450, 421 (1959)).
361. Id. at 456–457.
362. Id. at 472, 479.
363. See HIBBARD ET AL., supra note 326.
364. The RGGI regional organization has ―no regulatory or enforcement authority with respect to
the Program.‖ RGGI, Inc., supra note 342.
365. A New Jersey superior court held that a state agency used improper procedures when it
withdrew from RGGI. In re Regional Greenhouse Gas Initiative, 2014 WL 1228509, at *5 (N.J. Super.
Ct. App. Div. Mar. 25, 2014) (per curiam) (agreeing with the parties who challenged the procedures for
withdrawals because the agency ―engaged in improper rulemaking by posting the withdrawal notice on
its website rather than repealing the Trading Program regulations through the procedures established by
the APA.‖). Certain RGGI opponents expressed concerns that RGGI might violate the Commerce
Clause. See, e.g., Edison Electric Institute Comments on the Regional Greenhouse Gas Initiative
Memorandum of Understanding 22–24 (Mar. 20, 2006), https://web.archive.org/web/2015
1030213229/https://www.rggi.org/docs/rggi-eeimou_comments032006final.pdf (arguing that the
Memorandum of Understanding for RGGI, in which the states commit to implement individualized
legislation to implement RGGI, requires congressional approval under the Compact Clause); but see The
Compact Clause and the Regional Greenhouse Gas Initiative, 120 HARV. L. REV 1958, 1976 (2007)
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Other interstate approaches envisioned by the CPP implicate no Compact
Clause concerns. For example, the weakest form of interstate collaboration, in
which states decide to simply allow sources in their state to trade with sources
in any other state that has an EPA-approved plan and that follows an EPAadministered or approved trading scheme,366 might not even be considered a
compact or agreement. States would simply be opting into a federal scheme.
C. Stakeholder Representation
As important as the type of entity that will be formed to make and
implement interstate CPP decisions, and the extent of this entity‘s authority, is
the question of which stakeholders will be included in a multistate CPP
process. As our prior work on hybrid governance analyzes, effectively
addressing overlapping and fragmented governance at the energy-environment
intersection necessitates structures that can effectively include key public and
private stakeholders across levels of governance.367 A decision in this context
will require careful consideration of the entities that will be most impacted by
the CPP and those that can bring needed technical knowledge and other
resources to the table. This subpart uses the NPCC as a model for how to
include key public and private stakeholders in an interstate regional structure
and applies its lessons to the CPP context. It explores which governmental and
nongovernmental entities should be included in an interstate entity assisting
with CPP implementation and dilemmas around how to include key private
actors such as utilities without risking private interests subsuming public ones.
The most essential participants in interstate CPP governance, as noted
above, will be the states. The current regional discussions reflect the central
role of states, as regulators from MISO, PJM, and WECC states meet to discuss
collaboration.368 Representatives from state PUCs and environmental agencies
should have advisory and voting authority within an interstate CPP agency
because these representatives have expertise in and authority over generation
decisions. PUCs regulate the construction and operation of generation as well
as power purchases,369 and state environmental agencies influence generation
choice by implementing federal and state environmental regulations for
conventional and hazardous air pollutants.
The process for forming RGGI and including stakeholders is perhaps most
instructive. This effort required several states, all of which have distinct energy
(concluding that because RGGI allows for states to unilaterally withdraw, this suggests that ―it should
fall outside the scope of the Compact Clause‖); Michael S. Smith, Note, Murky Precedent Meets Hazy
Air The Compact Clause and the Regional Greenhouse Gas Initiative, 34 B.C. ENVTL. AFF. L. REV.
387, 397–402, 407–09 (2007) (discussing U.S. Steel and applying it to RGGI to argue that RGGI does
not require congressional approval).
366. Id. at 1294.
367. Osofsky & Wiseman, supra note 39; Osofsky & Wiseman, supra note 40.
368. Holden et al., supra note 331.
369. See supra note 13.
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policy, to reach consensus on carbon reduction goals—something that will have
to occur for the CPP as well. The RGGI initiative began when Governor
George Pataki invited eleven states to participate in an initiative that ―would
involve developing a regional market-based emissions trading system to require
power generators to reduce CO2 emissions.‖370 Eight states initially agreed to
join the RGGI effort, and most designated a state air regulator as their RGGI
representative.371 Chief executives from state agencies formed an ―Action
Plan‖ based on recommendations from a staff working group comprised of
―two representatives from each state (one each from a state‘s energy regulatory
and environmental agencies).‖372 The staff working group also established a
steering committee consisting of two representatives from each of three states,
and these representatives rotated every six months to allow all states input in
the process.373 In addition, the states formed working groups chaired by state
energy and environmental agency officials that made technical
recommendations.374 These groups had tasks such as conducting research and
exploring options for a model rule, engaging other stakeholders,
researching/developing a greenhouse gas registry, and conducting energy
modeling, among other tasks.375
The NPCC, which, as introduced above, serves many of the same
functions that an interstate CPP agency will serve, similarly relies on state
agency officials as its core state stakeholders and could also serve as a model
for regional CPP governance. It includes representatives of its member states as
the sole voting members of the Council. Governors from each state select and
certify two members from each state to serve as council members.376 These
members must be from state government agencies or other state government
entities.377
Beyond the states themselves, large multistate utilities have the highest
stakes in CPP governance and regional energy governance choices. These
utilities will be essential players in helping to decide how multistate plans will
operate and be implemented and therefore must have a seat at the regional
governance table. Indeed, the EPA explicitly recognizes that certain multistate
plans might be formed solely for specific utilities—a state may allow utilities
within the state to participate in multistate plans designed around these utilities‘

370. CTR. FOR RES. SOLUTIONS, LESSONS LEARNED FOR INTEGRATING RENEWABLES INTO
GREENHOUSE GAS TRADING PROGRAMS 3 (2005), http://www.hmwinternational.com/Publications/
Lessons_Learned_for_Integrating_Renewables_into_Greenhouse_Gas_Trading_Programs.pdf.
371. Id.
372. Id.
373. Id.
374. Id. at 4.
375. Id.
376. Council Bylaws, supra note 348 (―The Council consists of eight members, two each from the
states of Idaho, Montana, Oregon and Washington, who have been certified as members by the
Governors of their respective states.‖).
377. Id. (providing that council members are ―officers employed by their respective states‖).
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geographic operations.378 However, including the entities most impacted by a
CPP interstate approach in the decision-making process will raise potential
capture concerns, in which well-organized, relatively wealthy interests with the
most to lose or gain from a decision may have undue influence as compared to
diffuse, less-organized interests that collectively have a great deal to gain or
lose but individually have small interests. There are several strategies that states
embarking upon regional CPP approaches should consider to alleviate capture
concerns.
The clearest approach to giving utilities a needed voice at the table but
somewhat constraining their influence over interstate CPP decisions would be
to give them participatory access but not a vote in these decisions. The
interstate authority could automatically include utilities as ―interested parties‖
in any decision-making process and assign them to participate in various
working groups that propose strategies for regional implementation. This
approach would still potentially raise serious public choice concerns—concerns
that we have addressed in other work379—depending on the role that interested
parties play.
However, particular strategies of structuring the ―interested parties‖
participation may help to include these necessary private stakeholders in the
process without allowing them to unduly influence the process. For example,
the interested parties type of approach is used in the regional transmission
planning and operation context, where Michael Dworkin and Rachel Aslin
Goldwasser have extensively examined accountability and capture concerns.
Dworkin and Goldwasser note that most RTOs use a ―two-tiered‖ decisionmaking structure, in which one board of independent, non-utility entities makes
final decisions on the basis of advice from a ―second tiered advisory
committee‖ comprised of stakeholders, including utilities.380 RTOs can
alternatively have boards with decision-making authority that consist entirely
of stakeholders but prevent any one stakeholder from having veto authority,
and ―hybrid‖ boards with stakeholders and independent entities; some have
suggested that for this latter approach, independent, nonstakeholder entities
should hold the majority of seats on the board to prevent undue influence from
stakeholders.381
The NPCC takes an approach similar to the two-tiered approach of most
RTOs. To address stakeholder considerations and benefit from outside
expertise in making Council decisions, the NPCC may by majority vote

378.
379.
380.

Clean Power Plan, supra note 1, at 64,480.
Osofsky & Wiseman, supra note 39; Osofsky & Wiseman, supra note 40
Michael H. Dworkin & Rachel Aslin Goldwasser, Ensuring Consideration of the Public
Interest in the Governance and Accountability of Regional Transmission Organizations, 28 ENERGY L.J.
543, 563 (2007).
381. Id. at 563–65.
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establish advisory committees.382 For example, its Generating Resources
Advisory Committee (GRAC) ―was chartered to advise the Council regarding
generating resource and technology alternatives‖383—a task that CPP regional
agencies will also have to take up. Stakeholders may apply to the NPCC and
request membership in the GRAC, and the Council appoints GRAC
members.384 Members and interested parties include, inter alia, representatives
from privately traded utilities, cooperatives, and municipally owned utilities;385
state energy policy offices and PUCs;386 and nonprofit groups that support the
expansion of renewable generation.387
These types of structures are ones that a CPP organization might consider
for striking a balance between including private actors and giving them too
much influence. Regional CPP agencies could take similar approaches to those
of RTOs or the NPCC, either excluding utilities from voting and giving them a
role through membership or interested party status in advisory committees, or
including utilities in final decisions but constraining their voting authority or
watering it down by giving nonutility entities more votes. Such strategies
would involve the utilities while providing protection for the public interest.
As shown by the NPCC approach, utilities are not the only stakeholders
that will need at least a strong advisory role within interstate CPP agencies (due
to their operations being affected by carbon reduction rules and their
understanding of which approaches might be the most effective in reducing
CO2 emissions). Citizen groups consisting of electricity consumers who will be
affected by generation changes and associated price changes, environmental
groups that have long advocated for changes in the generation mix, and other
nonprofit entities should have the ability to at least participate in an advisory
capacity.
Interstate CPP agencies will also need to include federal representatives, at
least in an advisory capacity, because of the overarching federal structure of the
CPP. At a minimum, these representatives will need to include FERC—the
agency that writes rules for transmission planning, generator interconnection,
and wholesale electricity sales—and the EPA, which will review and approve
382. Council Bylaws, supra note 348 (―The Council may establish such advisory committees as a
majority of its members deem appropriate to assist it in carrying out its functional and responsibilities.‖).
383. Generating Resources Advisory Committee, NW. POWER & CONSERVATION COUNCIL (Nov.
15, 2014), https://www.nwcouncil.org/energy/grac/home/.
384. Id.
385. See NORTHWEST POWER & CONSERVATION COUNCIL, GENERATING RESOURCES ADVISORY
COMMITTEE (GRAC) 2014 MEMBERSHIPS (AS OF 11/2014) 1 (2014), https://www.nwcouncil.org/media/
7148488/gracmember-2014_11.pdf (showing members such as Clark Public Utilities, Grant County
PUD [Public Utility District], Idaho Power, and the Flathead Electric Cooperative).
386. Id. at 1 (showing members such as the California Energy Commission, Oregon Department of
Energy, and Idaho Public Utilities Commission).
387. Id. (showing Renewable Northwest as a member); Our Story, RENEWABLE NW., http://www.
rnp.org/node/our-story (last visited Aug. 10, 2015) (explaining that Renewable Northwest is a 501(c)(3)
organization with a mission ―to promote the expansion of environmentally responsible renewable energy
resources in the Northwest‖).
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multistate plans and individual state plans with regional coordination. These
federal representatives likely should not have voting authority, as the states
retain jurisdiction to decide specific CPP approaches, but they will play an
important role in advising the states of potential legal snags to their proposed
interstate approaches or other flaws in their plans that could cause the EPA to
later reject it.
Lessons for including a federal representative in an advisory role once
again come from the NPCC, which includes representatives from the Army
Corps of Engineers as interested parties on GRAC.388 Because the Corps must
permit dredging and filling for new hydroelectric dams or changes to existing
ones, it can alert the committee to any generation decisions that might implicate
Corps permitting and might be beneficial or problematic from a Corps
perspective.389 The NPCC also includes as interested parties federal
representatives from the Lawrence Berkeley National Laboratory (LNBL),
which conducts studies regarding the interconnection of generation to the grid,
among other technical studies.390 An LBNL representative could also be highly
valuable to regional CPP decisions or similar decisions made under other
potential carbon reduction approaches.
Beyond defining the voting members of the regional CPP agency and
stakeholders who will consistently be defined as ―interested parties‖ or similar
entities who have a guaranteed advisory capacity role, interstate agencies will
have to establish procedures for making rules and modifying them. The
following subpart explores these issues.
D. Decision-Making Procedures
The states that take a more formal approach to regional CPP governance
than the collaborative discussion models represented by current talks among
MSEER, PJM, and WECC regulators will need to decide on a process for
identifying and analyzing priority issues, resolving conflicts, agreeing upon
interstate CPP policies, and allowing for entry and exit. Given the variety of
key stakeholders identified in Part III.C., this process will need to have
mechanisms for input and for making a final decision. States will need to
decide whether to appoint a leader of the interstate entity, who might have the
role of initiating the process of identifying and voting upon priority areas and
policies. Addressing this range of procedural issues is crucial for
operationalizing hybrid regional governance structures in an effective way. As
with the prior three elements, existing regional entities—specifically RGGI and
NPCC—provide helpful models for how these decision-making procedures
might be established for a regional CPP entity.

388.
389.
390.

Id.
Id.
Id.
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With respect to the first issue of procedures for identifying issues and
exploring them with the input of stakeholders, RGGI has developed approaches
that might translate well into the regional CPP context. For the formation of
RGGI policies and implementation strategies, chief executives from state
environmental and energy agencies, such as secretaries of these agencies, led
the effort and decided on ―key policy issues.‖391 But they did so only after
receiving input from a staff working group comprised of environmental and
energy agency officials from each state and from working groups overseen by a
steering committee.392 Specific subgroups were also formed to conduct
―background research,‖ suggest stakeholder input processes, and draft the
model rule.393 These subgroups met and prepared a variety of issue papers,
which were extensively debated, and the staff working group then released a
―package proposal,‖ which was discussed at a large stakeholder meeting.394
The working group, after addressing comments from the meeting, sent the
proposal package ―to the Agency Chief Executives for their approval,‖ after
which the Governors of the participating states began ―intense negotiations‖
and agreed upon a MOU.395 Although the voting structure for agreeing upon
this MOU is not reported, it appears that the vote had to be unanimous, as
agreement on an MOU was reached only after Massachusetts and Rhode Island
initially withdrew from RGGI.396
This RGGI approach to deliberation potentially fits a CPP interstate
organization well because of its combination of state governmental leadership
and extensive stakeholder input. Because the CPP involves energy and
environmental law,397 it makes sense to have leaders from both sets of state
agencies in charge of the process. However, given the quantity of
nongovernmental stakeholders, and their crucial roles in implementation,398
involving them in a meaningful way is also important. Working groups paired
with subgroups addressing issues in more depth provides a helpful mechanism
for obtaining input to shape the implementation approach. These groups can
also serve as a forum for addressing the political differences within regions.399
Regarding the second issue of final decision-making procedures within the
regional entity, the NPCC provides an instructive model for the CPP context.
The NPCC elects a chair and vice chair ―[a]t the first meeting of each calendar
year.‖400 The chair is the presiding officer for all meetings and ―sets the date,
391. See REGIONAL GREENHOUSE GAS INITIATIVE (―RGGI‖) STAKEHOLDER GRP., OUTLINE OF
KEY POLICY ISSUES (2004), http://www.rggi.org/docs/revisedoutline _5_20_04.pdf.
392. CTR. FOR RES. SOLUTIONS, supra note 370, at 3–4.
393. Id.
394. Id. at 5.
395. Id.
396. Id. at 5–6.
397. See supra Part I.
398. See supra Part III.C.
399. See supra Part II.B.
400. Council Bylaws, supra note 348.
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time, place and agenda‖ of all meetings.401 He or she also chooses the chairs of
any committees assigned to address specific tasks, has the authority to execute
documents on behalf of the Council, and, along with an executive committee,
oversees Council staff.402 Most actions of the Council must be taken by
majority vote, although amending the Power Plan prepared by the Council
requires a supermajority vote.403
This combination of majority and supermajority voting could be a helpful
approach for the CPP, especially given the differences in politics and goals
among states that could cause conflict for certain issues.404 Substantive
interstate CPP agency decisions about the specific building blocks that will be
used to comply with the CPP—decisions that could fundamentally affect each
state‘s generation resources—should perhaps be subject to supermajority or
unanimous vote requirements. Laxer voting requirements for such important
decisions could make states hesitant to join an interstate CPP agency, as they
would be concerned that other states could substantively impact within-state
generation policy. More minor matters that would be less likely to raise state
concerns about the loss of in-state authority over generation decisions, such as
how CO2 emissions would be measured and accounted for, should potentially
be subject to laxer voting requirements such as majority support. Requiring all
interstate CPP decisions to be made by supermajority or unanimous votes
might unacceptably delay regional decision-making processes and make them
too burdensome.
Beyond considering majority versus supermajority or other forms of
voting for different types of CPP decision making, interstate entities will need
to resolve whether each state will have one vote—as states do in most of the
existing regional organizations that we use as models—or whether certain
states will have more votes based on their population, electricity consumption,
generation capacity, or another factor. Giving states weighted votes based on
these types of factors might be an impossible compromise to reach. Small states
would feel that they had too little power within a weighted voting scheme.
Moreover, the fact that states with larger populations and more generation
capacity were willing to agree upon a one-state, one-vote scheme for RGGI
suggests that this might be the most manageable approach.
Finally, states will need to establish procedures for adding states to and
allowing states to leave these cooperative relationships. If states discover that
the trading partners that they have chosen do not provide the least expensive
opportunities for obtaining low-carbon generation, they may wish to swap out
partners for others, and the regional entity that governs electricity flow through
the grid will need to have advance knowledge of these changes. The form that

401.
402.
403.
404.

Council Bylaws, supra note 348.
Id.
Id.
See supra Part II.B.
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these procedures can take will be shaped to some extent by which cooperative
option states have chosen under the CPP. Membership alterations will be most
straightforward in the scenarios in which states have individual plans but the
plans allow utilities to trade with utilities in other states.
As with other procedural issues, RGGI provides a helpful model for
simple entrance and exit procedures that would facilitate evolution in response
to changing market conditions, needs, and politics. Article 5 of the RGGI MOU
provides that new states can join with the consent of existing states, and can
exit by providing a 30-day notice. Remaining states then adjust their allowance
usage to account for those of the withdrawing state. RGGI also contains a
procedure for removal of states through its by-laws.405 RGGI has used both the
new signatory and withdrawal procedures to add states and allow states to
leave. For example, its Second Amendment to the MOU adds Maryland, and
the RGGI allowed New Jersey to withdraw, which could serve as a model in
the CPP context.406
What makes the RGGI approach useful for interstate approaches to CPP
implementation is that it provides easy-to-use mechanisms for change, but
ensures that existing members have some input in the change process. They
have the opportunity to consent before a new state joins, helping to ensure that
any concerns of member states are addressed. The withdrawal mechanism
allows a state total control over exit—which many states might require as a
condition for joining, as they would not want to cede their authority over
implementation—but also makes sure that the remaining states reexamine the
existing arrangement to maintain its functionality. These two mechanisms
would work well within an interstate organization created for states with
individual plans who want a formal collaboration arrangement with significant
flexibility.
This Part has focused on key components of developing interstate entities
to assist regions—whether they match the boundaries of existing energy
regions or not—that have the inclination and political will to do so. We think
that such entities have important advantages in addressing the federalism and
governance challenges, in that they could help create a fully coordinated
approach that can maximize the benefits of economies of scale and other
regional benefits explored above. In many cases, however, states will likely
follow less formal regional processes than those explored here given their
political differences and their preferences for maintaining individual solutions
or simply adopting the ready-for-trade federal approach to the CPP. But
405. REG‘L GREENHOUSE GAS INITIATIVE, MEMORANDUM OF UNDERSTANDING 9 (2005),
http://www.rggi.org/docs/mou_final_12_20_05.pdf.
406. REG‘L GREENHOUSE GAS INITIATIVE, NEW JERSEY, NOTICE OF WITHDRAWAL OF
AGREEMENT TO THE RGGI MEMORANDUM OF UNDERSTANDING, REGIONAL GREENHOUSE GAS
INITIATIVE
(2011),
http://www.rggi.org/docs/Documents/NJ-Statement_112911.pdf;
REG‘L
GREENHOUSE GAS INITIATIVE, SECOND AMENDMENT TO MEMORANDUM OF UNDERSTANDING (2006),
http://www.rggi.org/docs/mou_second_amend.pdf.
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because many states‘ generation systems are already deeply embedded within a
regional grid, many states rely heavily on electricity imports, and all economic
studies to-date point to regional solutions being far cheaper than state-centric
ones, these states are likely to at least seriously consider and discuss interstate
and regional solutions if not ultimately deciding to implement them. The
stakeholders included in these processes and the tools used for exploring
technical areas—employing working groups and other advisory bodies, for
example—can be equally instructive for formal regional governance and looser
state discussions about potential CPP solutions.
CONCLUSION
The CPP and similar carbon emissions regulations likely to be
promulgated in the future provide an important, transformational opportunity to
bring together the fields of environmental and energy law—a melding of law
that will be necessary if we are to effectively address climate change and meet
our voluntary national commitments under the Paris Agreement. Whether states
oppose or support the CPP and similar regulatory approaches, many are
beginning the process of making substantial changes in their approach to
energy to meet CPP goals or similar carbon reduction targets. States are also
starting to address changing markets that are driving the growth of resources
like renewable energy generation.407 But as this Article explores in depth, the
complexities of integrating energy and environmental law and their associated
state, regional, and federal governance structures could create difficulties for
effective implementation of the CPP or other carbon emissions regulations or
for expansion of opportunities to innovate. The regional physical, market, and
governance structure of energy makes it important for states to take advantage
of the interstate collaboration options allowed by the CPP to maximize utilities‘
provision of affordable, clean, and reliable electricity under the plan.408
Developing functional interstate solutions that harmonize with regional
energy governance is urgent because the implementation actions states take
now involve infrastructure choices and investments that will remain with them
for years to come. If states ―go it alone‖ or establish limited collaborations that
do not map well onto their energy markets, their initial decisions may make
longer-term collaboration harder. The key actors in implementation of any
carbon emissions reduction regime—the EPA, FERC, states, utilities, regional
grid organizations, nongovernmental organizations, etc.—have consistently
acknowledged the benefits of interstate cooperation. The detailed multistate
options within the EPA‘s final plan, MSEER‘s and other regional regulators‘
multiple meetings, and the many analyses of the economic benefits of interstate
collaboration in this context, are all a promising start.409
407.
408.
409.

See States’ Reactions, supra note 309.
See supra Parts I & II.
See supra Part I.B & I.E.
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This Article‘s institutional analysis aims to complement these efforts and
provide states with models and options for developing interstate entities that
can facilitate collaboration. Its approach maps how a hybrid regional
governance approach could help to address the challenges posed by the existing
structure of relevant energy and environmental law and institutions. Although
we recognize that in a number of regions, states likely will not opt to create a
new regional implementing institution, further development of existing
institutions or establishment of new regional entities could greatly assist a fuller
integration of state planning that would allow states to maximize the benefits of
collaboration. Moreover, even if states decide on a weaker form of
collaboration, the elements of institutional development that we analyze in Part
III—choice of agency, decision-making authority, stakeholder representation,
and decision-making procedures—should be key discussion points.
Addressing these questions in the CPP context is critical not only for the
implementation of this important regulation but also because these issues are
arising repeatedly as our energy system continues its transition and are driving
multiple forms of institutional experimentation.410 The grid is becoming
smarter—with more options for demand response, consumer input, and energy
storage—and the two main systems using energy, electricity and transportation,
are becoming more integrated.411 Moreover, consensus science suggests that
the need to address climate change, both in terms of controlling emissions and
responding to the impacts of climate change, including impacts on electricity
and transportation infrastructure, will only become more urgent.412 This
Article‘s novel assessment of how to integrate existing state and regional
institutions and develop additional ones provides a model for the types of
federalism and governance pathways needed to bring together energy and
environmental law.
In this broader context, the CPP serves as an important testing ground—a
key area in which government regulators will need to bring together the
substantively and structurally mismatched energy and environmental laws and
agencies, and more closely address the regional character of the interstate grid.
Forging functional interstate institutional solutions for carbon emissions
reductions can thus provide an important model moving forward. While this
Article‘s solutions are certainly no panacea for the many challenges facing
carbon emissions reduction or the energy system, they fill a gap in current

410.
411.
412.

Osofsky & Wiseman, supra note 40.
Id.
See EPA, CLIMATE CHANGE INDICATORS IN THE UNITED STATES (2014),
http://www3.epa.gov/climatechange/pdfs/climateindicators-full-2014.pdf; INTERGOV‘TAL PANEL ON
CLIMATE CHANGE, CLIMATE CHANGE 2014: IMPACTS, ADAPTATION, AND VULNERABILITY: SUMMARY
FOR POLICYMAKERS (2014).
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resources for regional collaboration and can assist states in their efforts to find
solutions that best serve their citizens.

We welcome responses to this Article. If you are interested in submitting a response for our
online companion journal, Ecology Law Currents, please contact cse.elq@law.berkeley.edu.
Responses to articles may be viewed at our website, http://www.ecologylawquarterly.org.
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